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As the title implies, introduction of a weapons system
is an evolution involving the interfacing of a set or several
sets of players, led or persuaded by an individual, a group,
or an organization, who/that may or may not properly consider
the whos, hows, whens, and wheres of communicating their
thoughts, ideas, or desires. By demonstrating behavior in
the weapons system introduction arena through the presenta-
tion of six in depth case studies, the authors attempt to
meaningfully expose students to the inexorably powerful, but
often neglected, role that these fundamental communications/
coordination considerations exert in the routine prosecution
of project management. In the process, focus will be directed
toward the dynamic inter and intra relationships existing be-
tween users and/or producers who participated in the Fleet
Introduction of the MK-48 Torpedo Weapons System. It is the
desire of the authors to not only provide some finite insight
to specific problems, but to also impart to the student a
strong personal identification with and appreciation for the
real life pressures and exigencies that manifest in the atmos-
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Philosophically, it is indeed satisfying to know that
man's ability to communicate with his fellow man makes vir-
tually none of his problems unassailable. This unique human
capability is exercised almost continuously from the time one
wakes until the time one retires, with little or no conscious
appreciation for the unlimited horizons that it opens up for
us. The problems we solve by exercising this ability through-
out the course of a single day really comprise a mixed bag:
finding ones pin-striped shirt, passively weighing the ad-
vice of the traffic helo in selecting the optimal route to
work, dealing with the varied exigencies of the day, choosing
the best course of action in ones investment program, plan-
ning a recreational venture, dealing with the problems of
the household, and romantically negotiating the mutual sat-
isfaction of sexual desires.
In and of themselves, none of these problems is monumen-
tal in nature. However, each requires special care in deal-
ing with when we elect to use communications as a means to
solve it. Once that decision is made, we must not only de-
cide who to communicate with, but also how, when, and often
where to communicate.
In dealing with the "who" question it is necessary to
appreciate that man need not be constrained by his own edu-
cation, ingenuity, past experience, or area of expertise.
His ability to communicate permits him to take advantage of

these traits in others and use them selectively to solve a
problem. Often he may find it necessary to coordinate these
efforts and bring them together to bear on a problem.
The "how" question deals not only with the medium to be
used, but the manner in which the communication is carried
off. The range here runs from romantic in nature to adver-
sary in nature, and there is a use for all natures in the
spectrum.
The "when" question deals with the timing of the communi-
cation. Plagiarizing Ecclesiastes (Chapter 3, Verses 1
through 8), "There is a time and place for everything," com-
munications included. Simply put, one has only to review
the mixed bag of problems to develop an intuitive feel for
the importance of communications timing.
The "where" question deals with geographic appropriate-
ness, "your turf or mine," and the type of atmosphere most
likely to enhance the communication effort. The comments
addressed to the "when" question also apply.
From all this follows the suggestion that the more com-
plicated a problem be, the more carefully we must deal with
the whos, the hows, the whens, and the wheres of communica-
tions. Also, as the number of communicators involved in a
problem increases, so too must the effort involved in deal-
ing with these questions.
As the title seeks to imply, introduction of a weapons
system is an evolution involving the interfacing of a set or
several sets of players, led or persuaded by an individual,
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a group, or an organization, who/that may or may not proper-
ly consider the whos, hows, whens, and wheres of communica-
ting their thoughts, ideas, or desires.
Accordingly, it is our intent to meaningfully expose
students to the inexorably powerful, but often neglected,
role that these fundamental communication/coordination con-
siderations exert in the routine prosecution of project man-
agement. To do this we will focus on the dynamic inter and
intra relationships existing between users and/or producers
who participated in the Fleet Introduction of the MK-48 Tor-
pedo Weapons System (TWS). We desire to not only provide
some finite insight to specific problems, but to also impart
to the student a strong personal identification with and
appreciation for the real life pressures and exigencies that
manifest in the atmosphere of severe time and money versus
quality constraints.
Six case studies have been compiled to forcefully illus-
trate the essentiality of meaningfully conceived communica-
tions/coordination in planning and executing fleet introduction
of a weapons system. Each case has been thoroughly research-
ed, and a considerable effort has been made to resurrect the
vital details surrounding events which actually occurred dur-
ing Fleet Introduction of the MK-48 TWS. The factual content
of each case has been reviewed by the Project Manager's Of-
fice (PMO).
For clarification of the acronyms used through this































In order to "set the stage", provide perspective/orien-
tation for dealing with specific cases, and instill an appre-
ciation for the scope of program involvement, a brief
chronological history of the MK-48 TWS program follows.
Ever since termination of World War II, there have been
visionaries within the U.S. Navy who have recognized the
need for and pressed for development of a more versatile
torpedo than was available in the 1940' s. In their estimate,
the steam and electric driven, straight-running torpedoes of
the war years offered little offensive capability against a
submerged submarine. Despite the fact that this view was
shared by several people in the Navy, little effort was di-
rected toward overcoming this deficiency during the early
post war years. However, the minimal effort applied resulted
in the introduction of the MK-27 acoustic homing torpedo, a
weapon designed from the ground up to attack submerged sub-
marines. Although it was not a very effective torpedo,
principally due to the novelty of concepts employed, it rep-
resented the first attempt to design a self guided anti-sub-
marine weapon. The lessons learned with the MK-27 torpedo
elicited the introduction of a more sophisticated MK-37
acoustic torpedo in the early 1950' s. The MK-37 torpedo
proved relatively effective against snorkeling submarines,
primarily due to the ability of the torpedo to home-in on
the noise of the diesel engines. Additionally, if the
14

2firing ship was able to develop a fire control solution
accurate enough to ensure the MK-37 torpedo gets close
enough to the target, it also proved itself fairly effective
against quiet submarines running submerged on the battery.
Use of the MK-37 torpedo against surface ships was severely
constrained by its slow speed and small warhead. Most sur-
face ships could outrun the MK-37 torpedo, and its warhead
was simply too small to do much damage, let alone sink a
surface ship of any size.
During the process of refining the MK-37 torpedo in the
mid 1950' s, the nuclear submarine became a reality. It was
a true submersible and its performance capability, in terms
of depth, speed, and maneuverability, proved an order of
magnitude beyond that of the conventional submarine. Al-
though considerable effort was directed toward improving the
MK-37 torpedo to permit it to deal effectively with the nu-
clear submarine, the need for a torpedo, designed from in-
ception, to attack the extremely capable nuclear submarine
became quite obvious to all concerned. In addition to the
2 Fire control solution — Submarines are equipped with
fire control equipment which received target data inputs
from both the ship's sensors (i.e. sonar, periscopes, and
radar) and manually. Manual inputs are based upon intelli-
gence, manual calculations, and the desired torpedo perform-
ance profile. The fire control equipment processes this
information and outputs a solution called the fire control
solution; namely target position (range, bearing, and depth,
if target is a Submarine), target course, and target speed.
This solution is displayed to the operator of the equipment
and it generates and transmits to the torpedo the commands
necessary to guide it to the target. Surface ships are
equipped with similar equipment.
15

nuclear submarine threat and the efforts to counter it, it
became quite apparent that torpedo inventories were insuffi-
cient to cope with foreseen scenarios. These two factors
provided the first real impetus to develop an anti-submarine
torpedo capable of killing all breeds of submarines.
In May 1962, the Navy solicited proposals for develop-
ment of the EX-10 torpedo in the Commerce Business Daily
,
officially setting into motion the effort which would even-
tually become known as the MK-48 TWS program. Initially,
management of the EX-10 torpedo development effort was exer-
cised by a Bureau of Weapons (BUWEPS) Division Director; the
first full time staff member was assigned in June 1962. Con-
tractor proposals were screened during the summer of 1962,
and by September 1962 torpedo development competition had
been reduced to five companies. During that same month, an
official EX-10 Project Office was established to work with
existing BUWEPS functional groups (i.e. Torpedo Division and
Fire Control Division). Ordnance Research Laboratory at
Pennsylvania State University (ORL/PSU) was designated the
Navy's Torpedo Development Technical Director in October 1962,
and in December 1962, the first "Program Manager", a Navy
Lieutenant Commander, was designated. At this point the
Program Manager (PM) had an office staff comprised of two
people who worked with the aforementioned functional groups.
3This organization remained until 1965 when the PM ' s staff
3 See Exhibit 1 for original program organization.
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was expanded to handle coordination of all functions in-
house.
By February 1963, torpedo development competition was
reduced to three companies, and development contract quota-
tions were received from each. In May 1963, Office of the
Secretary of Defense (OSD) requested that the EX-10 go
4through a modified system definition process, as a proto-
type program. "Project Definition" contracts were negotiated
with Westinghouse Electric Corporation (WECO) and the CLEVITE
Corporation (CLEVITE). As a result of a 1969 merger, CLEVITE
became the Oceans Systems Division of Gould Incorporated.
Costs and technical proposals were received in October 1963,
and requotations were requested from both companies in Jan-
uary 1964. In May 1964, WECO was approved as the successful
contractor. In June 1964, contracts were negotiated with
WECO for development of the MK-48 MOD-0 torpedo, and a sole-
source contract was negotiated with Singer-Librascope Com-
pany for development of the fire control system modifications
necessary to support the new torpedo. At this point the
4 Modified system definition process -- the initial
attempt of the McNamara OSD to employ "Contract Definition."
"Contract Definition" was a McNamara originated formal pro-
cedure which preceded full-scale development. During "Con-
tract Definition", preliminary engineering and contract and
management planning were accomplished in order to arrive at
realistic design characteristics, cost estimates, schedule
estimates, and definition of high risk areas, as well as
definition of system interfaces and management responsibil-
ities. The ultimate objective of "Contract Definition" was




EX-10 Project became the MK-48 Torpedo Weapons System Pro-
gram. The conceptual studies undertaken by the Navy prior
to entering into the system definition and subsequent devel-
opment contracts had received a wide range of very high
level scrutiny. There were those in the Office of the Chief
of Naval Operations (OPNAV) and the Department of Defense
(DOD) who felt that the technical complexities being under-
taken were of sufficient magnitude for the Navy to initiate
5back-up efforts in the areas of primary concern. Formal
proposals that such efforts be undertaken were initiated by
both the Chief of Naval Operations (CNO) and DOD during the
same month that the contract was signed with WECO. During
the period July thru December 1964, the two man Project
Office Staff (POS) made fifteen major presentations to gain
support for various aspects of back-up programs. The kinetic
effects and potential magnitude of the program began to pick
up and intensify interest at all levels. In November 1964,
the POS was increased to four persons, and a Navy Captain
replaced the incumbent Navy Lieutenant Commander as PM. In
December 1964, a back-up program was approved and contracts
were signed with CLEVITE, General Dynamics (GD), General
Electric (GE), and Honeywell. In June 1965, VITRO Labora-
tories (VITRO), Peat, Marwick, and Livingston (PML) , and
Operations Research Incorporated (ORI) were placed under
5 See Exhibits 2, 3 and 4 for organization of DOD, De-




contract to assist the PM in his effort to meet the new
CNO/DOD requirement that Fleet Introduction be accelerated.
In December 1965, the POS was increased to 25 persons to
handle the increased workload.
By August 1965, the MK-48 TWS Project Manager's Office
(PMO) felt it necessary to caution WECO regarding its lag-
ging development effort. These delays were brought about by
a number of technical problems that took WECO by surprise
and they were amplified by their refusal to carry on a mean-
ingful dialogue with ORL/PSU, the Torpedo Technical Director.
By March 1966, WECO had completed its first in-water run of
the new MK-48 MOD-0 torpedo, and, in the Navy's opinion,
with serious technical difficulties. By July 1966, disagree-
ment regarding program Technical status reached a crescendo,
with the Project Office zeroing in on the unsatisfactory
acoustic performance of the WECO torpedo. Advances were,
however, being made in some project areas. An example of
this was the Librascope MK-48-0 submarine fire control modi-
fication, which was completed and successfully installed in
a Submarine, the USS JACK. Despite the advances, attention
was still focused on the torpedo difficulties. In October
1966, for the first time, WECO admitted belief that there
would be a "small" program schedule slip. In December 1966,
the Navy called a top level meeting with WECO management and
presented its findings. It was agreed that the development
effort was at least six to eight months behind.
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At this juncture it is appropriate to provide some addi-
tional background information to clearly illuminate the key
forces which, in the opinion of CNO and the PMO, appear to
have generated the expressed problems. First, the complexity
of the envisioned weapons system was not correctly assessed
by WECO, and it had not been fully appreciated at all key
levels within the Navy. The torpedo contract and the fire
control contracts were executed as fixed price incentive
(FPI) type contracts. As it turned out, the fire control
contract was well within the capabilities of Singer-Libra-
scope, but the torpedo development requirements were far
beyond WECO's estimates. This problem was seriously com-
pounded by the fact that WECO's management attention to
technical hiatuses proved insufficient. In the stated opin-
ion of CNO, the Navy PM was placed in the awkward and tenuous
position of being unable to manage the WECO contract as well
as he might have been able to manage a cost plus (CP) type
contract. As it was, he was able only to "view with alarm"
the contractor's failure to meet set objectives. Unfortu-
nately, the contractor was not the only difficult player.
The records indicate that ORL/PSU, the Torpedo Technical
Director, because of difficulty in eliciting required infor-
mation from the contractor, failed to push sufficiently to
uncover potential technical difficulties, ostensibly under
their purview, in a timely fashion. The latter failure fur-
ther extended the time required for the PM to gather suffi-
cient evidence to take the contractor to task. However, the
20

PM's dogged pursuit of convincing evidence reached a climac-
tic point in February 1967 when both WECO and ORL/PSU inter-
nal management suffered severe shake ups. Both reorganized
and restaffed their efforts in the MK-48 TWS area. By April
1967, ORL/PSU efforts to rout out problems began to produce
results, and detailed electronics problems were finally
being identified. During the same month, a warhead/exploder
back-up program was initiated.
As events progressed, it became necessary to enlist the
assistance of a number of additional activities, commands,
agencies, etc., separate from the primary contractor, to
ensure successful prosecution of the program. This prolif-
eration of involved agencies concurrently complicated total
program management problems and increased expense. Many of
these efforts, as it turned out, did produce data and tech-
nical support that were required by the primary contractor.
Such additional efforts would, in the opinion of some, have
far exceeded original contractor cost estimates, had WECO
attempted to extend their development effort to pay for same
under the existing FPI contract. WECO did (no doubt gladly)
make selective use of the additional information.
Additional effort to develop the torpedo was now being
provided by: Defense Research Laboratory, University of
Texas (DRL) (simulation capability which monitored torpedo
versus target reaction time -- This information was used
primarily to debug the WECO acoustic homing system.), GD
(Electric Boat Division) (evaluation of tests of torpedo
21

sonar systems in varying open-ocean environments), Honeywell
Corp. (special underwater testing instrumentation and tech-
niques which measured torpedo "close-in" homing performance
in open-ocean, without expending torpedoes), GE (special
studies and analysis of torpedo acoustic and homing system),
Operations Research Inc. (ORI ) (operation analysis of entire
torpedo sequence from decision to fire to impact or reattack,
reliability design analysis of system/component/element
interfaces, and safety analysis of all torpedo internal sys-
tems), Naval Undersea Warfare Center, Pasadena (NUWC) (ocean/
target/torpedo guidance interface simulation to study effects
of parameters in sanitary versus count ermeasure environments),
ORL/PSU (designed research model of MK-48 homing system,
interfaced data received from multiple studies and analyses
to pin-point electronic deficiencies, and fed results to
WECO to close gaps in problem areas and areas where no WECO
evaluation efforts were being prosecuted), Naval Ordnance
Station, Indian Head (NOS/IH) (studies/tests to improve MK-48
fuel consumption efficiency), Naval Ship Research and Devel-
opment Center (NSRDC) (water tunnel proofing of torpedo hy-
drodynamic stability and control systems), General Motors
(GM) (parallel torpedo exploder development to ensure ade-
quate design in light of serious WECO exploder deficiencies),
and CLEVITE (development of an alternate sonar acoustics
package with a special "comb filter" countermeasure feature
and development of a test vehicle to test same, in light of
inability of WECO to make an operational MK-48 torpedo
22

available to CLEVITE). All of these efforts were in addi-
tion to those of the prime contractor, and all were directed
solely toward torpedo development. It is important to rec-
ognize, however, that the torpedo, although in the star role,
was but a single part in the overall scenario of the MK-48
TWS. Various major support sub-systems were also being de-
veloped. These efforts were kept, for the most part, inside
the Navy house and were being accomplished through Systems
Command Field Activities/Project Office Functional Tasks.
In June 1967, even as the first fire control production
contract was awarded to Librascope, the torpedo continued to
have acoustic, electronic, and reliability problems. These
problems were once again clearly demonstrated in July 1967
when the first full in-water prototype acoustics test proved
unsatisfactory. The new WECO management team had an extreme-
ly unenviable challenge, since they faced not only yet un-
solved technical problems, but also a projected contractual
ceiling over-run of $10 to $15 million. The prime contrac-
tor, needless to say, was not highly motivated to venture
into the world of new torpedo designs. Rather, he was bent
on making something acceptible out of existing design/hard-
ware. Fully recognizing WECO's plight, the Navy continued
to make available to WECO all of the information being de-
rived from the myriad of back-up programs.
In September 1967, WECO conducted the first Production
Prototype Torpedo (PPT) in-water run; this marked the end of
Development Prototype Torpedo (DPT) fabrication. Meanwhile,
23

CLEVITE had, under the 1965 and 1966 contracts, succeeded in
developing the back-up acoustic panel and test vehicle.
These successes were facilitated by the close CLEVITE/Navy
relationship afforded by the CPI contracts. Accordingly, it
was to no ones surprise that CLEVITE 's test vehicle looked
much like what a MK-48 torpedo was supposed to look like.
By spring 1967, it appeared that the new test vehicle/
torpedo design and engineering were in some aspects superior
to the WECO MK-48-0 torpedo. In June 1967, CNO directed
that efforts be redirected to consider expanding the CLEVITE
test vehicle/sonar panel effort into a MK-48 MOD-1 torpedo,
as a complete back-up for the WECO MK-48-0. The MK-48-
1
torpedo was to utilize the same fire control and launching
systems as the MK-48-0 torpedo.
The June 1967 CNO direction also addressed another key
area. While the MK-48 TWS Program had been underway to pro-
duce a viable anti-submarine capability, other lower profile,
minimally funded, and totally separate efforts had been un-
derway within the Navy to produce a submarine launched, anti-
surface ship torpedo. A new torpedo was needed to replace
the WWII steam driven torpedoes which were getting old and
waning in number, but represented the only existing anti-
surface ship torpedoes in the submarine force inventories.
Funds for the development of a new anti-surface ship torpedo
were exhausted in January 1967, but considerable interest in
upgrading the anti-surface ship capability of the submarine
force prevailed within DOD and CNO. In March 1967, DOD
24

specifically asked CNO to develop the MK-48 torpedo as an
anti-surface ship, as well as an anti-submarine weapon.
Thus, the June 1967 CNO direction also required that the
CLEVITE effort include integration of the anti-surface ship
capability. The final impetus for CNO's decision had, in
fact, been provided by CLEVITE. CLEVITE' s new test vehicle
was powered by an extremely efficient engine, thus reducing
the fuel requirements necessary to equal MK-48-0 torpedo
performance. The space savings due to the reduced on-board
fuel stowage requirements made available sufficient room in
the torpedo to install a larger warhead, specifically, one
capable of sinking a major combatant surface ship. Accord-
ingly, as a result of this development, CNO's June 1967 pro-
nouncement concurrently directed that WECO's MK-48-0 torpedo
also be considered as a candidate for dual capability.
In August 1967, Naval Ordnance Systems Command (NAVORD),
formerly BUWEPS, outlined a program which provided for es-
tablishment of the CLEVITE effort as the MK-48-1, continua-
tion of WECO's MK-48-0 effort, and the parallel WECO
development of a dual purpose MK-48 MOD-2 torpedo. Funding
in the MK-48-2 area was limited only to those characteris-
tics unique to an anti-surface ship weapon.
Concurrent technical/operational evaluation officially
began in September 1967, but, during the fall of 1967, WECO's
MK-48-0 PPT in-water performance continued to be unsatisfac-
tory. The acoustic system, torpedo transducer, warhead, and
exploder specifications were among the major areas of noted
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deficiency. ORL/PSU continued to turn up various electronic
problems which the Navy considered, in many cases, to be
basic and "attributable to inadequate implementation of
functional electronic design." By November 1967 the MK-48
Project Office recommended that the program be delayed nine
months to correct technical difficulties. Since previous
schedule slips had already consumed eight months, the program
now faced a 17 month slip from the original program schedule.
WECO clung to an opinion that there would be no more than a
2§ month slip, at the most. By December 1967, WECO and the
Navy reached a stand-off: In addition to firm disagreement
as to how much the schedule would have to slip to correct
technical problems, there was also disagreement on the course
of action necessary to correct identified deficiencies. The
Navy recommended certain major component redesign, but the
agreed plan for a solution, reached later in December, ex-
cluded any such major redesign as WECO continued to reject
recommendations that such steps were required. With all
this as a background, the MK-48 Project Office and ORL/PSU
(WECO reluctantly agreed that they would cooperate, but that
such action was unnecessary. ) formed plans to slip the WECO
program the additional nine months and to continue to fully
prosecute parallel development. Fleet and Type Commanders
were notified at this point of the approximate nine month
slip in Technical/Operational Evaluation requirements.
a.
Quote from a 1967 CNO memo.
26

Based on data generated by reaction to his June 1967
direction, CNO acted again in December 1967 by providing the
following guidelines to all concerned regarding the course
of action the MK-48 TWS Program was to take:
A) "Vigorously prosecute MK-48-0 development."
B) "Expand CLEVITE effort to provide a MK-48-1 develop-
ment."
C) "With reference to the MK-48 MOD-2, only that effort
which is common with MOD-1 should be taken through
FY-69. A decision should be reached prior to FY-70
as to which dual purpose version will enter engineer-
ing development."
Thus, in early 1968, new project organizational relation-
ships were established to handle an increasing program. The
project now had to be further expanded to include management
of the CLEVITE MK-48-1 development. Outside agency support
requirements were also further expanded. By. Spring 1968,
the MK-48 TWS Program Management structure consisted of two
closely coordinated, but parallel torpedo development ef-
forts within NAVORD. Management of the MK-48-0/2 WECO ef-
fort was under the direct cognizance of a MK-48-0/2 Project
Officer (ORD 055), while management of the MK-48-1 effort
was assigned to a separate Project Officer (ORD 054). Both
7ORD 055 and ORD 054 were Navy Captains.
7 See Exhibit 5 for new PMO organization.
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ORD 055' s responsibilities, in addition to those directly
related to MK-48-0/2 development, included development of the
MK-27 Mobile Torpedo Target (MTT), the modifications to ex-
isting Fleet fire control and launcher equipments (to adapt
both to accommodate all versions of the MK-48 torpedo), and
logistic support of the entire weapons system. His technical
advisor for MK-48-0/2 remained ORL/PSU. Specific technical
direction for MK-48-0/2 torpedo development and for Libra-
scope fire control modifications was provided by Naval Under-
water Systems Center, Newport, R.I. (NUSC). This arrangement
satisfied two additional requirements: First, it took the
pressure off of ORL/PSU and permitted them to devote greater
attention to correcting the myriad of MK-48-0/2 technical
problems; Second, it was the initial step down a prearranged
path which provided for NUSC assuming ultimate responsibil-
ity for MK-48 TWS technical support, following development
and Fleet Introduction. Another major technical development
fell under the cognizance of ORD 055 and was assigned to
Naval Ordnance Laboratory, White Oak, Md. (NOL/WO). NOL/WO's
technical support function was similar to that of NUSC:
NOL/WO's task was to focus on the technical development of
the back-up exploder system which was under contract to GM.
ORD 054 's responsibility focused on development of the
CLEVITE MK-48-1 dual purpose torpedo (anti-submarine/anti-
surface ship). The MK-48-1 effort concerned itself only
with the torpedo, which was to be fully compatible with all
MK-48-0/2 support systems (e.g. MK-27 MTT, fire control
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modifications, launcher, etc.)- ORD 054's outside technical
development director for the MK-48-1 torpedo was NOL/WO.
This was deemed logical since, in addition to technical de-
velopment of the exploder system with GM, NOL/WO had been
working as technical development director with CLEVITE in
the development of the "comb filter" acoustic panel under
the 1965 contract.
It can be readily seen that the ORD 055/ORD 054 organi-
zations, ORL/PSU, NUSC, and NOL/WO had to coordinate closely,
since there was considerable technical interface required
and a good deal of common interest overlap. While ORD 055
was recognized as a sort of titular head of the combined ef-
fort, there should be no doubt that the MK-48-1 effort was
now, in effect, proceeding in competition with the MK-48-0/2
effort, with the support systems considered common to both
efforts.
The complexity of the program support organization and
requisite management requirements became enormous as the pro-
gram grew. In some cases single government activities were
performing several roles within the program and, due to man-
power and dollar ceilings, trade-offs were made to achieve
desired goals. Work was allocated between contracts with
commercial activities, and in-house tasks assigned by job
order to government activities. The contractual and task
assignment relationships within the project were extremely
complex. In February 1968, there were 23 separate government
activities with task assignments and 15 commercial contracts
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underway in support of Project Office back-up efforts.
These were in addition to the WECO, CLEVITE, Librascope, and
GM prime contracts. Subcontractors are not even considered
in these figures.
This then was the setting as' the MK-48 TWS Program en-
tered calendar year 1968. At this point, Fleet planning or
development involvement had been minimal. Although both the
Atlantic and Pacific Fleet Submarine Force Staffs (SUBLANT/
SUBPAC) had been assigned one billet each for a MK-48 TWS
Project Officer, to more effectively interface the Fleet
with the Program Office, neither Force was playing a partic-
ipative or routinely active role in the Program during the
Spring of 1968. Although the Fleet was anxiously awaiting
development of the MK-48 TWS, when Fleet input was solicited,
the Fleet was quick to respond, but such solicitation was
sporadic. The most significant Fleet participation had oc-
curred in early 1966. A July 1965 letter from Manager,
Anti-Submarine Warfare Systems Project Office, Washington,
D.C. (MASWSPS) forwarded ORL/PSU ' s preliminary "Torpedo
MK-48 Operational Handbook" for Fleet review. Both COMSUB-
LANT and COMSUBPAC submitted comprehensive recommendations
resulting from forcewide study of the handbook. Many of
these recommendations were ultimately incorporated into the
design of the MK-48 TWS. This type of Fleet participation
was not, however, sustained throughout Program evolution,
and by 1968 the MK-48 TWS Program took a back seat to the
daily operational exigencies with which the Submarine Force
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was dealing. It should be noted however, that submarines
were beginning to receive the MK-48-0 fire control system
ordnance alterations that resulted from the June 1967 con-
tract with Librascope. These alterations/modifications, or
"ORDALTS" , as they are called, were being handled primarily
in conjunction with routine shipyard overhauls, or during
new construction. Since there were no MK-48 torpedoes in
the Fleet, however, submarine personnel gave minimal atten-
tion to these new equipments, as primary Fleet emphasis was
directed toward the handling, maintenance, and firing of
those torpedoes which were, in fact, members of existing
Fleet inventories.
As the Program moved into 1968, the MK-48-0 schedule was
officially slipped nine months. '"ECO was still resisting
incorporation of design changes recommended by the PM and
ORL/PSU. The FPIF contract with WECO continued to hamper
the Navy's efforts to actively engage and apply changes
evolving from the parallel development effort, except through
contract changes. In order to avoid uncontrolled escalation
of cost and contractor imposed schedule delays, the Navy was
forced to effect change through bi-lateral agreements with
WECO. Paradoxically, this approach was, itself, quite time
consuming, since reaching mutual agreement regarding sched-
ules and new cost ceilings, in conjunction with each change,
was an extremely difficult task at best. To further
Q
See Appendix II for explanation of ORDALT program,
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complicate matters, the existing FPIF contractural arrange-
ments consistently prevented review of the WECO internal
plans and engineering designs before fabrication began.
Hence, many defects withheld their debut until the torpedoes
were actually fired on the range.
By the end of 1967, 46 bi-lateral contract changes had
been negotiated, and the Navy had invested almost $30 million
in outside back-up programs. Further, in spite of the addi-
tional funding which accompanied the many changes, the con-
tractor had exceeded the originally projected cost ceilings
by $10 to $15 million. Cost and schedule had to be traded
off in order to meet minimum performance criteria.
The contractual difficulties being experienced with WECO
did not go unheeded. In April 1968, the Navy awarded a Cost
Plus Fixed Fee (CPFF) contract to CLEVITE to continue devel-
opment of the MK-48-1 torpedo and to fabricate 20 DPT's,
with dual purpose capability. This flagged the birth of the
MK-48 MOD-1 Torpedo. Fabrication of the first MK-48-1 DPT
began in June 1968. In this case the contract provided for
maximum Navy/contractor "engagement". Accordingly, full ad-
vantage was taken of all existing program experience, and
effective contractor technical direction was maintained by
the PM through NOL/WO.
The period between June 1968 and July 1969 was character-
ized by intensive efforts in both the WECO and CLEVITE camps
to perfect their respective torpedoes. WECO continued
MK-48-0/2 torpedo in-water tests, and CLEVITE completed its
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first official MK-48-1 torpedo in-water test in April 1969.
By July 1971, Y/ECO had completed over 1000 in-water tests of
the MK-48-0/2 torpedo, and CLEVITE had completed over 700
in-water tests of the MK-48-1 torpedo, plus thousands of
runs using actual torpedo homing and control hardware on a
real-time, hybrid computer simulator at NUWC. Multiple en-
vironmental tests of completed torpedoes and components were
also completed.
The final determination of which torpedo would be chosen
for production and Fleet Introduction was to be a "shoot out"
— an intricate selection process was to be conducted that
would permit parallel/side-by-side detailed evaluation.
Among many other criteria, the aspects of torpedo cost, per-
formance, supportability , reliability, maintainability, and
availability played key evaluation roles. The climax of
this highly competetive, side-by-side "shoot out" consisted
of two major steps: A Navy Technical Evaluation, and a Navy
Operational Evaluation. Overall responsibility for the ad-
ministration and coordination of this at-sea competetive
demonstration was, by CNO edict, assigned to Commander Oper-
ational Test and Evaluation Force (COMOPTEVFOR) , in Norfolk,
Virginia. He was to function as the unbiased "third party",
as it were — "the referee". The technical evaluation of
each torpedo was placed under the direct supervision of the
assigned technical director, NUSC for the MK-48-0/2 and NOL/WO
for the MK-48-1. COMOPTEVFOR oversaw the entire technical
evaluation and coordinated logistic support. COMOPTEVFOR
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kept things on track and basically attempted to ensure that
both technical directors got the support necessary to satis-
fy program test and evaluation criteria. The operational
evaluation fell under the direct cognizance of COMOPTEVFOR.
The technical and operational evaluations focused on the
final hardware configurations, testing not only the torpe-
does, but also the documentation, training, and, in general,
the total weapons system and its supportability . While many
of the tests and evaluations could have been and were con-
ducted in torpedo workshops, laboratories, and on simulators,
the "acid test", the final Technical and Operational Evalua-
tion, was conducted at sea. In many cases, the torpedoes
under test and evaluation were fired from specially config-
ured barges and surface craft, but the majority of firings
were conducted from submarines. These firings were conducted
at the Navy's three-dimensional tracking ranges in Tongue of
the Ocean, Andros Island, Bahamas and in DABOB Bay, Keyport
,
Washington. The Naval Weapons Station, Keyport, Washington
also functioned as a proofing station (conducted in-water
and bench tests) for all new torpedoes before each torpedo
entered into the evaluation program.
To provide for conduct of this effort, the CNO, in 1968,
required the Submarine Force to designate three "dedicated"
submarines to support the MK-48 TWS Technical/Operational
Evaluations. These submarines were equipped with hardware
modifications which permitted them to load, carry, support,
and fire MK-48 torpedoes. The first three submarines so
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designated were the USS JACK, the USS PARGO (both nuclear),
and the USS TRIGGER (a diesel submarine). "Dedicated" sub-
marines gave MK-48 TWS operations first priority and remain-
ed an integral part of the MK-48 TWS Program on an essentially
permanent, on-call basis. As "dedicated" submarines came
due for mandatory overhauls, they were replaced by other sub-
marines. While conducting MK-48 torpedo operations, "dedi-
cated" submarines fell under the direct operational control
of COMOPTEVFOR for all related matters. And, as a result of
the way operational directives were worded, all MK-48 TWS
Program reports generated by the "dedicated" submarines were
filed to or via COMOPTEVFOR rather than the Submarine Force
Commander. The results of MK-48 torpedo firings and perform-
ance were closely guarded to preserve the confidentiality of
the selection process. The torpedo contractors were not al-
lowed to participate in the at-sea Technical/Operational
Evaluation firings. Submarine personnel were enjoined to
offer no comments, official or otherwise, regarding torpedo
performance, except as solicited and controlled by COMOPTEVFOR.
Hence, by design, "dedicated" submarines of the Fleet were
program vehicles, but the Fleet was isolated from direct in-
put or participation in the evaluation process. The valuable
experience gained by participating submarines was not lost,
however. This information eventually played a vital role in
Fleet Introduction, but the communications restraints which
existed until MK-48-1 torpedo selection in July 1971 unques-




During calendar year 1969, the USS PARGO officially en-
tered the arena as the first MK-48 TWS configured submarine,
with a fire control system capable of firing either the
MK-48-1 or MK-48-0/2 torpedoes. The steps necessary to
reach this program milestone unveiled to many interested on-
lookers, for the first time, the fact that fire control mod-
ifications made specifically to support the MK-48-0 torpedo
were incapable of providing compatability for both the
MK-48-1/2 and the MK-48-0 torpedoes. Mutual compatability
was achieved in the "dedicated" submarines solely due to the
availability of two fire control systems per submarine: one
was modified to support the MK-48-1/2 while the other was
modified to support the MK-48-0. What this episode also
showed was the fact that a great deal more attention would
have to be directed to the fire control area following tor-
pedo selection, and the attention required would be a func-
tion of the torpedo selected. PARGO became the key partici-
pant in the early evaluation process and fired both WECO and
CLEVITE torpedoes during the Spring and Fall of 1969 at the
Navy's Tongue of the Ocean 3-D Range. While the 1969 evalu-
ation process unveiled many hardware problems, it also marked
the beginning of tangible corrective engineering. 1969 also
brought the dynamics, the reality, and the true dimensions
of the competetive effort into sharper focus for all partici-
pants.
The next major milestone occurred in Jaunary 1970 when
the first CLEVITE PPT underwent in-water testing. Early 1970
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was a period fully dedicated to in-water testing and contin-
ued torpedo hardware improvement. The formal side-by-side
technical evaluation, "shoot out", began in August 1970, at
which time both torpedoes had overcome virtually all serious
technical difficulties. Both torpedoes had been subjected
to a wide range of tactical scenarios under actual operating
conditions, and both torpedoes had performed well. There
were still problems, to be sure, but, all in all, both tor-
pedoes' capabilities in various ocean environments and against
differing targets and target geometries had been demonstrated.
There was now little doubt regarding the capability of either
torpedo to successfully attack and destroy nuclear submarines
or surface ships.
During 1969, the MK-48 TV,7S Project Office had been re-
organized. ORD 055 and ORD 054 were brought together under
one MK-48 TWS Manager, (PMO-402). The new manager was a
senior Navy Captain, subsequently promoted to the rank of
Rear Admiral. ORD 055 and ORD 054 became PMO 4021 and PMO
4022 respectively. At this point the PMO had grown in num-
ber to 47 officers and civilians. The PMO was a matrix type
organization, with a number of the staff members "wearing
two hats", since they were concurrently assigned to function-
al positions in other organizations within the Navy [e.g.
Naval Ships System Command (NAVSHIPS), Naval Ship Engineer-
ing Center (NAVSEC), NAVORD, etc.]. Recall that the MK-48
TWS PMO was also responsible for the development of all of
the subsystems necessary to launch and support the MK-48
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torpedoes. Accordingly, the PMO organizational structure
went through several reorganizations to accommodate various
phases and changes in hardware emphasis, as' the program
evolved.
During the 1970 timeframe, the PMO was organized under
PMO 402 into four separate divisions: One division for each
torpedo, a Test and Evaluation division, and a Plans and
Programs division. This organization seemed satisfactorily
structured to deal with the functional commands, the agencies
tasked to perform various support and back-up development
requirements, and the Naval chain of command.
In October 1970, with the side-by-side technical portion
of the Navy Technical/Operational Evaluation well underway,
the Navy negotiated contracts with both 17ECO and CLEVITE for
each to produce approximately 50 of their respective produc-
tion torpedoes. Either WECO's 50 torpedoes or CLEVITE' s 50
torpedoes would represent the first production lot, dependent
upon which torpedo was eventually selected.
The technical evaluation bogged down somewhat during
November/December 1970 because of a drop in torpedo on-range
hardware performance reliability. This caused a schedule de-
lay. The deficient on-range performance was eventually
traced to software and people problems, particularly in the
area of torpedo preparation. These problems were uncovered
at the Capt Kennedy, Florida torpedo workshop, where all of
the torpedoes were prepared for firing at the Navy's Tongue
of the Ocean 3-D Range. These problems were corrected
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following review and approval of revised shop procedures.
The evaluation effort resumed its normal pace in January
1971. Shortly thereafter, Technical Evaluation was com-
pleted, and Operational Evaluation began. The side-by-side
Operational Evaluation was concluded in June 1971, bringing
to a close what had become known as the Selection Test Pro-
cedure (STP).
Following the detailed review of each torpedo's in-water
performance a myriad of data surrounding engineering, relia-
bility, suportability , etc., the DOD Defense System Acquisi-
tion Review Council (DSARC) declared CELVITE's MK-48 MOD-1
torpedo the winner. Selection of the MK-48-1 signaled a new
and major shift in the scope of project management effort.
The WECO MK-48-0/2 was "out", and attention immediately
shifted to MK-48-1, which continued Operation Evaluation in
order to more fully satisfy data and testing criteria in cer-
tain technical areas. There was also strong impetus to
interface the ancilliary support systems and areas. The
program goal was now "Fleet Introduction" of the MK-48 TWS.
The Project Office was again reorganized to better man-
age the new requirements. Now the PM, PMO 402, functioned
as a kind of directorate, comprised of the PM, a Deputy PM
(a Navy Captain), a Technical Director (a Navy Captain), an
Assistant for MK-48-0/2 Phase-Out (a Navy Captain, formerly
PMO 4021), and a secretary. The PMO was reorganized into
five divisions under the directorate: Engineering, Produc-
tion, Plans and Resources, Test and Evaluation, and Fleet
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Support. The Engineering division was the largest, with
about 18 members. The other divisions had from six to nine
members. Each division was headed by a Navy Captain or Com-
mander. At this point there were over 50 persons assigned
to the PMO. 9
As noted earlier, the Fleet had provided ship services,
but there had been no formal or consistent user/producer
dialogue between the Fleet Commanders and the Project Office
as an integral part of the master planning and development
process. This is not to say that there was no liason; there
was. However, the interface was oriented toward solving
problems or exchanging information on a relatively unstruc-
tured "case basis". In addition to the ship services pro-
vided by both the Destroyer Force and the Submarine Force,
the Submarine Force did have some formal and informal com-
munications structure for exchanging information.
Early in the MK-48 development program, the CNO had
sought to provide a means to include the Fleet in the pro-
gram dialogue; this had been done through the establishment
of a forum called the "MK-48 Program Coordination Group"
(PCG). This group was chaired by CNO (OP-951E), Head, Sub-
Surface Branch, Technical Appraisal and Requirements Division
9 See Exhibit 6 for revised PMO organization.
Although the MK-4S TWS was designed for launch from
surface ships as well as submarines, the Surface Navy had,
to this point, shown relatively little interest in the pro-





of Anti-Submarine Warfare Programs, and membership included
a wide range of organizations and commands directly and in-
1 9directly involved in MK-48 TWS development. The Fleet
(e.g. Cruiser-Destroyer Force and Submarine Force) were PCG
members and sent representatives to the meetings. These
meetings were, in effect, "update" sessions for all concerned,
and they also afforded an opportunity for interested parties
to air their various complaints and/or recommendations re-
garding system development. Problems that were identified
which required some kind of follow-up action were assigned
as tasks to the appropriate and cognizant command. That com-
mand then reported on corrective action taken at the next
group meeting. In general, group participants felt that the
PCG was too large, it devolved into a "bitch" session too
frequently, it did not offer any truely constructive benefit
to program progress or improvement, and it simply added to
the PM's harassment. There were also two sub-groups assigned
to the PCG: The Torpedo MK-48 Weapons System Safety Review
Sub-Group and the Torpedo MK-48 Weapons System Fire Control
Sub-Group. The former was initially chaired by CNO, but,
pursuant to reorganization within OPNAV, chairmanship was
assigned to the Naval Safety Center, Norfolk, Virginia. The
latter was chaired by Commander Submarine Development Group
PCG Chairmanship was later transferred to CNO (OP-713),
Head, Submarine Warfare Branch, Undersea and Strategic Warfare
Division
.




Two, New London, Connecticut (COMSUBDEVGRU TWO). COMSUBLANT
and COMSUBPAC were represented on both of these sub-groups.
The safety sub-group's task was to examine the torpedo, as
well as the supporting ancilliary systems, with regard to
material and personnel safety. Deficiencies noted were to
be reported to CNO for further assignment of corrective ac-
tion by CNO to the PM. The fire control sub-group's function
was to develop torpedo firing doctrine for Fleet use. Both
of these groups were active to varying degrees throughout
the development effort. The successful effort of COMSUBDEVGRU
TWO to gather data pertinent to the development of a subma-
rine torpedo firing doctrine was particularly significant.
The Project Office made a considerable degree of otherwise
restricted information available to COMSUBDEVGRU TWO. Hence,
a firing doctrine, which was suitable for use during the STP,
was developed in parallel with the torpedoes. In this in-
stance, user/producer dialogue appeared to be excellent.
CNO also took another step to bring the Fleet into the
picture. He authorized both COMSUBLANT and COMSUBPAC a
special MK-48 Project Officer billet, as mentioned earlier.
The intent here was to provide both Submarine Force Command-
ers an officer specifically assigned to affect liaison with
the MK-48 PMO and to assist in the Fleet Introduction process.
Unfortunately, the job descriptions accompanying these bil-
lets were somewhat general in nature, and the billets were
not formally linked to the Project Office in a definitized
manner. Hence, the PMO paid little or no attention to the
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existence of such Fleet billets for points of contact, and
the Submarine Force Staffs initially found other, more pres-
sing staff work for the officers assigned to these billets.
During the 1968 to July 1971 time frame, as the torpedo
development showed tangible progress, there was unilateral
effort on the part of the Submarine Force Commanders to use
the officer assigned to the MK-48 billets to affect liaison
in MK-48 TWS matters. This effort continued to gain intra-
staff support as the MK-48 TWS Program successes mounted and
as submarines were "dedicated" to provide MK-48 Technical/
Operational Evaluation services. As a result, a considerable
amount of ground work for Fleet Introduction was ultimately
laid through informal liaison between the Submarine Force
MK-48 Project Officers, key members of the PMO Staff, var-
ious Systems Command functional offices, field activities
tasked to support Fleet Introduction, and the Submarine
Force's operational staffs and units.
As of the Summer of 1971, the major problem was hardware
and Fleet interface. This was complicated, in part, by the
fact that although the CLEVITE torpedo was selected, the
support systems, from inception, were designed to support
the WECO torpedo. Now, all hardware had to be made compat-
ible. Secondly, all hardware had to be installed in Fleet
units, be fully supported, and personnel had to be trained
to cope with all facets of the operational and support re-
quirements. Since the Fleet's time, resources, and efforts
were already programmed to fill a multitude of n'on-MK-48
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TWS related requirements, the magnitude of the problem
heightened.
In the Summer of 1971, the "players", contractors and
government support agencies alike, remained essentially the
same in name and number. However, their efforts now had to
be adjusted to "groom" MK-48-1 and achieve total system com-
patability. ORL/PSU remained a technical advisor to the PM,
with emphasis shifted to the nuances of the MK-48-1. Spe-
cifically, ORL/PSU was charged with analyzing the weapons
system's in-water performance with the express purpose of
establishing criteria affecting solution of the underwater
fire control problem. NOL/WO remained the MK-48-1 torpedo
technical director. NUSC remained technical director for
fire control development by Librascope. Additionally, NUSC
was assigned as the PM field representative, point of con-
tact, and command responsible for overseeing and directing a
wide range of Fleet Introduction support efforts. The func-
tional offices within the Navy's Systems Command structure
suddenly found their roles magnified, and their actions
closely scrutinized, for their responsibilities were consid-
erable. The torpedo and its logistic support (which will be
provided for by the manufacturer until approximately 1976)
had to be programmed for integration into the existing Navy
structure at all levels . As a result, NAVORD and Naval Sup-
ply Systems Command (NAVSUP) were enmeshed in the task of
assimilating this complex system into the already existing
Navy weapons support matrix. The torpedo had to be fired at
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sea for training purposes. Therefore, special torpedo re-
trieving capabilities were required. This involved Navships
development of either new retrievers or alteration packages
for existing retrievers. In addition, it had been deter-
mined that recovery of the 3500 plus pound torpedo or the
equally heavy MTT was quite dangerous in high "seas. There-
fore, helo recovery was developed and Naval Air Systems Com-
mand (NAVAIRSYSCOM) was involved. For Training purposes the
torpedo had to be fired at a target, and the MK-27 MTT's
were still under contract to WECO. For all intents and pur-
poses, the MTT's were torpedoes which simulated submarines
both acoustically and in terms of maneuverability. They
were used for the express purpose of exercise firing the
MK-48 torpedo. The benefits of the MTT's are obvious, but
another support chain was required, and, again, NAVORD and
NAVSUP functional involvement was extensive and necessary.
Although MK-48 torpedoes produced by CLEVITE were, after
"proofing" by Naval Torpedo Station, Keyport , Washington, to
be delivered fully assembled and essentially ready to fire
condition, the requirements of fueling, pre-shipboard issue
"go/no-go" testing, minor repair part replacements, and
periodic routine torpedo unit check out (torpedo "turn
around") necessitated fully equipped and staffed intermediate
work shops. These shops were to support torpedoes deployed
in both oceans. Accordingly, the shops had to be convenient
to submarine home ports, which meant that each such port re-
quired a shop located either ashore or on board a Submarine
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Tender (AS). In 1971, several facilities had already been
built to MK-48-0/2 support specifications. Despite the pre-
vious intent that MK-48-0/2 support systems be compatible to
support the MK-48-1 torpedo, the selection of the MK-48-1
torpedo broached incompatibilities which had to be corrected.
For example, the floor plans for MK-48-1 test equipment and
"turnaround" was not the same as that for the MK-48-0/2.
Accordingly, existing facilities had to be substantially
modified to support the "winner". Construction and modifi-
cation of these facilities involved Navy shore commanders
who managed the cognizant bases, Naval Facilities Command
(NAVFAC) who handled the contracts, prime and sub facilities
contractors, NAVORD and NAVSUP who had to render logistic
support, the Bureau of Naval Personnel (SUPERS) who had to
staff the facilities, and the Naval Training Command who had
to train the personnel. In addition magazine stowage was
required and explosive/quantity implications of these new
torpedoes, fully assembled and stowed in large numbers, re-
quired sufficient real estate holdings (or purchases) to
ensure community safety. In the case of the AS's, each class
ship had to be thoroughly "ship checked" and extensive ship
alteration plans had to be drawn up. Material had to be
procured by NAVSHIPS and NAVSEC to convert all AS's. Such
conversions were extensive and required time. Hence, special
long range scheduling had to be accomplished to accommodate
other critical Fleet support requirements. Needless to say,
NAVORD and NAVSUP, as well as CLEVITE were also involved
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here. Finally, NUSC's Fleet Introduction support function
encompassed responsibility for overseeing the general smooth
flow and integration of these efforts, both ashore and on
the tenders.
The torpedo loading and handling systems aboard each
submarine had to be converted to accommodate the MK-48 tor-
pedo, since the MK-48 torpedo required hardware considera-
tions which differed significantly from older torpedoes.
Therefore, each class submarine required a ship alteration
package specifically tailored to its structural configura-
tion. NAVSHIPS had to develop the plans and procure the
necessary material. Approximately 12 classes of submarines
were involved, with the total number of submarines exceeding
100. Some of this work could be done in shipyards during
routine overhaul, but, in order to get the job done in a
reasonable length of time (e.g. less than five years), much
of the work had to be considered for accomplishment along-
side tenders, during routine upkeep periods. Some of the
key questions surrounding this problem were: Could the task
be accomplished by forces afloat within the three to four
week time constraint? Once these installations were com-
pleted, would the torpedo stowage and torpedo tube alignment
be affected? If alignment was affected, what could be done
to correct the problem? NAVSHIPS, NAVORD, and NUSC were all
involved in this problem.
Submarines also faced the requirement to convert existing
on-board fire control equipment and to install certain new
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equipments to support and fire the MK-48 torpedo. Again,
both shipyard and tender upkeep installation had to be con-
sidered. Special Librascope teams contracted by NUSC and
Naval Ordnance System Support Office (NOSSO) teams were set
up to affect necessary "in the field" ship board Ordnance
Alterations (ORDALTS). This had to be closely coordinated
with submarine availability and team availability schedules.
By the Summer of 1971, most submarine fire control systems
had, over a five year period, been converted to fire the
MK-48-0 WECO torpedo. This represented about 50% modifica-
tion to the total ship's fire control system. However, the
escalation to a dual purpose weapon plus the selection of
the CLEVITE torpedo required the installation of two more
major, in tandem, ORDALT packages. One of the ORDALTS took
four weeks to accomplish, while the other required six weeks.
The four week ORDALT made the fire control system compatible
with the basic dual purpose weapon, and the six week ORDALT
provided the necessary ballistics for compatibility with the
MK-48-1 torpedo plus certain safety improvements/interlocks.
The six week ORDALT had to be accomplished in two 3- to 4-
week segments to accommodate submarine upkeep periods. More-
over, the fire control system had to be operational between
the first and second work segments. In addition to the very
sensitive scheduling requirements necessary to bring the
submarines, materials, and teams together, the actual ship-
board physical effort was quite complex and required flawless
planning. Ships plans, technical manuals, spare parts,
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equipment history records, preventative maintenance cards,
micro-fiche cards, and supply records had to be changed si-
multaneously as well as the parallel NAVORD/NAVSHIPS and
NAVSUP supporting records and configuration documentation
located shore.
There was also a requirement for updating all Navy tor-
pedo and fire control training programs (e.g. both documen-
tation and simulators), in order to train new personnel in
each of the areas mentioned. Moreover, immediate Fleet
training was required in the form of initial crew certifica-
tion. This was necessary not only to permit maintenance of
the new or converted equipments, but also to learn to fire
the torpedo in the ocean, under real world conditions.
Training was also required to permit the routine collection
and analysis of torpedo firing data. The need for long
range training was initially addressed by BUPERS. Subse-
quently, Naval Training Command became an active participant.
Field activity was vigorous in local training commands such
as the Naval Submarine School, New London, Connecticut.
These local training commands had long been tasked to pro-
vide MK-48 TWS training once the selection process was com-
pleted. Considerable valuable information was obtained
from the ships who had participated in the STP program. Post
firing data analyses involved NUSC and also COMSUBDEVGRU TWO




The Fleet Introduction effort was in full swing by the
close of Summer 1971. This required a monumental effort on
the part of all players. Several problems were encountered,
but, through trial and error, that led to a planning effort,
which improved in its attention to detail as the effort ma-
tured, most were successfully overcome.
The PM's immediate goal was to "certify" the first fully
MK-48 TWS configured submarine and its crew, and to deploy
the first MK-48 torpedoes by February 1972. This required
a fully converted submarine, a viable certification training
program and a team to administer it, full logistic support
for all shipboard MK-48 TWS equipments and functions, suffi-
cient production torpedoes with warheads, an at-sea "certi-
fication" readiness firing program, both surface and
submarine targets, a workable at-sea torpedo retrieval
capability, post firing data analysis, a determination to
"certify" the submarine warshot load out, and a schedule
that would put it all together within the time allotted.
It was at this juncture that the ground work that was
laid out, for the most part informally, between the Sub-
marine Force, the PMO, and the various program support agen-
cies really appeared to pay off. A concerted effort to
structure a "certification" program had already been under-
taken by the Submarine Force, in anticipation of such a
need, during the Spring of 1971. NUSC's assistance was en-
dorsed by the PM, and several meetings involving a cross
section of operational and development agencies had already
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been conducted. The resulting plan, including the alloca-
tion of special billets for the certification team, was sub-
mitted to CNO in August 1971 by COMSUBLANT. It was approved,
but the permanent certification team could not be assembled
on time. This dilemma was solved by structuring a temporary
team using COMSUBDEVGRU TWO MK-48 staff personnel as a nu-
cleus and augmenting it with Naval Submarine School, New
London, Connecticut and NUSC personnel. The submarine se-
lected was a unit of COMSUBDEVGRU TWO, the USS BERGAL SSN
667, which had participated in the torpedo evaluation pro-
gram. Since no Fleet facility had yet been converted to
handle the MK-48-1 torpedo, the torpedo preparation facility
used was the existing work shop at Cape Kennedy, Florida,
the facility which used to prepare torpedoes for firing at
the Navy's Tongue of the Ocean 3-D Range.
The combined effort went forward as planned. The certi-
fication team and BERGAL' s personnel worked to perfect the
training effort, proof equipment, and certify logistic sup-
port. Exercise MK-48-1 torpedoes were loaded at Port Cana-
veral, Florida following training period dn New London,
Connecticut. With the team embarked, the exercise torpedoes
were fired at both surface and submerged targets at the
Tongue of the Ocean 3-D Range. The post firing data was
analyzed thoroughly, and BERGAL was certified to carry the
MK-48 torpedo. Warshots were subsequently loaded, and
BERGAL put to sea, sporting the MK-48 TWS in February 1972.
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Concurrently, the effort to convert all designated sub-
marines and AS's to MK-48 status continued. The Submarine
Force MK-48 Project Officer became the focal point for nec-
essary coordination. The PMO provided the various inputs,
but these inputs had to be interfaced with the myriad of on-
going Submarine Force requirements. Efforts such as sched-
uling Ship Alterations (SHIPALTS) 3 and ORDALTS were worked
out quarterly within the Submarine Force by bringing together
Submarine Squadron requirements, Submarine Force require-
ments, and MK-48 TWS requirements, negotiating with all con-
cerned within the Submarine Force to designate submarines
for alterations during specific periods. Once decided within
the Submarine Force, the PM, NAVORD, NAVSHIPS, NUSC, NAVSEC,
NOSSO's, Librascope, Submarine Squadrons, and all others
concerned were notified by message of the dates and subma-
rines. Details were worked out for each submarine well in
advance by participating at meetings chaired by the cognizant
Submarine Squadron. The Submarine Force Commanders were
kept informed of decisions and progress. Thus the MK-48 TWS
Fleet Introduction effort moved forward. Each facility
activation and each submarine certification represented the
completion of a major hurdle, case by case.
As of September 1974, the certification program is well
underway, activation of MK-48 TWS workshops is progressing,
and AS conversion plans are moving forward. The road has
13 See Appendix III for explanation of SHIPALT program.
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been both rough and long, to be sure. Many of the problems
discussed herein have been corrected, and some have not.
From all of this there are several lessons to be learned.
Referring as necessary to the preceding background, the
authors now wish to focus on specific case studies.
53

MK-48 TORPEDO FLEET INTRODUCTION (A)
During the summer of 1969, LCDR Jim White received his
orders to report to the staff of COMSUBLANT1 in Norfolk, Vir-
ginia and relieve the Force MK-48 Project Officer. At the
time, Jim was commanding the decommissioning efforts aboard
a diesel submarine. He was elated with his orders which
placed him in the forefront of a new and important program
with which he was relatively familiar. He saw this as an
opportunity to demonstrate his competence and enhance the
probability of achieving his goals:
"I had three goals in mind. I had the goal of getting
a diesel submarine command, I had the goal of making
Commander, and I had the goal of getting specific rec-
ognition for a job well done. I saw this assignment
as an excellent opportunity to achieve these goals."
Upon decommissioning his submarine, Jim reported to a two-
week MK-48 Torpedo Indoctrination course at the Underwater
Weapons School in Orlando, Florida. There he had the oppor-
tunity to explore the minds of several people quite. knowledge-
able regarding the MK-48 Program. Many of these people were
For clarification of the acronyms used throughout the
case, please refer to Appendix I.
This case was written by CDR David A. Newcomb and LCDR Robert
F. Hurley, Jr., under the direction of Professors William
Giauque and Michael Dean of the Naval Postgraduate School,
Monterey, California. All names have been disguised.
Cases are prepared as a basis for class discussion and are not
designed to present illustrations of either correct or incor-
rect handling of administrative problems.
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senior enlisted men who had been associated with the MK-48
Program for several years. On completion of this course of
instruction, he felt fairly comfortable with the background
education he had received and felt he had a fairly good ap-
preciation for what would be required of the submarine force
in terms of fleet introduction.
On 21 October 1969, Jim reported to the COMSUBLANT Force
Weapons Officer, CDR Bill Greene, and introduced himself as
the relief for the Force MK-48 Project Officer. Following
the exchange of cordialities typical of the standard Navy
"Welcome Aboard" situation, CDR Greene explained that he had
only been in the job since July 1969 and was therefore also
relatively new to the environment. Despite his relatively
short apprenticeship with the submarine force weapons game,
he discussed his recognition of the fact that a lot remained
to be done in the MK-48 area. Answers were needed to dozens
of questions, most of which were yet to be broached. He
pointed out that the officer presently holding down the Force
MK-48 Project Officer job had been forced by operating exi-
gencies to devote most of his time and efforts to the manage-
ment of force underwater fire control problems. CDR Greene
went on to say that the MK-48 Program appeared to be headed
in a definite direction and that delivery of torpedoes to the
fleet was anticipated within one or two years. Accordingly,
he recognized a need to shift the Force MK-48 Project Officer
emphasis from day-to-day underwater fire control problems to





Following a quick tour through the Force Weapons Office
2
spaces to meet the staff, CDR Greene introduced Jim to the
present Force MK-48 Project Officer, LCDR Fred Gray, and left
the room commenting, "Pick his brains, Jim. Take advantage
of his experience while he's still here."
As the door closed, Fred turned to Jim and said, "I don't
know what you've been led to believe about this job, but the
title is a real misnomer. For the past two years, I've been
beating back the flames of the force fire control problems.
The only connection I've had with the MK-48 torpedo is to act
as a receiving point for all MK-48 related correspondence.
Oh, every once in a while, someone has a MK-48 related ques-
tion, and I'm expected to answer it, purely as a function of
my title. Also, the Admiral wants to be kept abreast of
what's going on in the MK-48 world, so I prepare him a status
update memo a couple of times a month, or bring to his atten-
tion significant MK-48 related events as they occur. I ex-
pect you'll be doing the same thing until we start seeing
some torpedoes coming our way."
With these opening remarks, the turnover process began.
It lasted for over a month, with Fred directing the emphasis
toward fire control problems still brewing and Jim trying to
resolve in his own mind the glaring discrepancy between his
perception of what the job title implied and what Fred was
2 See Exhibit 8 (Force Weapons Office Relationship in






laying out before him. Jim told the casewriter how he felt
during that first week:
"It was paradoxical. I had a preconceived notion
that when I got there I was going to get involved in
the MK-48. Perhaps I had a distorted view, but in
my mind's eye, I thought that I'd arrive as the MK-48
guy, and there would possibly be a number of things
underway with plenty of fertile ground to- plow. I
thought that there would be a lot of things to do in
the MK-48, and I looked forward to it because I felt
that it was an independent operation and a chance
for me to really do something. That's what I was
looking for. What I was seeing and hearing, however,
didn't fit this perception at all. Despite his
title, it was crystal clear to me that Fred was the
Force Fire Control Officer, and the MK-48 torpedo
was simply a collateral duty."
As the turnover progressed, with the general introduction
and explanation of areas of responsibility out of the way, de-
tailed briefings began in the form of "chalk talks." Fred
literally got up before a blackboard and introduced Jim to
some of the acronyms that were part of the job, some of the
terminology, and the chains of command, including names of
people, that he dealt with. Focus, however, was almost en-
tirely on the area of fire control and other weapons-oriented
staff projects. This is not to say that the turnover was
devoid of MK-48 matters. Certain areas of MK-48 matters were
discussed such as cases where specific action had been taken.
Fred related to Jim what had happened on the staff regarding
MK-48 up to that point. His discussion focused on staff in-
volvement in the CNO-established "MK-48 Coordination Group"
chaired by OP-95, the "MK-48 Safety Sub-Group" and the "MK-48
Fire Control Sub-Group." Both of the latter groups were
"spin-outs" of the former group. Fred showed Jim all the
A-4

minutes of the group meetings, related notes from the MK-48
Project Manager's Office, and trip reports prepared by Fred
and other staff attendees. Other correspondence Fred made
available to Jim included such topics as the local (Norfolk,
Virginia) MK-48 facility, COMSUBDEVGRU TWO'S firing doctrine
efforts, involvement of the USS PARGO as the force's MK-48
"dedicated" submarine, status update memoranda Fred prepared
for the Admiral, and a potpourri of MK-48 related topics
which resulted in memorandum exchanges between various staff
members and staff responses to outside queries.
At one point during the MK-48 turnover, Fred took Jim
down the hallway and opened the door to his "library." He
pointed to a couple of shelves filled with dusty books and
publications and said, "This is all MK-48 stuff. I've never
had much occasion to use it, but it's here to look at if you
want to." They next returned to the office and Fred showed
Jim stacks of MK-48 publications, manuals and letters on a
large table behind his desk. Some of the stacks were at
least two feet high. Fred then pulled open two file drawers
filled with MK-48 material. Referring to both the material
on the table and the material in the file drawers, he said,
"You'll probably want to read all this stuff because there's
lots of information on the MK-48 in it . It's not organized
yet; you'll have to do that."
About the sheer volume of this material, Jim once quipped
"If you put all that crap in one pile, it probably
would have measured three feet by three feet and
reached from the deck to the overhead."

At this point Fred had pretty much exhausted his Force
MK-48 Project Officer repertoire. He felt comfortable with
the fact that he had exposed Jim to all the things he needed
to know to carry on the job. Jim, on the other hand, was ex-
tremely frustrated. He recalled his feelings:
"Having gotten a fantastic amount of information
regarding the other commitments and requirements
attached to the job that Fred was prosecuting full
time, realizing the scope of the MK-48 effort that
was required, and seeing that pile of MK-48 stuff
that he hadn't even gone through yet, my feeling
at this point was—well, it has got to stand out
as one of the most frustrating moments in my life."
Jim didn't keep his frustration a secret from CDR Greene.
CDR Greene, however, in an effort to comfort Jim, tended to
dismiss Jim's asserted frustration with remarks to the effect,
"Don't let it get you down, Jim. Why, in a couple of months,
you'll be the local MK-48 expert."
Jim often asked himself, in response to statements such
as these, "Just where in the Hell is all this MK-48 time
going to come from?"
Determined to succeed, Jim began wading through the
countless piles of MK-48 material, asking questions of Fred
as he proceeded, and so the process continued. The stuff Jim
wanted to hear, Fred couldn't tell him, but the stuff Fred
wanted to pass on to Jim, he did. Moreover, when Fred felt
that he had passed on what was required, he didn't want any
more questions. It really wasn't until Jim had gotten him-
self fully submerged in the MK-48 material maze that he began
to appreciate the magnitude of the problem. "Christ," he
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thought, "if I ever get a rope around this mess, what the Hell
am I going to do with it?"
The problem would not have been nearly so. devilish had
Jim been able to devote all of his time to the MK-48. Jim
soon found out that little time was available to dig into the
MK-48 material between responding to "fire drills," forever
being interrupted by incessantly ringing telephones, and try-
ing to learn how to do Fred's job.
After about two weeks in the office, Jim had managed to
make only a small dent in the MK-48 material. Distractions
were constant. In addition to the constant din of the tele-
phones ringing, there were multiple background conversations
and an endless parade of various staff personnel and official
visitors coming in and out of the office. Amongst all this,
Fred was forever saying, "Hey, Jim, come over here for a
moment. I want you to get in on this 'flap' so you'll get a
feel for the job." These "flaps" included current research
projects, queries from submarine force personnel regarding
documentation or policy ambiguities, fire control equipment
failures aboard submarines, plus a myriad of other problems.
To be sure, the bag of "flap" subjects was mixed. Further-
more, it seemed that all Fred did was handle "flaps." He
didn't seem to want to relinquish that function, and Jim
wasn't complaining. Jim saw Fred's continuing "flap manage-
ment efforts" as an opportunity to continue his own MK-48
reading effort. As it turned out, Fred wasn't going to leave





Tuesday of the third week of turnover started like every
other day, with the telephone ringing. However, this day was
different. As Jim had found out during his initial turnover
briefings, the people in the Force Weapons Office did a great
deal of traveling, both to sea and to various other shore
commands in the routine course of business. Today happened
to be a day when such travel requirements resulted in all the
officers in the Force Weapons Office being absent except for
Jim. In fact, Jim, the yeoman (YNI Fingers), and Senior Chief
Fire Controlman Oblisk (Fred's assistant) were the only people
in the office. Fingers appeared to have things under control,
taking messages etc. for all the travelers. Jim noted that
Chief Oblisk was taking appropriate action on a number of
routine fire control matters, so barring no crisis in Fred's
area, it looked like he would really be able to get back into
the stack of MK-48 material again. That illusion persisted
until 0930 when Fingers came in looking quite concerned.
"Mr. White," he said, "CDR Whale, COMSUBDIV 62, is on the
phone. He wants to speak to CDR Greene or Mr. Gunn (LCDR
Bob Gunn, the Force Conventional Weapons Officer). I told
him that CDR Greene, Mr. Gunn, and even Chief Torpedoman
Spear (Bob Gunn ' s assistant) were all out to sea, but he says
he's got a hot item and he wants to talk to any officer."
"God damn it!" muttered Jim.
CDR Whale spelled out the problem quickly, referring to
a casualty report message sent by the USS EELFISH. It seems
that the EELFISH was down south on the Atlantic Fleet Missile
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Range in the throws of a SUBROC missile firing exercise, and
her SUBROC fire control stabilization system failed to func-
tion properly. All on-board efforts to remedy the problem
had thus far proven fruitless. A decision had to be made
whether to abort the exercise, which, according to CDR Whale,
was both "politically" and "operationally" undesirable, or to
fire in the "emergency mode," using the internal missile gyro
for a self stabilization reference. The latter tack had
never been tried before. Since SUBROC firing exercises were
few, expensive, and their accuracy results received consider-
able scrutiny, CDR Whale wanted the Force Commander's bless-
ing (i.e. an OK by the Force Weapons Officer) before using
the "emergency mode." He said that repair efforts would con-
tinue, but if all that failed, what he really wanted was a
message from COMSUBLANT, by 2000, telling the EELFISH to fire
in the "emergency mode."
Jim felt a little cold sweat in the palms of his hands
and answered, "Yes Sir! I'll get on it right away." "What
the Hell do I know about SUBROC?" Jim thought to himself as
he hung up the phone.
Jim didn't know much about SUBROC at 0935, but by 1830
that evening, even though his brain felt like it had been
shoved through a washing machine wringer, he knew a great
deal about the SUBROC missile. In fact, you might even say





The remainder of the day was spent alternately research-
ing technical publications and telephoning a wide range of
SUBROC-oriented people. His first effort, however, was to
brief CDR Greene's boss, the Deputy Chief of Staff for Polaris/
Poseidon/Conventional Weapons, CAPT Ready. Although CAPT
Ready wasn't up to speed on SUBROC , he grasped the urgency of
the situation immediately. He directed Jim, "Get all the
dope together, give me your recommendation, and if we can
justify an 'emergency mode' firing, draft a message to EELFISH
directing same."
By 1700, Jim had finally managed to talk to all of the
SUBROC experts in NAVORDSYSCOM and NUSC , Newport, sounded out
all the appropriate people on the staff of CNO, reviewed all
the technical data available, and briefed both CDR Whale and
CAPT Ready. At 1800, Jim was standing in front of CAPT
Ready's desk with a message authorizing EELFISH to fire in
the "emergency mode." After CAPT Ready released the message,
and Jim delivered it to the communications center for trans-
mission, Jim drove back to his office to collect his things
and lock up shop for the day.
Once in his office, Jim sat down, propped his feet up on
his desk and folded his hands behind his head. Drained of
his last ounce of energy, he pondered the events of the day
and those of the past 2£ weeks. He was perplexed, to be sure:
"I looked at that pile of crap on the table behind
me representing the MK-48 torpedo, and at the 'action
board' on the wall representing dozens of routine
fire control items that needed to be done, and,
staring at the ceiling, I said to myself, "How in
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the Hell am I ever going to take over the MK-48
project when I can't even do a minimum day's work?"
It really wasn't until that day that I saw quite
clearly that it was just about impossible to do
anything beyond a normal day's work in fire control
without having many interruptions on the telephone.
I'd heard of situations like this, but I'd never
been exposed to it myself. I just sat there, com-
pletely frustrated. I really didn't know how to
proceed from that point on. It seemed like a hope-
less situation, and I didn't know how to handle it.
So, there I sat, the whole day shot, and I hadn't
even made one step in a forward direction."
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MK-48 TORPEDO FLEET INTRODUCTION (B)
About three and a half weeks into the turnover, only a
week prior to Fred Grey's scheduled departure from the staff,
Jim White had another serious conversation with CDR Greene.
Despite the unremitting interruptions typical of the day-to-
day office routine, Jim had managed to make a fairly large
dent in the MK-48 paper pile. His inroads had required a
lot of quick scanning. Little opportunity for detailed at-
tention had existed, but Jim had begun to develop some strong
feelings about what was required of the submarine force in
the way of organization and attention if it didn't wish to
find itself in the position of trying to outrun the prover-
bial evergrowing "snowball".
This time when Jim entered CDR Greene's office he felt
that he at least had some "gut feelings" as to how they
should proceed. Moreover, Jim's exposure to the hectic re-
quirements of the Force Weapons Office permitted him to
appreciate the fact that everyone in the office had lots of
pressures to contend with that thoroughly obscured the MK-48.
This case was written by CDR David A. Newcomb and LCDR Robert
F. Hurley, Jr., under the direction of Professors William
Giauque and Michael Dean of the Naval Postgraduate School,
Monterey, California. All names have been disguised.
Cases are prepared as a basis for class discussion and are
not designed to present illustrations of either correct or
incorrect handling of administrative problems.
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Hidden in the maze of daily events was CDR Greene's "pet
project" that Jim soon discovered but did not get involved
with. It seems that CDR Greene had been pushing everyone in
the office except Jim to complete the COMSUBLANT Conventional
Weapons Manual . From what Jim had been able to see, this
represented a monumental effort that had already been under-
way for about two months prior to his arrival. Essentially,
the effort attempted to bring under one cover all the conven-
tional weapons related instructions, notices, message direc-
tives, letter directives, and miscellaneous guidance which
had been promulgated over the years. In the past, lack of
a "single" document covering conventional weapons matters
made it quite difficult for submarine personnel to lay their
hands on the required guidance in a hurry. Furthermore, it
was virtually impossible for them to determine whether or
not the guidance they had in hand was the most current. The
present intent, once the manual was published, was to cancel
all of the directives that had proliferated over the years
and thereafter publish such directives as changes to the
manual. It was a noble undertaking to be sure. However, it
looked too ambitious to Jim, based on the time office per-
sonnel had available. It came about as a result of a prom-
ise CDR Greene made to the Admiral several weeks ago to
deliver the final draft of the manual to the fleet before
the Admiral was to be relieved in early 1970.
For clarification of the acronyms used throughout the
case, please refer to Appendix I.
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As he took a seat, Jim recalls CDR Greene saying, "I'll
be right with you, Jim, just let me finish reading chapter
four of our new manual. I'm on the last page." Jim weighed
CDR Greene's last comment and concluded that their concerns
were miles apart: CDR Greene with his manual; Jim with MK-48
fleet introduction. Jim's gut feeling gave way to the old
"acid indigestion".
When CDR Greene finally did look up he remarked, more or
less to himself, "We are really going to have to bear down
to get this manual out." He quickly added, "What have you
got for me, Jim?"
Given the opportunity to speak, Jim didn't really know
where to begin. Hesitating for a moment, he rapidly recalled
the many hours he spent wading through the MK-48 morass and
discussing the MK-48 with various staff members in the weap-
ons, material, and supply offices. From all of this he had
concluded that there were a considerable number of MK-48
areas which were of immediate concern to the submarine force,
but he could find no evidence of ongoing, specific actions,
at the fleet level, directed toward these areas.
"Well, Boss," Jim began, "as I'm sure you know, I've
spent a great deal of time looking into this MK-48 business,
and I've discovered a lot of areas that should concern us."
"But," he went on, "I can't find anyone concerning themselves,
much less doing anything about any of these areas. Let me
give you an example. More than one piece of paper I've re-
viewed addressed the need for torpedo retrievers capable of
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recovering both MK-48 torpedoes and MK-27 Mobile Torpedo
Targets (MTT's) during exercise firings. And, from what
I've been able to find out, our present torpedo retrievers
are not capable of carrying out this task because of differ-
ences which I'm not prepared to discuss. Your predecessor
accordingly submitted COMSUBLANT's recommendations for capa-
bilities of and desired characteristics for such a torpedo
retriever to the "MK-48 Program Coordination Group" (PCG) at
their last meeting in April 1969. The problem seems to have
stopped right there, for I am unable to identify anyone
doing anything about developing a new torpedo retriever or
investigating the possibility of converting or modifying our
existing torpedo retrievers. This deeply concerns me.
What's more, nobody's even addressed the issue of how many
we need and where they are to be stationed." Jim went on to
describe similar situations in a few more areas and then
asked, "I know that most of our submarines have had their
fire control systems MK-48 modified. That's pretty well
tracked and documented. But, what the Hell else is required
or is being done to ready our submarines for the MK-48?
What's being done to ready our submarine tenders, our shore
facilities, and our training facilities? What's being done
regarding the preparation of technical manuals, development
of load lists for spare/repair parts, etc? Maybe the Project
Manager (PM) in Washington has a handle on all this stuff,
but we, as representatives of the fleet, ought to sit down
and identify each of these areas of concern, determine what's
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being doen about each NOW , and, if ongoing efforts don't
match what ought to be done, we ought to act accordingly.
No matter how I cut it," Jim concluded, "it looks like a
full time job to me."
CDR Greene had listened intently with obvious concern,
but he refused to provide any blanket endorsement to drop
everything else and devote full time to the MK-48. He did
set up some priorities and provide some short range guidance.
This didn't answer very many of Jim's questions, but it did
take some of the sting out of Jim's frustrations. CDR Greene
terminated the meeting with the following comments:
"Jim, I'm really pleased with the effort you're giving
this MK-48 business. You can rest assured that we are going
to get into it, but we are going to have to proceed with
patience and deal with things in the order of their prior-
ities. Right now, the Conventional Weapons Manual is the
top priority. Providing accurate and complete guidance to
the fleet regarding weapons systems they have in their hands
right now is more important than preparing for a weapons sys-
tem which isn't here yet. The manual should be finished
soon anyway. In fact, I just told Fred this morning that if
he wants to be detached on schedule, he had better get it in
gear and get his input (the fire control chapter) to the man-
ual completed. Unfortunately, you're going to have to worry
about the fire control business sidy-by-side with the MK-48
for a while. Recognize that I do hear what you are saying.
By mid-December, I'm told, things will probably start to
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slow down a bit due to the holidays. In the meantime, make
sure you have the names and phone numbers of Fred's MK-48
contacts. I'd like for you to be on the road, visiting key
MK-48 people and picking their brains, sometime prior to the
first of the year. In preparation, keep after the MK-48
paper work, and get everything that you can under your belt
before you go.
"
As Jim started to leave CDR Greene's office, CDR Greene
stopped him by saying, "Just a minute, Jim. I almost forgot
something. In this morning's mail I just ran across a piece
of correspondence setting up the next MK-48 (PCG) meeting in
Washington on the 20th and 21st of this month. Let's both
go to that meeting and get ourselves MK-48 educated. Every-
one who has anything to do with the MK-48 Program will be
2there. Maybe we can get some of your questions answered
there.
"
Jim cheerfully agreed and left CDR Greene's office.
Little time remained for Jim to prepare for the meeting, and
Jim clearly recognized it.
The next few days passed rapidly. Jim pushed as hard as
he could to read MK-48 material between other requirements.
Fred was starting to worry about finishing his input to the
Conventional Weapons Manual . As a result, Jim found himself
getting a little more of the office fire control responsibil-
ity that Fred had, until now, been clinging to.




By November 20th Jim hadn't made too much additional
headway in the MK-48 material. But, "Every little bit helps,"
thought Jim as he and CDR Greene entered the Pentagon on
their way to the MK-48 PCG meeting. Locating Room 1E801 was
a real drill in "labyrinth technology". After learning that
"ring" in "Pentagonese" means hallway, and after asking di-
rections a half a dozen times, they managed to be in their
seats by 0815. The meeting got underway on schedule at 0830.
The chairman was CAPT L.S. Clifford, from the office of the
CNO. He headed up CNO's code OP-713, the "Submarine Warfare
Branch, Undersea and Strategic Warfare Division". Jim re-
called from his assault on the "MK-48 paper pile" that CAPT
Clifford had been appointed CNO MK-48 Program Coordinator
and MK-48 PCG Chairman in August 1968.
Looking at the list of attendees provided him, Jim noted
that at least 25 different commands and agencies were present,
and that some had three to four representatives. The first
day's meeting lasted until 1630, with an hour off for lunch.
The first hour and a half were devoted to "cleaning up" ac-
tion items from the last PCG meeting held in April 1969.
Most of this commentary had to do with technical problems
that had been encountered during torpedo and MTT testing con-
ducted early in 1969. The speakers included representatives
from NAVORDSYSCOM, NUWRES , ORL/PSU, CNO, MASWSP, AUTEC Head-
quarters, NAVSHIPSYSCOM, OPTEVFOR, to name a few.
The discussions ranged from specific aspects of torpedo and
MTT technical deficiencies and nuances, to the need for
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MK-48 configured torpedo retrievers, the need for a fleet
firing doctrine, and specific action to ensure that both
ashore and afloat commands would have the handling equipment
necessary to prevent damage to MK-48 torpedoes. Jim took
copious notes, while concurrent ly wondering how he fit into
this passing parade. He knew that COMSUBDEVGRU TWO was
tasked with developing the fleet firing doctrine and that
CDR Greene's predecessor had already submitted COMSUBLANT's
MK-48 torpedo retriever capabilities/characteristics recom-
mendations to the PCG at their last meeting, but what about
all of this other business? Should COMSUBLANT be worrying
about any of this other stuff? It certainly sounded like
COMSUBLANT ought to be concerning itself with the handling
equipment business. After all, they would be handling the
MK-48 torpedo more than anyone else in the long run.
The remainder of the morning session was given to CAPT
3J.W. Shurfoot, the MK-48-0 Program Manager. He brought the
group up to date on the status of his program, which in-
cluded development of all of the ancillary support systems.
His vantage point afforded him the opportunity to pass on
many enlightening comments on a multitude of program areas.
Shore facility workshop construction, plans for internal
equipments necessary for setting up torpedo and MTT lines
within each workshop, training requirements and status, open
ocean exercise firing plans, production contract schedules,
3 See Exhibit 5 for "Dual Effort" PMO organization
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TECH/OPEVAL submarine requirements, torpedo retrieval re-
quirements on the AUTEC firing range, and several other top-
ics of fleet interest were included in CAPT Surfoot's
presentation.
The next day's meeting saw no change in pace. Jim hadn't
been able to begin to assimilate what he had heard the pre-
vious day, and here they were off and running again. This
time they started off with a status report from CAPT B.W.
4Compet, the MK-48-1 Program Manager. This was followed by
detailed discussions on services required to support the up-
coming TECH/OPEVAL, the projected requirement for more
changes to the submarine fire control systems, plans for
TECH/OPEVAL torpedo workshop activations, and the requirement
for a temporary torpedo workshop at Cape Kennedy, Florida.
It seemed that each item discussed carried with it a
host of yet to be solved problems — Although, from the pre-
vailing attitude, it seemed that, despite the problems, the
connoted outlook was optimistic. Jim, however, just couldn't
bring himself around to feeling optimistic. .In fact, he
really felt depressed when he and CDR Greene boarded the
plane for Norfolk that evening.
It was a good thing that CDR Greene had an ever prevail-
ing good sense of humor. By the time they were ready to
land, Jim, assisted in a large measure by CDR Greene's
colorful prodding, had managed to convince himself that they
4
See Exhibit 5 for "Dual Effort" PMO organization,
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could somehow get it all sorted out. And, with a little
concerted effort, COMSUBLANT ' s tasks could be identified.
"After all," thought Jim to himself, "many of these tasks
were brought to the surface by the PCG meeting." The big
picture still wasn't clear, but COMSUBLANT had, by the meet-
ing, surely been asked for specific positions on a number of
issues. A great deal of further probing was required to
formulate these positions. Jim knew that this was going to
be a tough row to hoe, considering his working environment.
Dwelling on the torpedo handling problem for a moment, Jim
soon recognized that the handling operations accumulated
over the life of a torpedo were manifest. And, depending
upon the definition of "damage" in the MK-48 arena, the pre-
cautionary steps to be considered in developing "safe"
handling equipment for the MK-48 torpedo could multiply
rapidly. Similar ramifications surrounded practically all
of the issues that COMSUBLANT was tasked to establish posi-
tions .
As they made their final approach to the Norfolk airport,
Jim scanned the tenative list of action items he'd developed
as a result of the PCG meeting. It read:
"a) Get the Admiral's position regarding future exercise
firings - should they be on an instrumented range or
in the open ocean? CNO OP-95 wants to know.
b) Look into future availability of 'dedicated' SSN/(s)
for the TECH/OPEVAL series.
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c) Find out what has to be done to get all required
MK-48 ORDALTS installed in our submarines.
d) Find out what has to be done to our submarines to
make their torpedo handling equipment 'safe' and
compatible with MK-48.
e) Find out from the Project Manager what specific re-
quirements he has in mind for 'Fleet Introduction'
that must be satisfied by 'Forces Afloat'. (This
looks both manifold and ominous.)
f) Don't forget to get more dope on the torpedo retriev-
er business. What else do they want from us beside
our capabilities/characteristics recommendations?
How about recommendations regarding numbers and de-
ployment sites on the East Coast?
g) Touch base with COMSUBDEVGRU TWO and get status of
fleet firing doctrine effort. Find out if there is
anything COMSUBLANT can do to assist."
The list represented a great deal of required effort,
but Jim couldn't help wondering about how much he'd missed
at the meeting. "Thank God it's Friday," thought Jim as he
put his papers in his briefcase and disembarked the plane.
"Take your 'MK-48 hat' off for the weekend, Jim," said
CDR Greene as they walked toward the terminal building.
"Monday's soon enough to sort this stuff out. Preparing our
'trip report' will help you to identify what has to be done,"
he added.
"See you Monday," said Jim as he headed for his car.
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Jim took CDR Greene's advice and spent a relaxing week-
end with his family. It would be untrue however, to say
that he was able to set aside completely the MK-48 burden.
It was a real struggle to dismiss its ever present loom.
Jim spent Monday morning preparing the required "trip
report" to CAPT Ready for CDR Greene and himself. CDR Greene
was right: Preparation of the "trip report" did prove en-
lightening, and it eased Jim's mind considerably by passing
some of his MK-48 worries "upstairs" . After handing the
"trip report" to CDR Greene for "chop" and "signature", Jim
renewed his assault on the "MK-48 paper pile" with renewed
vigor, hoping to answer some of his questions and permit
resolution of his list of action items. In addition to con-
tinuing this effort throughout the remainder of the week,
Jim managed to break Fred loose from his work on the Conven -
tional Weapons Manual long enough to get the names and phone
numbers of the contact points he needed to plan for his
pending trip.
The following week Fred completed his input to the Con-
ventional Weapons Manual and departed the staff on schedule.
Jim soon found himself fielding all of the problems that
Fred had exposed him to, plus a lot of new ones. It didn't
take long for Jim to get to know Chief Oblisk a lot better.
They rapidly developed a good rapport, and Jim immediately
recognized that Chief Oblisk possessed a wealth of knowledge
that Jim had here-to-fore failed to appreciate. There was
no doubt about it, Chief Oblisk really understood the fire
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control business and was a big help to Jim. Chief Oblisk
seemed to know just who to talk to when it was necessary to
seek advice or assistance from another command such as
NAVORDSYSCOM or NUSC, Newport (formerly NUWRES , Newport).
As a result of Chief Oblisk' s knowledge and willingness to
assist, Jim tended to rely on his help in the management of
routine fire control matters more and more as time passed.
This proved quite helpful, as it permitted Jim to devote more
of his time to MK-48: not as much as he'd have liked to have,
but more.
Jim didn't wish to be ill-prepared when he had to pre-
sent his proposed COMSUBLANT positions up the chain of com-
mand to the Admiral. And, he was convinced that these
positions could be better prepared after he'd had the bene-
fit of the additional knowledge he hoped to acquire on his
forthcoming trip.
Planning for his pending trip proved no simple task.
Jim had a list of players as long as his arm, but he really
5didn't know what each of the players could do for him. He
had some general feelings as to what each might be able to
do, but time, money, and geographical considerations prohib-
ited visiting all or, for that matter, many of them. The
competetive nature of this stage of the procurement caused
several of the players to be tight-lipped, and Jim didn't
5 See Exhibit 10 for organizational relationship between
COMSUBLANT Staff and other MK-48 involved commands.
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care to get involved in those kinds of problems at this
point in time. "God only knows," Jim thought to himself,
"I've got enough problems of my own."
By early December, Jim had decided that he could get the
best mileage out of his trip by visiting Washington, D.C.
and Newport, Rhode Island. In Washington, he would start
out at NAVORDSYSCOM in the PM's office and proceed to wher-
ever that took him. He was confident that the various visits
he would make in the Project Manager's Office (PMO) would
take him to other places, many of which were in the Washing-
ton area. If travels elsewhere became necessary, he'd just
have to take another trip. He'd settled on the Newport visit
because of NUSC, Newport's involvement in everything but the
MK-48-1 (CLEVITE) torpedo, which became obvious to him through
his "paper pile" efforts and his attendance at the PCG meet-
6mg.
With the middle of December approaching, Jim was really
surprised at how much more of the MK-48 material he'd been
able to digest. He was helped in part by the fact that CDR
Greene had twice placed a moratorium on all but emergency
incoming telephone calls. This was done in an effort to per-
mit all hands in the Force Weapons Office to concentrate on
getting the Conventional Weapons Manual to press. This
really assisted Jim as he was not involved with the manual.
See Exhibit 11 for NUSC, Newport organization
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On 15 December, the Conventional Weapons Manual finally
left the office, and the sighs of relief could be heard for
miles. The same day CDR Greene called Jim into his office
asking, "OK, Jim, have you got your itinerary together?"
"Yes sir!" answered Jim, and he quickly laid out his
plans for CDR Greene.
CDR Greene was particularly pleased with Jim's choice of
NUSC, Newport because he saw the opportunity for Jim to get
some double duty mileage out of the visit due to NUSC's in-
volvement with conventional fire control matters. Jim ad-
mitted that he didn't have too many names, but that he
wasn't too concerned about that. "Because," Jim said, "once
in the PMO, I'm sure I'll be directed to the appropriate
party if I'm asking questions that the respondent is not
familiar with. In fact," Jim went on, "one of the major out-
puts of this trip will be a current list of contact names
and telephone numbers categorized by areas of concern/exper-
tise."
CDR Greene agreed with Jim's proposal and asked how long
it would be before he was prepared to travel. Jim responded
with, "I'm planning to leave on the 18th." CDR Greene agreed,
and Jim's security clearances left the staff that afternoon.
Jim had another meeting with CDR Greene the afternoon of
the 17th. At that meeting, Jim discussed a list of items
he'd selected for further investigation and the rationale
he'd used to prepare the list. It seems that during the
several weeks that Jim had struggled to assimilate the MK-48
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material, a pattern began to emerge: He almost automatically
found himself categorizing areas of interest under the head-
ings of hardware, software, and training. After about four
weeks, he found that everything seemed to fall into a spe-
cific number of sub-categories. These were: the MK-48 tor-
pedo itself (three breeds: MOD's thru 2), the MK-27 MTT,
torpedo retrievers, MK-48 workshops and magazines (ashore
and aboard submarine tenders), submarine fire control sys-
tems for the MK-48, submarine MK-48 onboard handling systems,
MK-48 operational and technical documentation, and MK-48
training requirements. Jim also discussed an expanded list
of questions he'd prepared addressing each of these areas.
CDR Greene scanned Jim's list of questions. He was familiar
with many of the questions, but a great many more were new
to him. Shaking his head, CDR Greene replied, "Jim, it looks
like a real bag of worms to me, and I'm more convinced now
that the PMO is not going to have all the answers. Good
luck, Jim," he closed, "you're going to need it."
Jim began his trip the morning of the 18th and spent a
total of six days on the road. He met with a dozen people
starting in the PMO. His first four interviews got him in-
volved with specialists who wanted to discuss the technical
aspects of the fire control modifications, the torpedo's en-
gineering problems, and a myriad of other technical subjects.
This really proved frustrating for Jim, not because he
wasn't interested, but because no one could tell him how
these things affected the submarine force. What did the PM
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want from the fleet? What specifically did the fleet have
to do to get ready for fleet introduction? Certainly there
must be some plan for interface that requires fleet coordi-
nation and active participation? Those that did have some
feel for what Jim was talking about asked questions rather
than answering his.
"Holy wow! A day and a half shot to Hell," Jim thought
to himself as he was introduced to the Project Manager's
Plans Officer, Mr. Harold Progress, "I wonder if anyone in
this outfit realizes that this God damned torpedo is being
designed for the submarine force?" As it turned out, his
tete-a-tete with Mr. Progress proved most memorable. Jim
had no sooner explained his purpose when Mr. Progress ex-
pressed his genuine appreciation that Jim was interested in
the fleet's role. He went on to express his hope that they
could exchange a lot of information today and on a contin-
uing basis. In that fleet introduction was Mr. Progress's
bag, he stated that he particularly needed fleet input to a
whole host of matters, but no such dialogue had here-to-fore
taken place. Jim was truely amazed by the fact that Mr.
Progress had apparently been virtually isolated from the
fleet when the types of decisions he was tasked with making
all but cried for fleet input. Within moments, Mr. Progress
began bombarding Jim with a volley of questions: "Where do
you want to place the first weapons? How many weapons do
you want to load on each class of submarine? What shore fa-
cility do you want to see activated first? How do you
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intend to use your submarine tenders? These and scores more
of equally important and basic questions came at Jim like
automatic rifle fire. Jim had no answers but promised to
follow up on them and get them to him. Jim was becoming
frustrated rapidly. His twenty questions were being dwarfed
by the magnitude of the overall requirements that were un-
folding before him. Could all of the submarines in the
force be MK-48 configured within two years? That was what
Mr. Progress was suggesting as being the goal. To confound
the problem even further, Mr. Progress also indicated that
more fire control alterations (not yet specified) were on
the drawing board. He concurrently discussed the need for
special loading and handling alterations within each class
of submarine to preclude damage to the torpedo. These load-
ing and handling alterations would come in the form of
7SHIPALTS which had yet to be completely developed. And,
Jim was reminded, the activation of torpedo workshops would
require trained people as would submarine fire control sys-
tems and torpedo rooms and submarine tender facilities acti-
vation.
"I can't believe it," thought Jim as he boarded the
plane for Newport, "Thank God I didn't plan to visit any
more commands."
7 See Appendix III for explanation of SHIPALT program.
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The visit to NUSC, Newport was just as busy as the Wash-
ington visit. He visited with both MK-48 personnel and
other weapons oriented people in the fire control area with
whom he and Chief Oblisk had frequently conducted past busi-
ness. Jim found the latter visit productive as well as in-
formative, but he was almost preoccupied with MK-48 concerns.
His points of contact in the MK-48 area included Mr. Ron
Tyme in the MK-48 fire control area, Mr. John Kabel in the
loading and handling area, Mr. Red House in the facilities
and workshops area, and Mr. Jack Tester in the MK-48-0/2
TECHEVAL area. It became very apparent to Jim that NUSC,
Newport, in their capacity as In Service Engineering Activ-
ity (ISEA) for the PM and the Technical Evaluation Director
for the MK-48-0/2 (WECO) torpedo, was a prime mover in the
MK-48 Torpedo Weapons System development program.
The NUSC, Newport visit strongly reaffirmed the need for
immediate fleet involvement in the many areas which had been
so shockingly brought into focus by Mr. Progress. Mr. Tyme,
for example, had gone into the projected changes facing the
already installed MK-48-0 modified submarine fire control
systems. He also brought into sharp focus some of the major
problems his shop was facing. Not the least of these was
ggetting submarines scheduled for ORDALT accomplishment.
Mr. Tyme was well aware of the fact that future ORDALT accom-
plishments required greater acceleration. And, when he
o
See Appendix II for explanation of ORDALT program,
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combined this with the well known fact that SSN scheduled
availabilities changed so frequently, he simply didn't see
how he was going to be able to keep up with the projected
ORDALT requirements. This problem was greatly complicated
by the fact that most changes to the MK-48 torpedo required
changes to the fire control system, and, in many cases,
these changes were significant. Jim couldn't help but won-
der if there might be anything he could do at the COMSUBLANT
level to ease this situation. Tyme's problem was one of the
more significant of many problems Jim heard articulated.
Jim's head was swimming as he mulled over the events of
the past six days on the flight back to Norfolk. He felt
much like he did the day Fred Grey introduced him to the
"MK-48 paper pile."
"Thank God," he thought, "I had the foresight to schedule
a few days leave over Christmas." On arrival in Norfolk,
Jim dismissed the idea of visiting the office before driving
home. Ke mused for a moment, "No way! I could be shot for
even considering giving this bag of worms to the Boss for
Christmas.
"
Jim drove home repeating over and over to himself, "I'm
not going to let this ruin my family's Christmas." Jim had
convinced himself of this by the time he arrived home. And,
his wife couldn't have been better prepared with the big
punch bowl filled with eggnog for a small neighborhood get
together they'd planned for this evening.
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Jim returned to the office the day after New Years,
loaded for bear. "This is ironical," he thought, shuffling
through his notes, "I left with twenty questions and re-
turned with a hundred and twenty. And," he continued to
himself, "most of them wanted to know what COMSUBLANT was
doing about this, what was the fleet's position regarding
that, or who could they talk to on the staff regarding a
myriad of issues?" Regarding his feelings at this moment,
Jim once recalled to this casewriter:
"It had been one Hell of a trip, and the thing that
came through loud and clear was that everyone wanted
and truely needed to know something. But, it appear-
ed, I was the first person from the fleet that they
ever had the opportunity to ask. There were so damned
many problems, and it appeared to me that many of
them could have been solved right there on the staff."
"I've got my ducks in line now," muttered Jim to himself
as he headed for CDR Greene's office.
Jim was seated, notes in hand, when CDR Greene entered
his office. "You must have a lot to say," CDR Greene said
as he seated himself behind his desk.
"Yes sir!" replied Jim, and he began to unload. He be-
gan by elaborating the more pressing problems as he saw them:
Namely; the need to select "dedicated" submarines for the
forthcoming TECH/OPEVAL series; the need to see what could
be done to stabilize SSN availability schedules to ease the
fire control ORDALT accomplishment problems faced by Mr.
Tyme of NUSC, Newport; and the need to answer many of the
basic yet important questions posed by Mr. Progress of the
PMO. He then went on to discuss the implications of what
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apparently had to be done within the submarine force to re-
ceive the first torpedoes in operational submarines. Specif-
ically; he brought to CDR Greene's attention the fact that
hardware and training requirements were still not defined,
the fact that better than a hundred submarines have to under-
go yet unclear material alterations in the loading and hand-
ling area which varied with submarine class, the fact that
the overall MK-48 support system and its requirements for
submarine tenders, shore stations, torpedo retrievers, and
even the submarines themselves were not yet clearly defined,
and the startling fact that the "master plan" called for a
limited number of torpedoes to be delivered to the fleet as
early as 1971. Jim continued for over an hour. And, it
would be safe to say that CDR Greene probably felt much like
Jim did when he was listening to Mr. Progress.
"One Hell of a collateral duty, eh Boss?" Jim concluded.
"Chief Oblisk has been a real help in the fire control area,
leaving more time available for me to romance the MK-48, but
he's due to leave soon. Frankly, I'm a bit worried. I don't
know what kind of replacement I'll get. Even if he's as
good as Oblisk, I'll be carrying both jobs until he gets up
to speed. I hate to think about the other alternative. One
thing's clear, Boss," Jim continued, "the paper pile was just
the trunk of the 'MK-48 Elephant', and I really don't know
how much more of him remains to be seen."
"That's a fair appraisal of the situation," CDR Greene
interrupted, "and I recognize that you will have to spend a
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lot more of your time on the MK-48. But, Jim," he continued,
"we in our shop can't answer all of these questions by our-
selves. We will have to 'staff each one of them."
Jim rogered the CDR's comments, and they both decided
that they must categorize the areas of concern into the de-
9fined areas of responsibility of the various staff codes.
Once this was done, it would be necessary to bring these
items to the attention of the cognizant senior staff officers
heading each of the involved staff codes and seek their sup-
port. Individual items could then be farmed out to the ap-
propriate action officers throughout the various staff offices
The all important responsibility for follow up would still
rest with the Force Weapons Office: specifically, with Jim
White. This seemed like the way to proceed, and Jim left
CDR Greene's office with the feeling that he finally had a
real direction to point toward. "This is truely refreshing,"
Jim thought as he headed for his desk.
Jim spent the first part of January working on his cate-
gorization efforts. He then prepared numerous memoranda and
forwarded them to the appropriate staff codes via CDR Greene.
As he was preparing the memoranda, he was forced to reread
much of the correspondence in the "MK-48 paper pile". Re-
reading it he couldn't keep from wondering why much of it
wasn't initially distributed to the concerned staff codes.
9 See Appendix IV for charters/responsibilities of
COMSUBLANT functional codes. See Exhibits 8 and 9 for Force
Weapons Office Relationship in COMSUBLANT Staff organization
and Force Weapons Office layout, respectively.
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"After all," he thought to himself, "most of this stuff clear-
ly falls into the areas of training, operations, material,
and logistic support. A lot of this stuff is purely weapons
and clearly my bag, but I really wonder how much of this
stuff would be in this pile if MK-48 didn't appear on it some-
where. I'll bet the Yeoman in the mail room just looks for
a few key words in correspondence titles to guide his routing
decisions. That's why it's in this pile: because MK-48 ap-
pears on the front page somewhere."
Within three weeks, all available information had been
distributed to the various staff codes, noting the urgency
of the situation, and requesting early efforts to seek solu-
tions so that potential crises may be avoided as the fleet
introduction date neared. The full dimensions of the prob-
lems in each area remained to be scoped out, but, with the
full support of the responsible staff offices focusing on
the problems, it was anticipated that a plan of attack could
be hammered out within a few weeks.
The first requirement for follow up on the part of the
Force Weapons Office came in the form of an UNCLASSIFIED
message and two or three telephone calls from the PMO.
These communications were attempting to schedule the USS
TRIGGER, a diesel submarine, for the long anticipated and
Messages below the security classification of SECRET
are routinely distributed to all concerned COMSUBLANT staff
officers twice daily: In the morning and after lunch. De-




necessary SHIPALT required to convert the submarine's on-
board torpedo loading and handling equipment to a MK-48 com-
patible configuration. The work was to be accomplished by
the Charleston Naval Shipyard (CHASN.NSY) in Charleston,
South Carolina, but a certain amount of scheduling and coor-
dination was being requested of COMSUBLANT to ensure that
the job would proceed smoothly. Jim discussed the matter
with CDR Greene, and it was agreed that the nature of the
work, scheduling and coordination of diesel submarine hard-
ware modifications, clearly fell under the purview of staff
code N-403, the Diesel Submarine Material Officer, whose of-
fice was just down the hall. Accordingly, Jim gathered to-
gether all of the communications received, including memos
summarizing telephone conversations, attached them to a brief
memo that he wrote to CDR Swain (N-403), and forwarded the
package to him through the inter-office mail system as a
matter under his cognizance.
At 1400 the same day, while CDR Greene was standing by
Jim's desk discussing a fire control matter, CDR Swain en-
tered the office. He was red in the face and obviously
quite irritated. "God damn it! Is this your memo?" he
blurted while looking Jim straight in his eyes. Failing to
cast a single glance in CDR Greene's direction he continued,
"Look here! Don ; t be trying to pawn off your work on us.
This is what you're supposed to be looking after. You are
the MK-48 Project Officer, aren't you?"
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"Well yes," replied Jim, "but this appeared to be diesel
material business. We certainly aren't trying to duck out
of anything that falls into our area of responsibility."
"You're here to introduce the MK-48 Weapons System, and
this is part of it. I'll be damned if I'm going to start
doing your work for you," replied CDR Swain.
"OK, Commander," replied Jim, "I had no intention of dis-
rupting the staff over this. It's pretty routine, and I'll
be happy to look after it if you feel that strongly about
it. Pretty soon though, I'm going to reach a point when
I'll need your help and the help of several other staff
codes.
"
CDR Swain calmed down somewhat, but he didn't back down
a bit. After a few more words, the atmosphere grew a little
less tense, but CDR Swain's position still didn't budge.
As the confrontation wound down, Jim couldn't believe
what had happened. If he was frustrated before, he was
ready to cut his throat now. If this was a preview of what
he could expect of the rest of the staff, he saw an impass-
able morass of work ahead. And, with Chief Oblisk soon
leaving, he really didn't know how in the Hell he was going
to be able to manage it all.
While all of this was in progress, CDR Greene had found
himself a seat and propped his feet up on an empty desk to
listen. He didn't enter a word until CDR Swain had left the
room, and he smiled slightly when that happened. "Jim," he
said, "I think we've done a pretty good job outlining the
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problem up to now, but I can tell you one thing right now:
These people aren't going to do a damned thing for us. And,
I really don't know if I blame them. The routine in every
office of this staff is just as hectic as ours. They're al-
ready loaded up to the eyeballs with their own work. They
very well know their areas of responsibility, but they're
not going to volunteer for additional work. What's more, if
they respond favorably to one of your memos, they virtually
open the door for further invitations to more work. No, Jim,
these people just aren't going to worry about fleet intro-
duction of the MK-48. And, what really worries me is the
fact that I'm not really sure that you can do a whole Hell




MK-48 TORPEDO FLEET INTRODUCTION (C)
February 1970 began with Jim seriously considering drop-
ping his one man assault on the MK-48 fleet introduction
problem in favor of fielding individual MK-48 problems as
they arose. Lord knows he had more than enough to do in the
fire control area, and no one else on the staff short of CDR
Greene appeared enthusiastic about assisting Jim in the man-
agement of MK-48 problems.
This dilemma in which Jim found himself engulfed was con-
founded by the loss of Chief Oblisk on February 10th. Jim
really hadn't realized how much he had depended upon Chief
Oblisk until he left the staff. His replacement, Senior
Chief Firecontrolman Sharp, was also new to staff duty. He
came to COMSUBLANT Staff from instructor duty at the FBM
Training Center in New London, Connecticut. There he en-
joyed an excellent reputation instructing FBM Submarine Fire
Control Parties, made up of both officers and enlisted men,
in the MK-113 Fire Control "Attack Teacher". However,
For clarification of the acronyms used throughout the
case, please refer to Appendix I.
This case was written by CDR David A. Newcomb and LCDR Robert
F. Hurley, Jr., under the direction of Professors William
Giauque and Michael Dean of the Naval Postgraduate School,
Monterey, California. All names have been disguised.
Cases are prepared as a basis for class discussion and are
not designed to present illustrations of either correct or
incorrect handling of administrative problems.
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despite Chief Sharp's excellent reputation, he was unfamil-
iar with staff duty, and, like Jim on his arrival, he
couldn't believe what was going on around him. In fact, for
the first few days following his arrival, he just sat at his
desk,- awe-struck with an "I don't believe it" look on his
face, while he passively surveyed the chaotic office routine.
Jim was dismayed as he observed Chief Sharp's arrival
behavior. He realized that Chief Sharp's past experience
had been pretty much operational and hardware oriented, and,
as a result, it was really going to take some time for him
to acclimate to the staff environment. What really worried
Jim was the possibility that Chief Sharp, like many senior
enlisted men, could not adjust to the staff routine.
One thing Jim had managed to do before Chief Oblisk de-
parted was to have him make up a list of all of his outside
contacts, their telephone numbers, and the function each
performs. Chief Oblisk turned this list over to Chief Sharp
and gave a copy to Jim. It goes, without saying that this
list saved the day on several occasions by permitting rapid
reaction to various emergency fleet equipment support re-
quirements. It also opened Jim's eyes further to how much
Chief Oblisk had really been doing for him.
It was in this environment that Jim pondered the future
of COMSUBLANT involvement in MK-48 fleet introduction. The
daily routine was burying him, but he never lost sight of
the fact that MK-48 decisions were going to be made, with or
without COMSUBLANT involvement, that the submarine force was
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going to have to live with over the entire life of the MK-48
Torpedo Weapons System. Accordingly, the submarine force
should have a greater vested interest in MK-48 fleet intro-
duction than any one else in the Navy. Jim just couldn't
imagine how they, the submarine force, could sit back and
not get involved in the decision making process. To think
that important decisions could be made which would affect
the submarine force for years to come, by people who really
didn't always understand the problems of the fleet, while
the fleet could but would not involve itself in the decision
making process, sickened Jim. He recalled the MK-37 torpedo
which had been with the fleet since the mid 1950 's and rec-
ognized, as did many more submariners, that some 20 years
later we still didn't know how to handle or shoot it proper-
ly. "Christ," he thought to himself, "do we really have to
go down that road again? Why can't we get involved and be
ready this time?"
By the 20th of February Jim had decided that, since a
torpedo development program of MK-48 magnitude comes along
only once every 25 or 30 years or so, he wasn't going to
forget past mistakes. Rather, Jim concluded that through
the benefit of these mistakes, he, with or without help, was
going to attempt to represent the submarine force in the
MK-48 Program and get involved, full-time, some how or an-
other. Looking over at Chief Sharp sitting at his desk Jim
thought to himself, "Chief, like it or not, you are going to
become the Force Fire Control Officer."
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Moments later Jim was standing in front of CDR Greene's
desk. "Boss," he said, "do you remember your comments the
day CDR Swain was in here raising Hell about the installa-
tion on TRIGGER? Well, as you said, it's pretty obvious
from what happened with TRIGGER that we're not going to get
a Hell of a lot of help from the staff in dealing with the
MK-48. I don't know what I'll be able to do alone, but I
want to try. I want to give Chief Sharp the entire fire
control load — everything: decisions, letters, messages,
files — the whole thing. I'll require him to keep me
briefed and to route all correspondence and decisions through
me, but I want him to do the job. I will remain accountable
if it doesn't work, but I want to go full-time on MK-48
business -- it's the only way I can get out from under and
get moving."
When Jim had finally gotten it all off his chest, he
took a deep breath and waited. In retrospect, Jim wasn't
sure why he expected to get some kind of backlash. CDR
Greene time and again had proven himself a very practical
individual. He made it a practice to let everyone, officer
and enlisted alike, have just enough rope to get the job
done, but not enough to hang themselves with. This proved
no exception -- after weighing what Jim had said for a few
seconds, he replied, "Jim, MK-48 and fire control are yours.
Chief Sharp works for you. If you want to find out if he
can 'hack it' -- go ahead — it's your decision."
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Jim felt relieved as he left CDR Greene's office. He
returned to his desk where he collected his thoughts and de-
cided not to break the news to Chief Sharp until the next
morning — better to sleep on it and see how he felt about
it tomorrow.
Jim wrestled with the idea overnight and concluded that
giving Chief Sharp the fire control load was the only re-
course he had available. The immediate problems he had to
cope with were how to break the news to Chief Sharp, and,
more importantly, how Chief Sharp was going to accept the
2
news.
The following morning Jim called Chief Sharp over to his
desk and invited him to join him for a cup of coffee. After
drawing their coffee they returned to Jim's desk and began
a conversation that neither would ever forget. After getting
the generalities out of the way, Jim vectored the discussion
toward the MK-48 Torpedo Weapons System: Specifically, the
challenge facing fleet introduction and the need for
COMSUBLANT Staff to get involved. He discussed his own dual
role as Force Fire Control Officer and MK-48 Project Officer,
the obvious inability to do both jobs concurrently in an ef-
fective manner, and the paradoxical reality that the subma-
rine force desperately needed to have both jobs performed
2 Students unfamiliar with the Navy, specifically the
type of performance that can reasonably be expected of or
the types of responsibilities normally assigned to Navy
Chief Petty Officers, please refer to Appendix V.

effectively. Jim then began to level with the Chief.
"Chief," Jim went on, "the only way we can get both jobs
done effectively is to share the load. And, I feel that
your seniority and excellent record of past performance
quite appropriately justifies my turning the Force Fire Con-
trol load over to you."
Chief Sharp didn't even flinch.
This somewhat startled Jim in that he wasn't sure that
the Chief really understood or appreciated the impact of
what he had said. "That's right, Chief," Jim continued,
"for all intents and purposes you will be the Force Fire
Control Officer. I'll expect you to route all outgoing cor-
respondence through me and keep me informed regarding the
problems you encounter and the decisions you make. And,
most importantly, I'll expect you to seek my assistance in
matters or decisions that you think I should be involved in,
regardless of reason."
To Jim's complete amazement, Chief Sharp still didn't
bat an eye. And, this time, Jim knew damned good and well
that the Chief understood him.
When later asked by this casewriter why revelation of
his new and expanded assignment failed to elicit any appar-
ent emotional response on his part, Chief Sharp responded:
"To this day I still don't know how I was supposed
to have responded. Quite frankly, I was just wait-
ing for someone to tell me what was required of me.
And, that's what Mr. White did."
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From that point on, Jim tried hard to let Chief Sharp
field all the fire control problems. Chief Sharp was obvious-
ly struggling to keep his footing during the next couple of
weeks, but he was a willing worker and appeared to be doing
his best. At first, Jim watched Chief Sharp like a hawk,
and he often found himself getting involved in fire control
matters more than he wanted to. On balance, however, Jim
soon realized that he really wasn't getting too involved:
Chief Sharp wanted only enough of Jim's time to ensure that
things were being handled correctly. As the Chief's confi-
dence grew, the routine "flaps" crossed Jim's desk much less
frequently and almost always not until the Chief had staffed
up a proposed solution. As a result of all this, Jim was
able to fully devote 90% of his attention to the Iv"K-48 by
the second week of March.
In addition to continuing to broaden his grasp of the
MK-48 Program's idiosyncracies through further reading and
telephone contacts, Jim was still struggling terribly with
the mental challenge of how to get the others on COMSUBLANT
Staff to take an active role in the business of preparing
the submarine force for fleet introduction of this new weap-
ons system. He had nothing more persistent on his mind, and
he desperately wanted to come up with a solution. He was
convinced that there had to be a way, and, after a great




Jim made up his mind in mid March that the only way to
get the MX-48 dope out to the staff was to stop chipping
away at the individual areas of concern. Rather, he had to
"get a rope around the whole thing" . He had to let everyone
on the staff get a feel for the dimensions of the entire
problem. Specifically, he decided to put together a detailed
review of the complete MK-48 Program from a submarine force
point of view: As the end user of the system. He would com-
pile his findings in writing, identify all known items that
should be of concern to the submarine force, highlight asso-
ciated problems, and make proposals and recommendations,
where appropriate, regarding what COMSUBLANT should do and
3
what staff codes were recommended to take action. In the
back of his mind, Jim knew that some staff officers might
take offense to his recommending that they take an item for
action, but he also knew that, if he were to do everything
by himself, other staff officers might take offense to his
doing things which clearly fell into their areas of responsi-
4bility without consulting them. No matter how he looked at
it, it was six of one thing and a half a dozen of another.
He therefore clung to his original idea and decided to title
his paper the "MK-48 Program Staff Review". He would for-
ward the paper up his own chain of command to the Admiral,
3 See Exhibit 8 for Force Weapons Office relationship in
COMSUBLANT Staff organization.




providing copies to the Deputy Chiefs of Staff and the As-
sistant Chiefs of Staff for further distribution within
their respective departments. If the Admiral bought it,
things would have to happen.
Jim became increasingly determined the more he thought
about going forward in this manner. He counted several rea-
sons for launching this new effort: First, he was convinced
.that whatever the effort necessary, the submarine force had
to wake up and prepare for this new weapons system or the
long range cost could be catastrophic; Second, he had arrived
at a point where he really thought that he could put together
a cogent pitch; Third, he was tremendously encouraged by the
dynamic and significant interest in COMSUBLANT ' s projected
input by Mr. Progress in the Project Manager's Office (PMO)
;
Fourth, he was quite pleased and further encouraged by the
liaison that was manifesting between himself and various key
people on the staffs of COMOPTEVFOR, COMSUBDEVGRU TWO, and
NUSC, Newport; Fifth, he was getting strong backing from CDR
Greene; Sixth, he was being freed of the fire control shack-
les by the fact that Chief Sharp was really beginning to
take hold; And last, and probably most important, he was be-
ginning to get the message that the new Admiral at COMSUBLANT '
s
helm since January was interested in and concerned with MK-48.
In fact, despite the failure of COMSUBLANT staff performance
to reflect it, the new Admiral let it be known to his senior
staff officers shortly after his arrival that fleet support
of MK-48 introduction stood high in his list of priorities,
and that ho accordingly expected full staff support of MK-48.
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After mentally outlining his plans and reaffirming the
rationale of his proposal, Jim became quite concerned, for
he recognized that such a review, if done properly, would
necessarily be voluminous. What worried Jim was the likely
possibility that the volume would turn the Admiral off be-
fore he read the first page. Alternatively, Jim began to
consider preparing and delivering a verbal pitch to the Ad-
miral and senior staff officers. This too would necessarily
be lengthy. More important though, and the reason Jim dis-
missed the idea, was the fact that a verbal presentation
failed to lay a permanent foundation upon which others could
later reference or place in the hands of other staff members.
"No," thought Jim, "it had to be a written review." Jim
broached his idea and his concern over the necessary volume
to CDR Greene, for Jim recognized that the "Boss" was some-
how usually able to "separate the wheat from the chaff".
CDR Greene's response' to Jim's reported dilemma gave him
the push he needed. "Jim," he said, "don't sweat the number
of pages. Something needs to be done, and I believe that
the Admiral will read such a summary with great interest —
so, get your fanny back to your desk and get cracking."
As expected, the undertaking turned out to be something
1 more than a trifle. For Jim, the remainder of March was
built around his "MK-48 Program Staff Review". His time
wasn't all spent writing, however. His first big hurdle was
to determine how he should format such a study. After sev-
eral false starts, he essentially came right back to the
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natural category sequence that his review of the MK-48 files
yielded. First he selected- four broad categories: hardware
requirements, training requirements, exercise firing policy,
and post firing analysis and data employment. He then listed
pertinent sub-categories under each of the four headings as
appropriate. Under hardware requirements he listed: torpe-
does, retrievers, targets, MK-48 shore facilities/tenders,
loading equipment, submarine MK-48 fire control system con-
versions, and firing doctrine. Under training requirements
he listed: torpedo/target training (general), retriever crew
training, shore facility and tender crew training, and sub-
marine crew training/instructor training. Exercise firing
policy and post firing analysis and data employment stood on
their own as major categories without further breakdown.
With categorization out of the way, Jim next decided
that for each category or sub-category, as appropriate, he
would present the material in three steps: current and proj-
ected status, considerations (with focus from submarine force
point of view), and proposals (for staff action were appro-
priate)
.
Once he had his outline in hand, Jim set to work extract-
ing data from newly organized files, one category at a time.
He supplemented this effort with an undeterminable number of
telephone calls, visits to COMOPTEVFOR in Norfolk, and an-
other trip to Washington to discuss each category with
Harold Progress. Harold Progress was quite receptive to
this new-found informal liaison with the fleet, and he placed
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a high value on it. So much so that he reciprocated by
visiting Jim in Norfolk two weeks later. These two meetings
proved themselves so productive that they set a precedent
for a pattern which was to be followed by Jim and Harold
Progress throughout the remainder of their relationship.
Formal, direct liaison with the PMO was not one of the pre-
5
rogatives afforded COMSUBLANT. Both Jim and Harold Progress
recognized this fact clearly and took maximum advantage of
their informal relationship. During every one of their per-
iodic meetings, each of Jim's categories was discussed in
detail, providing each with a complete and candid update.
After these six to eight hour skull sessions, Jim always
felt like he'd been both a participant and an administrator
of some kind of an intensive oral examination.
Through Harold Progress, the vastness of the PM's empire
was unfolding before Jim, producing an endless flow of new
and changing information. He knew he was getting candid
glimpses of fantastically complex and dynamic plans. An in-
tricate mosaic was evolving while simultaneously undergoing
change in various ways — almost daily in Jim's eyes. He
often felt that he was being afforded privileged information
and had to proceed with caution regarding the manner in
i
which he presented such information, lest he substitute hear-
say or supposition for fact or compromise a confidence. But,
most assuredly, it was quite evident to Jim that many decisions
5 See Exhibit 12 for organizational relationship between
COMSUBLANT Staff and the PMO.
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that would affect fleet introduction (and beyond) were for-
mulating on high and that related fleet inputs were needed
and appropriate, whether or not formally solicited.
By early April, Chief Sharp appeared to have come to
grips with staff life. He was improving steadily in his
ability to draft correspondence, render sound judgments, and
sense what needed the boss's attention as opposed to what he
could handle by himself. Jim was particularly impressed by
the fact that Chief Sharp seemed to be effectively expanding
his informal network of communications with other commands
involved in submarine fire control hardware support functions
While exercising this network, he turned up some significant
information regarding apparent problems in the MK-48 fire
control area. He presented this information to Jim and it
was incorporated into the fire control portion of the "MK-48
Program Staff Review". In retrospect, Jim recalled, "In
several areas it appeared as if Chief Sharp had put his fin-
ger on the tip of an iceberg named trouble." Chief Sharp
had cultivated several points of contact that Jim knew they
would have to follow up on in greater detail as soon as the
"MK-48 Program Staff Review" was out of the way, and he so
noted the need for such action.
Recalling that early period on the job, Chief Sharp
reminisced:
"I had never had an administrative job like that be-
fore. And, I really didn't know what was expected
of me, even though Mr. White had explained the job
to me. It probably took me a full six months of nos-
ing around, listening and asking questions before I
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really became productive and could do something more
than put out brush fires. I didn't realize it at
first, but a good many of the problems in the fire
control area that I tackled in those days were symp-
toms and not really causes. There were some deep
seated causes in many cases, but it took me a long
time to see the light. I had to get to know the key
people in the 'Naval Ordnance Community' that admin-
istered the procurement and support of our fire con-
trol hardware. Oblisk's points of contact were good
for fighting the brush fires, but I soon found out
that there were a lot of people that we should have
been talking to in NAVORDSYSCOM, NUSC , Newport, and
in several other commands that had a lot to do with
administering our ship's ordnance hardware installa-
tions, ORDALTS , ^ and configuration records. Appar-
ently, no one on the staff had ever communicated
with some of these people before. It was a real ed-
ucation for all concerned. Among other things, it
began to appear to me during the first couple of
months in the job that we really didn't have any
accurate knowledge of or control over our own sub-
marines' ordnance configurations."
On thing Jim hadn't put much effort into during the
months of March a.nd April was the pursuit of the original
intra-staff memo effort (to get staff support) that he and
CDR Greene had launched in January. He had gotten some feed-
back from most of the staff codes notified. In most cases,
the replies acknowledged receipt of the information and
either indicated that action would be taken as appropriate
or stated briefly that such and such had been done and ac-
tion was complete. The impression Jim got was that, even
now, no one was very worried, and MK-48 would stay on their
back burner until some force, still unbeknownst to Jim,
pushed it to the forefront. "That will probably be receipt
of the first operational torpedoes," mused Jim.
See Appendix II for explanation of ORDALT program.
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In early April, the Force Weapons Office had started a
separate MK-48 incoming/outgoing message file (there-to-fore,
the MK-48 message traffic had been mixed in with all other
office messages). Jim had also decided, for the time being,
to field any incoming action himself, after touching base
with the other ("quasi" he dubbed in mentally) cognizant
staff codes, before initiating any official response. The
one or two times he took the initiative, after checking with
the appropriate code, he didn't get any real complaints.
Jim recalled:
"Just a few comments to let me know that they hadn't
really relinquished their authority, but that they
had no objection to me doing their work for them."
Jim didn't really mind all that, however, for he liked the
feeling that the N-62 office was actively overviewing, tak-
ing action, and interpreting incoming MK-4S information for
COMSUBLANT. He dearly wished, though, that he could keep
formal control and concurrently be able to vector appropriate
staff interest and action to areas where it was deemed appro-
priate.
Actually, aside from the various planning correspondence
emanating from the PMO concerning TRIGGER'S pending conver-
sion to MK-48 configuration, COMSUBLANT really hadn't been
formally involved with anything at the PM level, and, as far
as Jim could see, no significant opinions were being openly
sought from COMSUBLANT. However, it was not uncommon for
the PM to communicate directly with the Admiral or other sen-
ior staff officers concerning any number of things.
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Fortunately, for Jim, CDR Greene was usually made aware of
such communications, and he related them to Jim. Jim, on
the other hand, was being permitted an informal peek into
the PM's club house through the Harold Progress window. But,
there were people in the program that Jim had talked to that
gave the impression that COMSUBLANT's (Jim's) interest was
premature. Perhaps the responses of two or three of the
people in the program could have been interpreted by Jim as
suggestive that he was meddling. This occasionally occurred
when Jim's questions hit a sore spot. Also, fortunately for
Jim, no one turned him off.
As he gained program inroads, he gained other strong
feelings and impressions. Jim later recalled that he might,
in retrospect, even say that some of these stimuli were al-
most subliminal. For example, he had been exposed to so
many people and so much data that he wasn't always sure that
he had been able to clearly discern totally candid informa-
tion from "edited" information. He certainly felt that
Harold Progress had always been candid, but, looking back,
Jim recalled:
"There were some people who were being very protec-
tive of their jobs and functional areas of interest
at the expense of the program. I began to realize
this more clearly at a later date. I found out that
few people wanted to admit short-sightedness or
shortcomings in their areas of responsibility. I
also found out that there were not too many people
who understood clearly how their area of responsi-
bility interfaced with others. In fact, two of the
field activities, NUSC , Newport and NAVORDSYSUPOLANT
,
who were both in the ORDALT administration and in-
stallation business, had an almost adversary rela-
tionship ;it that point in time. That certainly didn't
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do anything to help promote the necessary intra-
or inter-command communications. Although lots of
people had explained their problems to me, at that
point it was really difficult to grasp the aggre-
gate implications or their rationale."
In any event, the TRIGGER effort had certainly not be-
come too complex. Jim, working through staff code N-31 (Op-
erations) and the COMSUBRON FOUR Weapons Officer in Charleston
7(USS TRIGGER'S parent Squadron), had determined the dates
that TRIGGER could be made available for the MK-48 work to
be accomplished. Then he simply initiated a message to the
PMO, including interested commands as information addressees,
setting the conversion dates. The principal work on TRIGGER
was to be done by the Charleston Naval Shipyard (CHASN,NSY)
in accordance with specifications drafted by NAVSHIPSYSCOM
and NAVSEC in support of the PM. Neither Jim nor any one
else on the staff had seen all of the detailed specifications,
but the work was reported to be similar to the prototype ef-
forts already completed on JACK and PARGO. That work had
essentially "softened" the torpedo handling and storage
equipment in each submarine to minimize damage to the MK-48
torpedo. From what Jim was able to find out, CHASN,NSY was
going to remove all of the torpedo storage skids in TRIGGER'S
torpedo rooms and coat or replace all metal that would come
in contact with torpedoes with a special nylon or polyurethane
Q
substance. The same treatment was to be given to all torpedo
7 See Exhibit 13 for SUBLANT organization.
Q




lashing straps, hooks, special handling nose and tail pieces,
9
and the submarine load line rollers.
In any event, after the TRIGGER scheduling message had
been "on the air" for a couple of days, Jim had, in the course
of a few telephone conversations dealing with MK-48 matters,
received favorable reference to the message. That indicated
to Jim that all concerned felt that the TRIGGER job was on
track. It was a "rinky dink" accomplishment on balance with
the other ongoing efforts at the PM level, but it was some-
what gratifying to feel that this small initial involvement
had been executed smoothly.
On 20 April 1970, Jim turned his rough draft of the "MK-48
Program Staff Review" over to YN1 Fingers for typing. The
completed review was 23 pages in length, less the cover let-
ter. It had required one Hell of an effort to crank it out,
but Jim felt sure that it clearly addressed the known issues
and they were presented in such a way that they could not be
ignored. And, the icing on the cake was his attached letter
proposal reestablishing the COMSUBLANT Staff "MK-48 Torpedo
Working Group", chaired by CDR Greene. It would be comprised
of representatives from each staff code, and, if approved,
it would convene periodically to review all required staff
actions and assign appropriate tasks to cognizant staff codes .
Jim's research of the old MK-48 files revealed that such a
9 See Exhibit 15 for description of submarine onboard




group existed some time ago, but disuse or some other un-
known reason caused it to dissolve or simply fade away into
oblivion.
Jim affixed his signature on the smooth forwarding memo-
randum on 24 April and placed the review on CDR Greene's
desk. Within the hour CDR Greene emerged from his office.
"Jim," he said, "I'm going to hand carry this over to CAPT
Ready and express my endorsement verbally -- Your paper
speaks for itself."
Two hours later CDR Greene returned and reported that
CAPT Ready had read the review, was anxious to get staff ac-
tion underway, and had forwarded the review to the Chief of
Staff. Jim was on pins and needles for the next two days
wondering how the Admiral would receive it . "Would it get
past the Chief of Staff — maybe it was too long?" worried
Jim.
Jim had the answer on 26 April when CDR Greene returned
from a conference at headquarters. CDR Greene had the orig-
inal in his hand when he entered the office. "Jim," he said
flipping the review face up on Jim's desk, "this time you've
hit paydirt. The Admiral read it cover to cover, he buys
your recommendations, and he wants action. As soon as the
'Working Group' is formed up, we'l] convene the opening meet-
ing and get the show on the road."
Recalling his elation on that occasion, Jim remarked to
this casewriter:
"I knew we were on our way at long last. We had the
tools we needed, we had support from the top, and we
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would get staff participation. There was a lot of
work to be done, but with the entire staff vectored
in on the problems, we would get the job done."H
Due to time and volume constraints, the authors could
not pursue the research required to develop case studies for
each of the subject areas addressed in Attachment (1). While
each area provides very fertile grounds for further case
study development, the authors elected to concentrate their
remaining research on tracking the efforts leading to the de-
velopment of the final plan for hardware conversion of sub-
marines to full MK-48 configuration. It should be recognized
that all of these case studies address Atlantic coast efforts
by COMSUBLANT. Activity of much the same nature took place
in the Pacific, but the authors know little about the efforts
of COMSUBLANT' s Pacific counterpart, COMSUBPAC . This is not
to suggest that COMSUBLANT and COMSUBPAC operated independ-
ently regarding MK-48 Fleet Introduction — to the contrary,
there was common effort and continuous liaison between CDR
Green and Jim White, and their counterparts throughout the
Fleet Introduction Effort. The impact of that effort would




"MK-48 Program Staff Review"
This review has been obtained from the COMSUBLANT archives.
In its original form it was classified. Classified portions
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Fran: N622 j /) ^ ,VfC
Via: N62
Subj : Fleet Introduction of the MK A8 Torpedo; staff review concerning
Ref: (a) Chief of Staffs' Memorandum of 22 December 1966
Encl: (1) N622's MK h8 Program Staff Review
(2) Proposed Memorandum to reconvene the MK k& Staff Working Group
1. Recent communications with the various program offices concerned with the
development of the MK k& torpedo and associated support functions have led me
to conclude that program developments have reached a point that warrents a
coordinated staff effort to review all areas, in terms of readiness to support
fleet introduction and beyond.
2. It is now apparent, in my opinion, that the development status of many
program support functions portend significant constraints during introduction.
In addition, there are projected employment considerations, beyond introduction,
that require more detailed study and planning. High level policy decisions,
recording employment of the MK A8, are formulating and ! believe that it is
time that official Submarine Force positions be taken, where appropriate, on
such matters as training, positioning of the initial weapons, support defi clone: es
,
open ocean firing versus on range firing and submarine participation in fleet
introduction (i.e. selection of squadrons/ships).
3. Enclosure (1) lists many of the considerations affecting introduction and the
projected employment of the MK ^8 torpedo, undoubtedly there are more. Some
areas are being effectively pursued independently by other staff codes; the intent
here is to focus attention on these related matters and elicit a coordinated
Staff effort to ensure adequate in depth/breadth review, understanding and
preparedness
.
k. Reference (a) established the staff "MK ^8 Working Group". N'i2 , now N62
,
was appointed chairman. Deputy and Assistant Chiefs of Staff were tasked to
appoint officer rep rcsen ta t i ves . t o that working group. Because of program
slippage, orouo meetings were suspended indefinitely. It is requested that the
"Staff Working Group" be reconvened and that it remain .funct iona I . Enclosure
(2) is forwarded, as the proposed official notification of re-establishment.
Copies of this review (enclosure (1)) will be forwarded to DCOS and ACOS, for
review by members of their departments. It is recommended that the first
Working Group meeting be ne 1 d on 7 May 1970. As this coordinated effort progresses
I believe it would be desiraole to include SU8DEVGRU TWO and Submarine School
(and/or perhaps other interested parties) as working group members.
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5. Based on ihformal communications received from MK*t8 Project Manager's
Office (PMO) (NAVORDSYSCOM) and CNO (OP-31), it is recommended that the first
two agenda items be:
a. COMSUBLANT's position/policy regarding future MK ^8 exercise firings
and firing areas.
b. COMSUBLANT's position regarding PMO's present plan for initial fleet
Introduction of MK ^8-0 (Wes t i nghouse version) in Charleston and MK ^8-1
(Clevite version) in Norfolk (about 30 "token" units in each area in DEC 71).
The above subjects and associated considerations are discussed in detail in
enclosure (1), paragraphs 5 and 3-d. respectively.
6. It is further recommended that the Staff Working Group's task include
submission of viable proposals concerning the above and that official positions





Nl, N3, N4, N6




N622 MARK 48 PROGRAM STAFF REVIEW
1. The MK 48 and associated support areas are reviewed below, for staff consi-
deration and expansion. Items covered are grouped into four general categories;
hardware, training, exercise firing policy and post firing analysis. A further
1 breakdown by subject areas follows in paragraph 2. Each subject is discussed in
detail in paragraphs 3-, *»• and 5.
2. Hark 48 Program Areas of Interest




(4) MK 48 shore facilities/Tenders <
(5) Loading equipment
(6) Submarine handling equipment
(7) Submarine MK 48 Fire Control System Conversions
(8) Fi ri ng Doctrine
b. Training Requirements :
(1) Torpedo/Target Training, general
(2) Retriever Crew Training
(3) Shore facility and Tender crew training
(a) Torpedo
(b) Target
(4) Submarine Crew Training/Instructor Training




_3. Fl re Cont rol
h. Safety
«4 APK ig;-(
ENCLOSURE (I) to N622's MEMO of
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(b) Individual and special training.
1. FT for Fire Control Maintenance (NEC)
2. Equipment Operator Training (i.e. F/C)
3. TM loading and handling
U. Firing doctrine for F/C parties
5- Team training
C. Exercise Firing Policy .
d. Post firing analysis and data employment .
3. Discussion by subject. [
a. MK 1*8 TorpedoE
(1) Current and projected status:
(a) CNO has directed that the MK ^8 torpedo Mods and 2
(West i nghouse) and Mod 1 (Clevite) will be evaluated during the sametime span to
complete by 1 July 1 97 ' - At that time either Mod 1 or 2 will be selected, a
contract signed and fleet delivery will begin 17 months subsequent (aDoul FEB /-£)
under current plan). This 17 month period includes 3 months of proofing for eacn
weapon, on the NTS Keyport Washington range.
(b) Delivery to the fleet will be at a rate of units per year
for 5 years, then units per year.
(c) The following token buys are programed to take place for fleet
introduction in DEC 71, contracts are to be signed in June 1970:
1. MK ^8 Mod 0. 88 main assemblies will be purchased;
subsequent to proofing the Submarine Force will receive about 52 of these,
with *(8 warheads/warshot tanks and A 1 exercise sections/tanks. About 60
percent of these totals will go to C0MSU3LANT, ^0 percent to COMSUBPAC
(These percentages apply to all interim and final buys).
2_. MK ^8 Mod I. It is reported that about "50 units" will
be delivered to the Submarine Force about DEC J], Information on MK UB-] is
1 imi ted.
3^. The above numbers will be subject to funds allocated.
(d) PM0 (Project Managers Office, NAV0RDSYSC0M) feels the MK ^8-0
torpedo's technical problems ore now minimal. C0M0PTCVF0P. cites the following
technical problcr.ib as unsolved at this time:
I. Fuel compartment expulsion bladder tends to rip.

2. Acoustic panel alignment not yet completely satisfactory.
Weapon tends to pursue in wake if it approaches aft of beam, vice attack MOT,
per design.
3- Shaft seal leakage experienced.
k. Some internal weld failures experienced.
(e) At this time the MK 48-0 TECH/OP EVAL is continuing at AUTEC
range. Hod 1 evaluation will begin this Fall, by January 1971 Mods 0, 1 and 2
will be simultaneously under evaluation. The following schedule is forecast:
APR 70 Continue MK 48-0 TECH/OP EVAL
MAY 70 Commence MK 48-1 TECH EVAL at Keyport, Wash.
OCT 70 Commence MK 48-1 TECH EVAL at AUTEC
FEB 71 Begin MK 48-2 TECH EVAL
MAR 71 Complete MK 48-0 TECH/OP EVALS
MAY 71 Begin MK 48-2 OP EVAL
MAY 71 Complete MK 48- i TECH EVAL
JUN 71 Complete MK 48-2 TECH OP/EVAL
JUL 71 Choose MK 48-2 or MK 48-1
NOTE : MK 48-1 OPEV schedule is not available at this time.
(f) Turn around time for both MK 48-0/2 and MK 48-1 is reported as
days, with predictions that after experience is gained:
1. MK 48-0/2 turnaround could be extended, to a possible days.
2_. MK 48-1 turnaround could be extended, to a possible months.
(g) Many tests have been run on stowing MK 48-0 in flooded tubes;
while the feasibility is reported to exist no action appears to be currently
underway to turn research findings into a projected goal. Both torpedo and tubes
would require modifications (at an estimated maximum cost of $8,000 per tube).
(2) Cons i derat ions :
(a) "Unofficially", neither C0MQPTEVF0R nor PM0 seem to believe that
MK 48 Mod I can be evaluated by JUL 71, without "lowering the statistical confi-
dence level". Slippage of TECH EVAL commencement at AUTEC until JAN 71 is con-
sidered a possibility. PM0 also suggested that both Mod i and 2 operational
evaluations could in fact run as late as DEC 71, with t ho possible effect of




(b) The MK 48-0 (Wes t inghouse) is limited to a pound warhead.
Its successor, the MK 48-2 (West inghouse) , will be a dual purpose (ASW/Anti-
Surface Ship) weapon, with an estimated pound explosive capability,
attained by exploding the pound warhead and remaining OTTO fuel, with a
special detonator. The MK 48 Mod 1 (Clevite version) is competing with the
48-2 and advertises, as its selling points: the acoustic "Comb Filter",
which improves active homing , a
more efficient OTTO fuel engine t
with greater range, smaller fuel requirement and larger warhead ( pounds
of PBXW or pounds of H-6). The 48- 1 has no plan to explode OTTO fuel,
but this feature would probably increase yield to excess of pounds TNT.
It is noted that new facilities must consider safety requirements for these
high y i elds.
(c) USS PARGO (SSN650) and USS JACK (SSN605) with Fire Control
Systems MK 113 Mod 6 are presently tasked to support TECH/OP evaluation of all
MK 48 versions. PARGO' s pre ROH upkeep is scheduled for JUL 70, JACK's pre ,
ROH upkeep is scheduled for DEC 70. SUBLANT has recommended a replacement loA^
>
7
SSN 594 be substituted for JACK, it is felt that early approval and selection, ,.~ .
is warrented for the following reasons: A*fft
'^^
J_.
C0M0PTEVF0R states that seven months lead time are required
to procure hardware and install in a replacement SSN. Immediate selection will
provide minimum lead time necessary to ready the third ship for JACK's ccmrr.i;-
ments by DEC 70. V/ork required is installation and interfacing of DDAS (degi-
tal data aquisltion system), "softening" modification of torpedo handling
equipment (i.e. plastic rollers on skids, etc.) and alteration to utilize
modified SUBROC loader for 48 torpedo loading.
2. Failure to designate a third ship, could, if the JUL 71
MK 48 evaluation completion date slips, as has been suggested, leave both
PARGO and JACK facing overhaul, without relief.
(3) Proposal: That a third SSN, either 637 or 594 class be designated
and committed as soon as possible to replace JACK.
b. Retrievers.
(1) Current and projected status :
(a) At present there is no existing retriever that can satisfactorily
handle the MK 48 torpedo (under other than ideal sea and wind conditions).
(b) In APR 69 PMO (Project Managers Office) was tasked by CNO to
propose a program to obtain a retriever capable of recovering MK 48 torpedoes
and MK 27 targets. In NOV 69 COMSUBLANT reaffirmed this requirement. No
proposal has been issued to date. The minimum requirements provided PMO were:
1. Open ocean capability.
2. Ability to remain on station 2 weeks.
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2j- Stowage space for 8 torpedoes and 8 targets.
kj. Ability to launch MK 27 target.
5_. Ability to recover Target and Torpedoes with safety to
personnel and hardware.
6. Equipped with precise position recovery equipment
(c) CNO (OP-95), during NOV 69 MK 48 Coordination Group Meeting,
proposed using ASR's for open ocean retrievers.
(d) To date the following status of retriever development is known;
AUTEC operations have determined:
1. Retrievers under 70 feet are useless.
2. Retrievers over 70 feet are of marginal value up to sea state
three conditions.
3^. The IX-306, an AKL prototype fitted with an articulated arm,
Is reported to require great expertise in sea states above 2. Its open ocean
suitability has not yet been determined; however, unofficial reports tend toward
pessimism.
(e) Controlling factors in retriever design are:
J_.
The weapon, which is very sensitive to physical mishandling
(i.e. a .0020 inch scratch or dent within 14 inches of the nose is reported to
adversely affect acoustic performance.
2. V/eapon weight (about 4,000 pounds) combined with its
verticle nose up flotation, with about 18 inches of nose exposed has proved to
make the weapon suseptible to damage and dangerous to retrievers.
3. Wave height and wind velosity will be prime factors to be
overcome in the design of any ocean going retriever.
(2) Cons i de rat ions :
(a) Conversation with 0PTEVF0R revealed that civilian construction
company helocopter retrieving was contracted by West inghouse , during tests at
NTS Kcyport, with good results. Development Prototype Torpedoes (DPT's) were
retrieved up to sea state 4 successfully and quickly, without damage. The helo
used a specially designed inverted cone, which was lowered by cable over the
bobbing torpedo. When in position a mechanical trip caused the torpedo to be
gripped around the nose; the torpedoes weight acted to hold it securely, while
the unit was hauled to the helo. It is reported that the helo could hold 2
torpedoes internally as well.
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(b) Without open sea retrieving capability, firing will be limited
to AUTEC or a similar range. (see enclosure (1), paragraph 5.)
(c) Resolution of the retriever problem will require in part:








2. Some retrieving vehicle, with crew(s)
3. Review of firing constraints imposed
j»_. Decisions on range logistics, such as retriever and weapons
positioning and support.
(3) Proposal :
(a) That PMO be requested to release the status (if any) of retriever
design proposals. (Proposed letter drafted by N622)
(b) That the subject of retrievers be an agenda item for the MK A8
Staff Working Group and that the following, in part.be considered:
J_.
Requirements for commencing fleet introduction of MK ^8
without a new retriever and limitations.
2. Helo retrieving as a possibly preferable alternative for future
at sea firings.
C. Targets .
( 1 ) Current and projected status ;
(a) OPTEVFOR reports that the following deficiencies still exist in
the target; solution is anticipated by Fall 70:
I. The proximity system, which causes end of run shut down
when MK 1)8 torpedo range is 10 feet, docs not function properly.
2_. Combination node, which causes the MK 27 to transmit a con-
stant submarine signiture for passive ^8 homing and simultaneously respond
actively to ^8 pings, does not function properly.
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(b) Twenty-one targets have been ordered and will be delivered for
completion of HK h8 TECH/OP evaluation. COMOPTEVFOR states that all these units
are expected to be expended or worn out during the evaluation, none of these
units can be planned on for fleet introduction.
(c) PMO reports that due to funding limitations no_ MK 27 targets
will be procured for fleet introduction in DEC 71. Lead time for MK 27
procurement, subsequent to a contract, is \k months.
(d) The following MK 27 delivery schedule was provided by PMO:
JUL 72 Begin MK 27 delivery to fleet (about 2 per month)
JAN ~]k (about) Increase delivery rate to about 2.5 per month.
Total delivery will be 107 targets.
(e) The maximum acceptable loss rate set by COMOPTEVFOR for TECH/OP
evaluations is k percent of total assets per year. Actual figure will be
determined during TECH/OP EVAL.
(2) Considerations:
(a) It must be assumed that the MK 27 target will not be ready for
initial fleet introduction DEC 7i- Possibie alternative targets zrz:
J_.
Surface ships
2. Surfaced submarines (at this time this in not authorized by
PMO). Impact information related to this matter has been formally requested by
COMSUBDEVGRU TV/0, with COMSUBLANT endorsement. This study is now underway.
jj. MK 17 stationary target. This type target is lowered by
winch from a small ship and functions as either an active or passive target for
the MK ^8 torpedo. It is being extensively employed during TECH/OP evaluation
at AUTEC/Keyport.
(b) The launch vehicle for mobile target MK 27 must be determined,
as well as employment doctrine. The MK 27 is designed for launch from a 21"
torpedo tube; there are advantages to the concept of retriever launched targets
(precludes launching own target or employing a 2nd submarine). Retrieving the




(a) That official correspondence be initiated to PMO citing the
fact that exercise firings, subseuqent to MK 48 introduction in DEC 71 will re-
quire MK 27 targets if optimum experience is to be gained. It is suggested
that a minimum of four (l») targets be requested (Aon each coast) for initial
Introduction. This would permit the assignment of two targets, per turnaround
facility, for fleet introduction DEC 71 (enclosure (I), paragraph 3-d.(l)(d) refers)
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(b) That planning for fleet introduction without initial benefit of
the MK 27 target be an agenda item for the Staff Work ing Gro up. The following
should.be determined:
J_.
Advantages/limitations of using surface ship targets?
2. The results of the study proposed by COMSUBDEVGRU TWO to
Chief of Naval Material in JAN 70 to determine the MK A8 impact effect on
submarine hulls and the feasibility of using a submarine as a target?
3. Advantages/limitations of using the MK 17 target?
k_. The degree of training degradation suffered or benefits
gained by placing heavy training emphasis on utilization of the MK 22 Weapons
simulator, installed on all A8 configured submarines, vice actual weapon
firings? The simulator is designed to provide the ability to conduct a complete
attack problem exercising every phase of the attack situation except physical
launch. Perhaps training benefits derived from actual firings would be secondary
to firing weapons primarily under controlled conditions to seek performance infor-
mation for optimum employment.
d. MK *i8 Shore facilities/Tenders .
(1) Current and projected status :
(a) The fcl lowing are the projected completion dates cf MK '18

















































NAD GUAM JAN 73 ONE - JUN
NOF YOKOSUKA JAN Ik ONE - JUL
* Facilities now designated for Fleet Introduction by PMO.
2
2
(b) The following are the projected completion dates of MK k8
SHIPALT installations on tenders (spaces and foundations, etc.) and subsequent
dates when torpedo lines will be installed:
INITIAL LINES
SHIPALT 875 AND INSTALLATION
TENDER COMPLETED DATE OF EACH
* ASH NLON 1971 ONE - JAN
AS12 SDIEGO ? ONE - AUG
AS16 KWEST Complete ONE - AUG
AS19 (FBM Tender) ? ONE - JUL
AS 311 (FBM Tender) Complete ONE - JAN
AS32 (FBM Tender) Complete ONE - JAN
AS33 (FBM Tender) JUN 70 ONE - JAN
AS3*» (FBM Tender) Complete ONE - JAN






















* NOTE: (1) AS11 Class will receive only 1 torpedo line, all others receive 2 lines.
(2) NAVSHIPS recently proposed only partial completion of AS33 MK ^8 spaces
to divert funds to other work. COMSUBLANT concurred, based on NAVSHIP's
statement that AS33 2 line requirements could be provided during next
overhaul. NAVSHIP's final decision remains unde rtermi ned at this time.
(c) The projected MK 27 target line delivery scheduly is not firm.

















AS-31, 32, 33, 3h Class ONE




At present the following target lines exist:
KEYPORT THREE (OP/TECH EVAL
AND PROOFING)
ORLANDO ONE (TRAINING)
CAPE KENNEDY TJO (OP/TECH EVAL)
KUWRES ONE (TECH EVAL)
PMO indicated that 3^ target lines will be delivered by 19 , but dates
and locations were not available. It is presumed that a target line will be
delivered to each facility supporting fleet introduction of the MK ^8 torpedo.
(d) Informal connun i ca t i ons from PMO-NAVORDSYSCOK stated that PMO at
this time is formulating plans for delivery of fleet introduction torpedoes in
DEC 71 and has tentatively selected t he Charleston faci lity to introduce the
MK ^8-0 (about 30 units) and the N orf olk facility to introd uce the MK. As-
I
.
The basis for choosing these two sites is that they are the only two East coast
facilities that will be completed in DEC 71< These facilities will be expected
to handle both exercise and warshot units. The Charleston facility will be ready




The history leading up to this situation was provided by N622 MEMOs of 12 FEB 70
and 13 MAR 70. Briefly, in I966 it appears that an exernise torpedo facility,
only, was envisioned outside of the Submarine Force. In February 1 96 7 COMSUBLANT
officially requested conversion of the NORVA facility to a warshot capability.
(\t that time we recommended Yorktown as a less des i rab le a 1 ternat i ve) ; our request
was based primarily on the arguement that a two line tenser, could not adequately
meet the projected turnaround requirements of Submarine Squadron SIX. As a re-
sult of COMSUBLANT' s request the present site was examired and formally approved
to handle a maximum of 1000 pounds high explosive, if banricades were constructed.
In March I969 C0MNAV0RDSYSC0M , by letter, increased the txp los i ve handling re-
quirements, for all facilities, from pounds per line to pounds per line.
It is assumed that this was based on the fact that the M. k&-2 will have an
estimated pounds of high explosive yield (enclosure (1), paragraph 3-a.(2)
refers). The Norfolk building is now essentially completed, but without a
barricade and without any hardware (torpedo lines). In January 1970 CINCLANTFLT
requested that Atlantic Division of NAVFAC0M proceed witHo planning for conversion
to a warshot facility. COMSUBLANT, by letter, p rovi ded HANTFLTNAVFACOM wi t h the
new pound per line explosive requirements and requested that the capability
of the N'ORVA facility be re-evaluated and that information on the maximum
attainable capacity, with barricading, be supplied. This request was passed to
C0MFIVE for review, as cognizant area coordinator. Commsndant FIFTH Naval
District's letter reply stated in effect:
]_. pounds high explosive is the mas.imum capability
attainable in the N'ORVA facility.
2. That movement of a single torpedo with pound yield from
the facility to the piers would be in violation of safety requirements. (By
telephone COMF1 VE Ordnance Office stated that present torpedoes (i.e. MK 16-8)
are handled one at a time on piers with a waiver).
3. That no satisfactory alternative site existed on the Naval
Station.
k. That Yorktown is the logical alternative and that CO. York-
town is directed to coordinate development proposals on cne or more sites for
submission, with recommendations, to the Ammunition and hazardous Material
Handling Board, scheduled to convene in NORVA JUL 70. !T is understood that
Yorktown will respond favorably and that COMF1 VE will then solicite COMSUBLANT's
Intent ions.
(e) Torpedo and target day turnaround capability, based on a 5
day work v/eek, 8 hour shifts and no down time is estimaled as follows:











(f) Based on numbers of submarines per port, PMO estimates greatest
turnaround requirement after 1973 will exist in New London.
(g) In January 1972, when "selected" weapon delivery begins, PMO
planning calls for simultaneous delivery of new "lines" (until that time only
existing TECH/OP EVAL lines will be in use). The first "new'.' lines will go to
NTS Keyport proofing range and Orlando, to support training. This will, as
explained to me, result in a reduction of lines, from two to one, in NORVA and
CHARLESTON, for a period of about 2 to k months, because only one half of the
existing lines wi 1 1 be compatible with the selected weapon Mod; The plan being
that, either CHASN or NORVA would give the other one of its two lines to permit
continued operation in both facilities.
(2) Considerations:
i
(a) NORVA's ability to handle warshots must be resolved. Based on
day turnaround the present alternatives appear to be:
_]_. Formally request a waiver to increase the existing facilities
explosive handling capability (The general opinion in COHFIVE Ordnance Office is
that no significant waiver would be granted because of the population density).
2. Barricade the present facility and attain a pound
capability (which would ultimately not be sufficient to handle even one MK ^8-2
with a pound yield, if selected).
3. Review feasibility of a Yorktown facility for warshots
(funding and time will be major considerations). SUBPAC presently is constructing
an "exercise only" facility in Pearl Harbor, with a separate warshot facility at NAD
OAHU.
ji_. For fleet introduction, review feasibility of installing one
of NORVA's two lines in L. Y. SPEAR (AS-36) to handle warshots.
(b) If MK 1)8-1 is ultimately selected, NORVA would, as a pound
facility, have a one line capability for warshots, permitting turnaround of
about such units per quarter, based on day turnaround. This would meet
initial introduction requirements (about units) for the ^8-1. One line would
help support, but not by itself meet MK ^8-1 projected needs beyond introduction.
For example, the nine SSNs presently homeported in NORVA, if carrying assumed
"BRAVO" loads of units per 637 and per 59^ class, would require turnaround
of about units per quarter.
(c) AS-36, scheduled for homeport in NORVA, could eventually provide
two additional lines (when in port) and increase warshot turnaround capability
by units, providing a Tender/facility total capability of units per
quarter; however, based on the presently advertised delivery rate I estimate that




(d) Some thought has been given to Introducing both the MK 48-0
and MK 48-1 in CHASN. In opposition to this it is noted that. the MK 48-0 and
HK 48-1 are essentially different weapons. They do about the same thing, but
the internal hardware is not the same. Internal components, test equipment
and turnaround lines are not interchangab le. It therefore is not feasible to
consider handling both the 48-0 and 48-1 in the same facility. Some of the
problems would be in PMO's judgement:
1. Normal facility manning for introduction is 14 men. Because
Mod and 1 training is different, manning would have to be double. Mutual
Interference potential would be great.
2_. Logistic problems are different. Mutual interference po-
tential here would also be great.
3. It is reported that the facilities physical space would
probably be inadequate for four introduction lines (CHASN ultimately is
programed for only THREE lines).
(e) COMSUBLANT's agreement or recommendations concerning PMO's plan
to position and introduce about MK ^8-0 ' s and MK 48-1 's in the CHASN and
NORVA facilities, has been unofficially solicited. The range of choices appears
to be
:
JL MK 48-0 in CHASN and MK 48-1 in NORVA. (PMO's current plan).
To do this would require either:
a. Barricading NORVA for pounds explosive, or
b. Placing one warshot line on L.Y. SPEAR.
2. MK 48-1 CHASN and MK 48-0 NORVA (same requirements as a_.
above)
.
3. Both 48-1 and in CHASN. This is not considered feasible
(see para, (d) above).
(3) Proposal :
(a) That the MK 48 Staff Working Group take the following as high
priority agenda items:
V. How MK 48 warshots will be handled in NORVA?
2_. Concurrence or non concurrence with PMO's plan to introduce
HK 48-0 in CHASN and MK 48-1 in NORVA, and recommendations.
(b) That official decisions be made on the above items and promulgated,
as requi red.
e. Loading Equipments ;




(a) A converted SUBROC loader has been tested on both SSN 59** and
637 class submarines; it appears to be promising for these classes . It has not
been tested on other classes. This loader is being presently evaluated in Cape
Kennedy during TECH/OP EVAL.
(b) Use of a crane is reported to be feasible, but great care must be
exercised to prevent torpedo damage. The availability of crains with 4000 pound
capacity is limited and their employment must be proofed.
(c) The concept of loading and stowing of HK 48 torpedoes in plastic
"PODS" has been evaluated on board the 594 and 637 class submarines (POLLACK
and BERGALL, JAN 70). This shows some promise as a means to protect the torpedo;
however, the large pods (containing the guidance wire) would not fit in POLLACK.
The small POD (wi thout wire) did fit. PODs have not been tested on other classes.
Research continues in this area.
(d) Standard loading equipment does not afford sufficient protection
against torpedo damage.
(2) Cons i derat ions :
(a) The converted SUBROC loader may not be feasible for all submarines
(i.e. the 598 class FBM loading hatch is far forv/ard and suseptible to water
entry. The combined weight of the load and torpedo may be prohibitive.)
(b) At this time the impression is that considerable work must be
done in the area of loading to achieve acceptable standards for our submarines
and acquire the necessary hardware; prior to fleet introduction, each ships
loading capabilities and deficiencies must be examined. It is suspected that
problems will be encountered, based on experience to date.
(3) Proposa
1
: That the Staff Working Group make loading equipments an
agenda item for discussion.
f . Submarine onboard Handling Equipment .
(1) Current and projected status :
(a) All submarines handling the MK 48 torpedo must have loading
equipments "softened" to prevent torpedo damage. NAVSHIPS has been tasked to
develope applicable SHIPALTS.
(b) If POD loading is determined to be feasible some SHIPALTs will
also be required. This became apparent on BERGALL and POLLACK.
(2) Cons i dc ra t i on :
(a) That class SHIPALT reauircments be determined in adequate time
to permit planning and installation in ships participating in fleet introduction.









(a) That the above be an agenda item for the MK A8 Staff Working Group.
g. Submarine HK *)8 Fire Cont rol System Conversions .
(I) Current and projected status :
(a) The following fire control systems have received the MK ^8-0
conversion in SUBLANT:
TYPE SYSTEM NO. WITH kB CAPABILITY
MK 113 (SSNs) 16
MK 113 (SSBNs) 3
MK 112
MK 101 (TRIGGER) 1
MK 106 2
(b) The following numbers of fire control systems in SUBLANT will
have the MK A8-0 conversion by DEC 71:






* (See paragraph (d) below)
(c) The MK ^8-0 fire control conversion to MK 113, MK 112, MK 101
and MK 106 F/C systems is progressing on schedule; however, to make these ship's
F/C systems compatible with MK A8-2 and MK ^8-1 torpedoes a still further 0RDALT
is required. It is reported that F/C systems wi th MK ^8-0 capability will re-
quire a kO percent change to the present ^8-0 functions. The prototype kit for
this conversion is being developed by Librascope. The first kit will be available
11 May 70. The two TECK/0P evaluation SSNs and ships introducing MK ^8-1 will
require this 0RDALT. The former will have one half of their MK 113 systems con-
figured for MK *»8-0 and the other for MK 't8- I and 2 in order to provide services
for forthcoming simultaneous TECH/OP evaluation of all MK kS Mods. A recent
engineering naterial casualty in USS PARG0, during TECH evaluation of MK ^8-0 at
AUTEC, will now cause her to be available for possible installation of the MK
1*8-1/2 0RDALT on 11 May. C0M0PTEVF0R is considering the feasibility at this time.
(d) Recent inquiries from CN0 indicate that future MK k8 installations
on GUPPY III Submarines may be postponed indefinitely. Message communications
between Philadelphia Naval Shipyard and CN0, regarding diesels programed for over-
haul, seem to confirm this.
(e) It was recently learned th3t the MK U8 equipments and functions





This situation has existed since October 19&9. The basii for -this tact by
NUWRES v/as reported to be to save money, justification being that the MK 48
torpedo is not available. A verbal objection was filed wiith HASWSP on 5 March
70 by both COMSUBLANT/COMSUBPAC representatives during tie ASW Test Program
meeting in Washington; this was recorded in the minutes. Our position was that
MK 48 F/C WSAT is mandatory to ensure crew interest, familiarization and to
preclude equipment degradation.
(f) Conversation with Naval Ordnance System fommand Support Office
Atlantic (NAVORDSYSUPPOLANT) has disclosed the fact that ships receiving the
MK 48-0 F/C conversion are reporting to the fleet with rradequate spare parts
support. Typical problems are:
J_.
MK 48 capability spares purchased by ^AVORD and automatically/ ?
shipped, are not loaded onboard and are left in an unopened condition in the (
shipyard.
2. APLs prepared to support certain 0RD?iiTs and/or equipment
Identified with the MK 48 conversion do not reflect the "ntended NAVORD support
posture, hence, items not identified are off loaded as excess.
NAVORDSUPPOLANT has assisted at least two known ships during conversion thus
precluding the above; however, it seems apparent that a continuing problem does
ex i s t
.
(g) Current plans do not include a V/SAT MK 4£ torpedo turnaround
facility in Roosevelt Roads for the ST CROIX range. This proposal was formally
submitted by COMNAVAI RSYSCOM in J UN 67 to CNO, no further action manifested. AUTEC
range is also being considered as a possible WSAT range, out the turnaround site
at Cape Kennedy will be disbanded subsequent to completion of TECH/OP EVAL. It
appears that WSAT MK 48 torpedoes will be issued by home port CONUS facilities.
(2) Cons i dera t ions :
(a) The projected availability of kits for installation of the
second generation ORDALT to MK 48-0 configured systems (for 48-1/2 capability)
must be determined, in order to plan for installation In the ships supporting
the MK 48-1 introduction in DEC 71.
(b) The arguements for not installing MK 48-0 conversions in GUPPY
1 1 I diesels are
:
J_.
Cost versus benefits derived. GUPPY III diesels will
probably be close to or deactivated prior to delivery of their MK 48 torpedoes.
2_. It is also reported that physical problems, yet unaddressed,
exist such as space available and inadequate 400 cycle power to support MK 48




(c) The MK 48 fire control equipments and functions must receive
VSAT or suffer degredation and attendant problems in the future. Symptoms of
such problems exist at this time. Meetings with and inquiries solicited from
NAVORDSYSUPPOLANT indicate:
J_.
Equipment presently installed is, in general, not receiving
adequate preventative maintenance.
2. Ships receiving this equipment apparently are not adequately
Indoctrinated regarding spare part problems associated with the conversion.
(d) Preparation of weapons for WSAT and designation MK 48 WSAT
ranges (i.e. AUTEC?) requires study in preparation for MK 48 F/C system grooming
for introduction and beyond.
(3) Proposals :
(a) That the following be agenda items for the MK 48 Staff Working
Group:
J_.
Availability dates and installation time required for the
2nd generation ORDALT converting MK 48-0 F/C systems to a MK 48-1/2 capability.
2_. Preparation of MK 43 weapons for V/SAT , WSAT range availability
and WSAT requirements for ships participating in introduction.
(b) That COMSUBLANT Supply contact NAVORDSYSUPPOLANT Supply (Mr. H-
Glockenspiel TEL: 397-6531) to review deficiencies associated with MK 48
fire control system conversions and that the alleged need for forces afloat
indoctrination be ascertained, for possible follow up action. NAVORDSYSUPPOLANT
has collected considerable supply data on both the 48 F/C systems and the weapon,
that could be of great value.
(c) That official correspondence be forwarded to NAVORDSYSC0M to
reinstitute MK 48 WSAT checks (N622 will prepare a letter).
h. Firing Doctrine .
(1) Current and projected status :
(a) COMSUBDEVGRU TWO- has completed and forwarded a proposed firing
doctrine for the MK 48-0 torpedo for COMSUBLANT Staff review; this is in progress.
This doctrine will be employed and undergo review during operational evaluation
of the MK 48-0. In addition COMSUBDEVGRU TWO is prepared to update this doctrine
to cover MK 48-1 and MK 48-2. COMSUBDEVGRU TWO has requested early staff review
of the MK 48-0 doctrine to permit evaluation on range as soon as possible.
(2) Cons i dcrat i ons ,
(a) Optimum employment of the MK 48 torpedo will require the firing
ship to program the weapon for the prevailing sound velocity conditions. This
means the fire control team must mentally see and understand the ray path




running depth, etc.). With the sound velocity trace in hand, the usual method
Is to manually extract required data from tables or graphs. Needed are the
best ballances of simplicity and accuracy necessary to obtain an acceptable
sound velocity profile (in excess of 2500 feet) and convert same to a visual
display of the ray path envelope.
(b) Two devices have undergone some degree of testing; the XBT and
a simple ray path device which converts the sound velocity readings to a depth/
range cathode ray tube visual presentation of the ray path envelope. The sub-
marine's sonar transducer can be inserted for any depth and the related ray
paths are immediately apparent. While all variables are not considered this
equipment does provide a very functional picture. Conversation with DEVGRU TWO
and 0PTEVF0R indicates that this gear has potential; more work is required, but
it appears to present an acceptably accurate picture. In January 1970 ORL
(Ordnance Research Lab) Penn State University made a presentation to selected
Staff members emphasizing the need for such equipment. Graphs and tables re-
gardless of their accuracy do not lend themselves to facility and accuracy in
the hands of the average sonarman or officer performing under stress.
(3) Proposal :
(a) That the necessity for development and employment of the XBT/
ray path tracer or similar equipment for use with the MK 48 system, be an
agenda item for the MK 48 Staff Working Group.
4. Training. Training is to a great extent dependent on hardware availability
and "up-to-dateness"; at this time training is hardware limited. The training
requirements for the MK A8-0 are outlined in the "Technical Development Plan
(TOP) W23-06 for Torpedo MK 48 Weapons System". A new TDP is in development
for the combined MK A8- 0/ 1 and 2; it will be published in July 70 according to
PM0. Based on best information the following training picture exists:
a. Torpedoes and Target Training .
(1) Current and projected status :
(a) About 95 TMs have been trained by Westinghouse and/or Orlando
AUW school in the MK 48-0 torpedo and target. Orlando training wss suspended
in JAN 70 (because of excess personnel and no weapon), pending selection of
torpedo Mod in JUL 71. The MK 48-0/MK 27 target course length is:
1. MK 48-0 maintenance
Target MK 27 maintenance kk weeks
and test equipment
2. MK 48-0 and MK 27 assembly 20 weeks
TOTAL 64 weeks
(b) MK 48-2. No training has been or is being conducted. It is
reported that MK 48-0 trained men (para (a) above) will require approximately




additional training requirements for A8-2 is not known.
(c) UK J)8-l. No training to date. Clevite factory training is
programed for 20 of the 95 MK ^8-0 trainees above and was to begin 18 MAY 70.
It is, however, now reported that delays have occurred due to non-delivery of
MK ^8-1 test equipment; the new school date is 27 JUL 70.
(2) Projected training expected to be available :
(a) MK k8 (Mod selected) and Target Maintenance, assembly and test
equipment):
Orlando AUW School
(Training was planned at SDIEGO FASW School. PMO states that this has been
cancel led)






SDIEGO FASW School? (disposition not known)
b. Retriever Training .
(1) None projected.
(2) Cons i derat i ons :
(a) A means to retrieve both weapon, and target must be defined, to
permit training.
(b) Present AUTEC retrievers are not manned by Navy crews.
(c) The only known Navy retrieving experience is at NTS Keyport.
(3) Proposal : That retriever requirements and associated training be a
MK hb Working Group agenda item.
c. MK h8 Shore Facility and Tender Personnel Training :
(1) Personnel manning these billets will receive the training delineated




(2) Personnel that will man the MK A8 facilities for fleet introduction
will supposedly be ordered in 3 months in advance of introduction date. Manning
requirements for each facility are:
5 TH per MK ^8 1 ine




d. Submarine Crew Training .
(1) Current and projected status :
(a) Submarine crew training for MK '18 evaluation has, to date, been
"on the job" in all areas, with the exception of fire control, which is presently







DAM KECK, VA. MK 11
3
FSTF Pearl Harbor MK 113
FBMTC CHASN MK 1 1 3
(2) Familiarization (FAM). It is understood that FAM training will
ultimately be provided in short courses at some of the above facilities.
Submarine school has, for example, made plans to provide the following instruction,
based on the selected weapon:
Torpedoman's Course - 2 weeks
Fire Control Course for MK 112 and MK 113 Systems - 8 weeks
SOIC (5 week Course) - 1 hr presentation (Officers Intermediate Course)
SOAC (6 month Course) - 20 hrs classroom, lab and attack center
training (Officers Advanced Course)
SOBC (6 month Course) - 2 hr presentation (Officers Basic Course)
PC0/PX0 Training
Weapons Officer Package Course - 2 weeks
Command Level Hardware and Tactical Employment Course - 1 week
Appropriate Refresher Training in hardware and employment of
Weapon for SSBMs, SSNs and Diesel Electric submarine.
(3) It is very necessary that certain fleet introduction training be






1. General officer and applicable enlisted FAM:
a. Torpedo/Target
b. Loading/Handling
c. Fi re Cont rol
d. General Safety
2. Individual training for applicable officers and enlisted
a_. F/C Maintenance
b. F/C Operation
c. Loading and Handling
d_. Firing Doctrine (including ray path affect, equipment
3. Fire Control Party Team Training.
5. Exercise Firing Policy .
a. Current and projected status :
(1) In June 1 969 and again in November 19&9 COMSUBLANT went on record,
during the MK k8 coordination group meetings in Washington, D.C. as advocating
unrestricted open ocean firing of the MK ^8 torpedo. I believe at this time t
that position should be reviewed. The following facts and considerations all >
tend to support the concept of firing only on a range:
(a) No open ocean retrieving vehicle exists and none has been pro-
posed by PMO, as directed by CNO (para 3-b. refers).
(b) Security must be provided to protect both weapon and target
during firings. The following is required:
JL Ability to pin point locations and to guarantee recovery
or determine unit to be beyond salvage.
2. Ability to ensure limited access to range firing area.
(c) High cost of weapon and target and limited assets require the
same recovery assurances as paragraph (b)
_!_;_ above, plus:




2. A firing plan that restricts losses to under 5 % of total
Inventory projected to the end of each fiscal year. This figure has been set
by CNO and NAVORDSYSCOM.
(2) PMO's planning calls for two exercise firings per quarter for SSNs
and one per quarter for SSBN/SS submarines. PMO's planned load out priorities
for fleet introduction and subsequent call for loading SSNs first then SSBNs
and SSs, as assets permit.
b. Considerations:
(1) If the MK k8 torpedo is confined to range firing:
(a) AUTEC is the only range now used for the MK bB. Competition for
that range will be considerable. Other commands will require range time. Type
training could be affected.
(b) If other ranges are selected, which ones will they be? Existing
ranges? New ranges? Could SUBROC ranges be utilized?
(2) If MK *t8s are fired in the open ocean, where and can requirements of
paragraph 5-a.(l)(b) above be met? Should open ocean firing be limited to
special requirements (i.e. under ice), when we weigh all factors and risks?
(3) How will cur introduction submarines be loade-J out? For example,
If 30 HK A8-0 torpedoes are positioned for introduction in CHASN will one or
possibly two SSNs be loaded with only MK ^8s , off loading other weapons, or
will several ships be required to mix load (with attendant problems)? Will our
interest be in providing maximum dispersion of the weapon to provide as many
units as possible with immediate capability or will emphasis be placed on lim-
ited distribution, with prime interest in learning how to use the weapon? Do




(1) That COMSUBLANT Exercise Firing Policy be a high priority agenda v^
Item for the MK k8 Staff Working Group. Discussion should include: / £rJ
(a) Pro and Con of Range Firing
(b) Pro and Con of Open Ocean Firing
(c) Frequency of exercise firings des i red/requi red
(d) Load out priorities
(2) That results of paragraph (1) be converted to an official position




6. Post Firing Analysis and Data Employment .
a. Current and projected status :
(1) The MK k8 is sophisticated in design, its logic is complex and post
run data analysis will be a comprehensive undertaking, beyond any past experience.
(2) At present one master data bank exists, at .All post
run torpedo/target/ship data must be analysed there. Subsequent to TECH/OP EVAL
the master bank and computer will be located at . That will be the only
one on this coast available for fleet introduction and perhaps beyond. The data
bank is building a base of information on the MK ^8, during TFCH/OP EVAL, which
will be continued at . Post firing read outs will be forwarded from
to operational commands.
(3) "Quick Look" equipment will be incorporated in turnaround shops
(MK ^8 facilities) which v/ill permit graphic printout of only six of the fifty
parameters recorded by the torpedoes Digital Data recording system. The post
run analysis value of the quick look equipment is reported to be limited.
b. Cons i derat ? on : Interpretation of post run readouts will probably be
tedious, time consuming and perhaps complicated. It well may be that new approaches
will be required, such as special team(s) or center(s), to ensure optimum
interpretation and utilization of post run data in the development of tactics and
firing doctrine and to improve weapon performance.
c. Proposal : That post run data analysis and its employment be an agenda
item assigned the MK A8 Torpedo V/orking Group for the purpose of determining




DEPARTMENT OF THE NAVY
COMMANDER SUBMARINE FORCE
U. S. ATLANTIC FLEET
NORFOLK, VA. 23511 IK MM tlTlH TO!
STAFF MEMORANDUM
From: Chief of Staff
To: Al 1 Staff Officers
SubJ : Mark A8 Torpedo Working Group; re-establishment of
Ref: (a) Chief of Staff Memorandum of 22 DEC 66
End : (l) TWO Agenda Items
1. The Staff "Mark *t8 Torpedo Working Group" was initially established in
December 1966, by reference (a). Because of significant program slippage
Group meetings were suspended indefinitely.
2. Introduction of the Mark k8 Torpedo Weapon System into SUBLANT units
requires re-establishment of the Mark ^8 Torpedo Working Group to keep
fully appraised of all aspects of this program, to provide timely response
to the varied requests made by participating organizations, and to insure
coordinated end consistent positions are generated by the Staff.
3. Commander W.E. Greene i N62, is hereby appointed as Chairman of the
Staff Working Group. Deputy and Assistant Chiefs of Staff shall re-appoint
suitable officer representatives to the Working Group. The Group will meet
on call of the Chairman, review current status of Mark k8 Weapon System
problems affecting the Force, and generate proposals for action which will
be forwarded via customary review channels. Agenda items will be prepared
by individual members of the Working Group and forwarded to all members
prior to meetings. The Chairman will keep a record of the meetings,
follow-up on action items, and submit reports to me.
k. Enclosure (l) is attached showing desired format for agenda items.
J. P. Jones
Enclosure (2) to N6?2
Memorandum of £ /[ APf) IQ^Q
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MK-48 TORPEDO FLEET INTRODUCTION (D)
By mid May, Jim was considering another visit to the
Project Manager's Office (PMO) to hold further discussions
with and exchange information with Harold Progress. These
mutual exchanges were beginning to prove themselves valuable
assists to both Jim and Harold in the routine performance
of their respective jobs. So facilitating were these ex-
changes that they mutually agreed to meet at least monthly
in either Norfolk or Washington. Between meetings they
stayed in touch by telephone — lots of information and new-
ly broached questions were handled that way. However, the
sheer volume and the security classification of much of the
new and changing information tha.t they found it necessary to
discuss basically forced the requirement for their face-to-
face exchanges.
Although, by this time, Jim found himself getting more
and more involved in all aspects of the MK-48 Program's
status and progress, he very definitely began to develop a
particularly keen interest in those areas where COMSUBLANT
For clarification of the acronyms used throughout the
case, please refer to Appendix I.
This case was written by CDR David A. Newcomb and LCDR Robert
F. Hurley, Jr., under the direction of Professors William
Giauque and Michael Dean of the Naval Postgraduate School,
Monterey, California. All names have been disguised.
Cases are prepared as a basis for class discussion and are
not designed to present illustrations of either correct or
incorrect handling of administrative problems.
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could and should exert an effort toward preparing for fleet
introduction. For some unexplained reason however, at the
CAPT Ready level on the staff, there seemed to be a strong
interest, almost a preoccupation in Jim's opinion, in the
MK-48 torpedo itself. They wanted to know things like how
many torpedoes were fired during MK-48 evaluation firings by
PARGO on the AUTEC range and what the torpedo hardware prob-
lems were. Jim considered things like this "nice to know",
especially if they afforded some insight into the dependa-
bility of projected torpedo delivery schedules, but he cer-
tainly didn't feel that they deserved the focus that they
were getting. "We can't do anything to help in this area
even if we wanted to;" thought Jim, "things like this are
clearly the Pioject Manager ' s (PM) problems." II seemed to
Jim that things like getting submarines, their crews, and
support facilities ready were the kinds of things that COM-
SUBLANT should be worrying about. But, somehow things didn't
work out that way. In fact, CDR Greene had been asked to
provide CAPT Ready with a summary of weekly torpedo firing
results every Friday, and Jim was tasked to get the required
information. He had worked it out with the COMOPTEVFOR
staff, and the required information, appropriately "edited"
to protect the competetive selection process, was made avail-
able every Friday. Jim never overcame the feeling that it
was a near useless exercise and an aggravating, cost inef-
fective use of his time. He felt his time could be better
spent preparing for fleet introduction of the MK-48 Torpedo
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Weapons System (TWS) as a system, rather than just a torpedo,
over which he had no control.
One of the reasons why Jim found it advisable to visit
Harold Progress was that he was anxious to pursue in greater
depth the conversion of integral submarine hardware to MK-48
configuration. The major items involved were submarine tor-
pedo loading and handling equipment and submarine fire con-
trol systems. Although both torpedo handling and fire control
hardware were fundamental to a submarine's purpose, Jim sur-
prisingly discovered that little was known by COMSUBLANT
2Material Office (N-4) personnel regarding the scope of con-
figuration changes to be made to these systems. As a result,
Jim usually became uneasy when he started thinking about
these two areas. Ke had visited codes N-402 , N-405, and
N-403, SSN, SSBN, and SS Material Officers respectively, in
an effort to find out what they and their shops knew about
MK-48. It didn't take him long to find out that they knew
"damn little". CDR Swain (N-403) had made his position
rather clear earlier, and further discussion, under more re-
laxed circumstances, in early April, revealed that his shop
also knew little or nothing about work being done in the
MK-48 area.
A recent statement made by LCDR Spalt , the assistant to
N-405, the SSBN Material Officer, in response to Jim's PMO
visit preparation inquiries pretty well summed up the
2 For this COMSUBLANT Staff Office and all others on-





situation. Jim had asked how the N-405 shop, acting for
COMSUBLANT, handled MK-48 work being accomplished on SSBN's:
Specifically how such ordnance equipment work packages were
reviewed prior to commencement of shipyard overhauls.
"Well," replied LCDR Spalt, "as you know, we go to the
SSBN pre-overhaul planning conferences after having reviewed
3
all proposed work items. ORDALTS to be accomplished by the
shipyard are listed in an ORDALT work package forwarded to
us by NAVORDSYSCOM. They are the ones who fund the ORDALT
work. We just check the package against other work to en-
sure that we have no conflicts. We haven't gotten any in-
puts from your office, pro or con, about these ORDALT packages
We don't review the technical aspects of ORDALTS, and, unless
there is some obvious glich, we just 'rubber stamp' the
package for completion with other overhaul work items. The
616 and 627 class SSBN's, for instance, were all approved
for MK-48 fire control ORDALT installations during overhaul,
and I expect all 640 class SSBN's to get MK-48 fire control
ORDALT packages installed during their upcoming POSEIDON
conversion overhauls. As a matter of interest, last fall, I
think in September 1969, we received some correspondence
from NAVSHIPSYSCOM that revealed plans to have us, 'Forces
Afloat', do some kind of alteration to the torpedo loading
and handling systems on our 608 and 616 class SSBN's. We
sent out a letter to NAVSHIPSYSCOM asking them to define the
scope of work involved, but we never received an answer."
3 See Appendix II for explanation of ORDALT Program.
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LCDR Spalt's comments both surprized and disturbed Jim.
He was unaware that submarine MK-48 conversion information
of such detail, particularly in ORDALT form, was available
to the staff. And, given that such information was available,
combined with the vested interest COMSUBLANT should have in
such work, he somehow felt that such work deserved a more
detailed review than it seemed to be getting: at least as
much as the other work items were getting by the N-40 shops.
Jim later discussed this conversation with Chief Sharp,
and the Chief indicated that it appeared to him that they,
the N-62 shop, had, to this point in time, never been given
an opportunity to review ORDALT work packages before the
pre-overhaul planning conferences. In fact, Chief Sharp
ended that discussion with Jim by saying, "Mr. White, this
whole ORDALT area, not just MK-48 related ORDALTS , appears
to be totally screwed up. I'm getting a lot of information
together and trying to make heads and tails out of what's
going on. I've already asked the Chiefs in the N-40 shops
to forward all ORDALT package information and correspondence
they receive to us for a chop in the future. As soon as I
know enough about what's going on to discuss it sensibly,
I'll bring you up to speed, Sir."
Chief Sharp's comments supported Jim's impressions and,
to Jim's way of thinking, highlighted the need for someone
on the staff to get more involved in the ORDALT program.
They, the N-62 shop, were the most likely candidates for such
involvement, but, before they could tackle such a venture,
they needed to know more about the program.

Jim tried to fill his ORDALT knowledge deficiency by re-
viewing the appropriate sections of his MK-48 files and by
discussing the subject with other staff members. Neither
of these ventures proved too rewarding. As a result, Jim
decided to take the matter up with Harold Progress during
their upcoming visit. He realized that this wasn't specif-
ically a MK-48 problem, but it did affect the MK-48 Program,
and tackling the problem at the MK-48 level was as good a
place as any to start. "Who knows?" thought Jim, "Maybe I
can kill two birds with one stone."
When Jim arrived in Harold Progress's office on 22 May,
he was prepared, as usual, to address all MK-48 subject
areas, but he was particularly interested in those areas
xhat would affect fleet introduction. Accordingly, he at-
tempted to vector the exchange toward that direction. And,
when the dialogue in Harold Progress's office finally reached
the subject of submarine MK-48 configuration and how the
ORDALT process affected submarine conversion, Jim discussed
his concerns regarding what had to be done and why it had to
be done to get the submarines ready to handle and fire MK-48
torpedoes. He started by quickly reviewing impressions de-
rived from a pre-trip re-reading of the MK-48 Program Coor-
dination Group (PCG) minutes for the 9th and 10th meetings
held on 20 November 1963 and 16 April 1969 respectively.
Briefly, he recalled that during those meetings Harold Prog-
ress had first (on 20 November 1968) broached the fact that
there were "torpedo/ship interface problems" that resulted
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in incompatabilities between submarine torpedo handling gear
and the MK-48 torpedoes. For example, the hard dolly and
torpedo tube rollers were making point contacts with the
thin torpedo skin. This caused scraping and scuffing of the
torpedo skin. As a result, Harold Progress noted that sub-
marines scheduled to participate in the torpedo evaluation
program would be modified "to improve their loading and
handling characteristics". At the 10th meeting he had ela-
borated further saying that torpedo skin abrasions caused
certain torpedo acoustic interference problems. He addressed
the fact that submarine torpedo loading systems fell into
three basic design categories: nose first, tail first, and
vertical loading. Corrective options ranged from use of a
"pod" to encapsulate the torpedo while loading it, to the
use of a phenolic coating, or some other suitable coating,
on all metal objects that came into contact with the torpedo.
He had concluded his presentation to the MK-48 PCG by stating
that the problem required urgent attention.
"Harold," said Jim, "I've read a lot about the loading
and handling problems, but I'm not sure I understand all that
I should about them. The term 'softening' keeps cropping up,
and I have a vague idea what it means. But, it sounds like
a 'buzz word' that covers a myriad of things. No matter how
I look at it, it appears as if several modifications are
going to have to be performed on our submarines, and that I




But, before giving Harold Progress an opportunity to
respond to his loading and handling query, Jim launched into
the MK-48 fire control conversion efforts and quickly ad-
dressed several areas of concern. He began by expressing
his frustration over the fact that projected conversions re-
quired for submarine fire control systems seemed rather neb-
ulous. On top of the "SPEC change ORDALT" that had to be
,
performed on the existing MK-48-0 fire control installations
once the ORDALT kits were eventually made available, Jim
revealed the staggering content of a 20 May telephone call
he received from NUSC, Newport. NUSC , Newport wanted COM-
SUBLANT to schedule 21 different submarines, by hull number,
for a total of about 4000 man hours of fire control work
that they referred to as "MK-48 Field Engineering Changes"
(FEC's). As far as Jim and Chief Sharp could determine,
FEC's were essentially ORDALTS , but they were not being ad-
ministered with the normal NAVORDSYSCOM ORDALT system. How-
ever, their accomplishment was necessary for the fire control
systems to become MK-48 compatible.
"Harold," confessed Jim, "We at COMSUBLANT don't even
have a handle on the ORDALT program, and now they're hitting
us with these FEC's, which we know absolutely nothing about.
Our shop is presently getting formally involved in the
ORDALT loop, so anything you can toll me about either,
The "SPEC change ORDALT" was an ORDALT which changed
the basic MK-4S-0 configures fire control systems to
MK-48-1/2 dual purpose capability.
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especially in terms of how both impact on the MK-48 Program,
will certainly be appreciated." Another fire control related
matter that puzzled Jim was the fact that NAVORDSYSCOM was
no longer funding the testing of MK-48 fire control equip-
ment along with other submarine fire control equipment dur-
ing Weapons System Accuracy Trials (WSAT) following submarine
shipyard overhauls. Thirdly, Jim disclosed the fact that
some of the submarines that were receiving MK-48 fire con-
trol conversions did not appear to be receiving adequate
spare part support, and, in some cases, the spare parts
allowance lists had been noted to be inadequate. Lastly,
Jim expressed concern that the submarines that had received
MK-48 fire control conversions, to data, didn't seem to be
concerned or motivated to maintain this new equipment. Ke
really wasn't sure why he should bother Harold with the last
item. It clearly sounded like a submarine force problem,
but, for some reason, Jim felt that the PMO should be as con-
cerned about it as he was. "Harold," Jim concluded, "pre-
cisely what is being done, and what will be required to be
done in our submarines in order for them to handle and shoot
the MK-48 torpedo? I'm really not sure I know."
"Well," began Harold, "let's take your questions in
order and start with the loading and handling problems. The
5background on the 'softening SHIPALT' is rather interesting."
See Appendix III for explanation of tho SHIPALT program.
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And, with that, Harold Progress proceeded to bring Jim up to
speed. His comments were illuminating. It seems that any
system which interfaced with the torpedo was subject to an
"overnight" design change requirement because of some newly
discovered incompatability with the torpedo. An example of
this was the loading and handling problem. Who would ever
have thought that submarine loading and handling equipment
would be incompatible with the torpedo? Apparently, no one
did in the early days. As Harold Progress related:
"We learned a lot of things once we started
exercising development torpedoes. The handling
problem first developed back in 1967 — they were
having problems with experimental launchings.
Corrosion was a major problem before a design
change that isolated the ground circuit from the
skin of the torpedo. As an example, once we were
forced to keep a torpedo in a flooded torpedo tube
for two hours because of bad weather which prevented
our launching it. When we finally took the torpedo
out of the tube, we'd discovered that electrolysis
had eaten a hole through the shell of the torpedo.
The electrical design change helped, but the cor-
rosion problem wasn't completely solved. We ran
some tests up at NUSC, Newport, and, after vari-
ous alternatives were considered, we ultimately
decided to coat the torpedo with a special laminar
paint. This provided good protection, but we had
to exert a concerted effort to prevent scratches
because any exposed metal was extremely susceptible
to corrosion. It soon became apparent that tradi-
tional methods and equipment used to load and handle
torpedoes in submarines were not going to preclude
marring the torpedo's protective coating. I ob-
served a MK-48 torpedo being experimentally loaded
on-board the USS JACK in Portsmouth, New Hampshire.
The crew was permitted to align the torpedo and
move it as they would any other existing torpedo.
Well, they 'mule hauled' it and used crowbars and
rubber mallets just like they did to any other
torpedo, and, when they finally pulled it back out
of the torpedo tube, it had scrapes and gashes all
over it. While there, I also noticed that the
torpedo rested on steel rollers while in the sub-
marine's torpedo stowage cradles. This resulted
in point contacts with the torpedo skin. Armed
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with this new found information, I returned to the
Project Office and revealed to all concerned that
we were going to have to do something to 'soften'
the submarine loading and handling equipment to
prevent unacceptible corrosion damage. No one be-
lieved me, so I went to ORL, Penn State, our tech-
nical advisor, with the problem. I also went to
VITRO to have them develop some interface drawings
in an effort to pin point all of the interface
problem areas. As it turned out, corrosion wasn't
the only problem resulting from scratches on the
torpedo skin. Scratches near the torpedo nose had
a deleterious effect on acoustic performance. This
accelerated the need for corrective action, so we
went to NAVSHIPSYSCOM to seek their assistance in
developing some kind of 'softening' plan. They
weren't very interested, but the SSBN people had „
some money and asked me to come up to Electric Boat
in Groton and discuss what could be done right away
to get the necessary work accomplished in SSBN's
while they were in overhaul . I went , and there we
reviewed the VITRO interface drawings in detail and
came up with a 'softening' plan which we incorporated
into the plans for overhaul of the 616 class SSBN's.
That's basically where the 'softening' effort began.
Essentially what we did was coat all the handling
gear that came into contact with the torpedo with
polyurethane and replaced or coated metal rollers
with nylon. For 637 class SSN's like PARGO we did
basically the same thing for both loading and hand-
ling equipment. We got NAVSEC involved in the prob-
lem in 1968, and in September of the same year we
established a 'MK-48 Torpedo Weapons System Inter-
face Coordination Team' to look at all possible tor-
pedo/submarine interface problems. There were about
twelve commands and agencies at the PM ' s level in-
volved. Right now, NAVSEC and NAVSHIPSYSCOM are
fully involved in the loading and handling business
to develop SHIPALT plans for each class of submarine
to ensure that their respective equipments are made
compatible. PARGO presently, as you probably al-
ready know, has a prototype installation that en-
ables her to properly handle all versions of MK-48
torpedoes for evaluation firings. Obviously, this
expense wasn't programmed into the original MK-48
Program budget, and the initial cost estimates to
install these alterations in all submarines approached
the astronomical total of about sixty million dollars.
Electric Boat is a submarine shipyard located in Groton,
Connecticut, owned by General Dynamics.
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That, of course, was prohibitive. We've had to
come up with some money for SHIPALTS, but we are
going to have to find ways to keep the cost down.
We hope to have the proposed SHIPALT plan for the
637 class SSN's in hand very shortly."
"Holy wow!" exclaimed Jim, sitting back in his chair, "I
don't know what I thought 'soften' meant when I first heard
it had to be done, but it certainly looks like shipyard work
will be required for all submarines. Given that's the case,
how in the Hell are we ever going to be able to schedule
such an effort during the middle of submarine operating cy-
cles? At least two thirds of the submarines of this force
won't be going into overhaul prior to MK-48 fleet introduc-
tion."
He didn't really get any answer. All Harold said was,
iiiai/ s one Oi xne Dig 2^i*GuiGiTiG lacmg us rigiiu new.
After some more dialogue on the loading and handling
problem, Jim suggested that they shift the discussion over
to the fire control problems.
Harold agreed. "That's one area," he began, "where we've
been doing extremely well. In fact, as far as I know, the
fire control system has been keeping pace nicely with all of
the torpedo design changes. I'll have to look into these
specific problems that you have just brought up and get back
to you with my findings. Regarding ORDALTS however," con-
tinued Harold, "I'm sure you recognize that ORDALT is an
acronym for Ordnance Alteration, a formal change or modifi-
cation to a NAVORDSYSCOM sponsored piece of equipment. And,
like any formal change handled by a bureaucracy, the process
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of getting one approved and distributed is painfully slow.
This is why we are using FEC's. They are nothing more than
ORDALTS that haven't made it through the formal NAVORDSYSCOM
ORDALT approval loop. Don't get frightened though, we've
got a good handle on the FEC's."
Despite Harold's efforts to console Jim's FEC worries,
Jim was suspicious. "By-passing any formal system often in-
troduced attendant problems that usually cropped up much
later on," thought Jim to himself. "Besides that," he thought,
"If I haven't got a handle on the 'painfully slow' ORDALT
program, how in the Hell am I ever going to be able to stay
on top of this 'expedient' FEC program." He decided to de-
fer commenting however, at least until he was able to discuss
the problem more intelligently.
Harold continued, "I certainly wasn't aware that there
were any hardware support problems, but I'll look into it.
I don't see any difficulty in getting the required altera-
tions installed, as long as we can maintain a satisfactory
installation schedule. I'll look into all of these problems
you have mentioned and take them up with our fire control
people. If you work on the availability and scheduling of
submarines for installation of these ORDALTS and FEC's back
at COMSUBLANT, I'm sure that will be a big help. Another
thing you can do for us at COMSUBLANT is to start thinking
about nominating another 'dedicated' submarine to supplement
PARGO. That requirement is going to come up soon. Do you
at COMSUBLANT have one in mind?"
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Jim had no answer for this question, but he had been
forewarned of this requirement some months back when he
started a dialogue with the MK-48 types on COMOPTEVFOR staff.
As the meeting was winding down, Harold used a "sea
story" to illustrate how the "softening" requirement took
everyone by surprise and how ill prepared they were prepared
to cope with it. Harold began,
"Jim, don't leave until I tell you this — it
really shows how 'bush league' our original "soften-
ing' efforts were. Back when I initially discovered
the 'storage tray roller point contact problem', I
thought about it overnight, and, before I flew back
to Washington, I told one of the on scene engineer-
ing types that the obvious way to temporarily solve
the problem was to coat the rollers with a rubber
or soft plastic. He agreed, and I left.
The next day I get a frantic phone call from
this fellow, and he tells me, 'I did everything
you said, but now we can't get the torpedo into the
tube — the top of the torpedo nose hits the top
edge of the tube.
'
'Well,' I said suspiciously, 'Tell me exactly
what you did.
'
'Just what you told me, Harry -- I removed the
rollers from the storage trays and took them over
to the Rubber and Plastic Shop and had them coated;
then I reinstalled them.'
I than asked him how thick the coating was, and
he told me. 'Well,' I asked, 'did you remove that
much metal from the rollers before you had them
coated?' I don't have to tell you what his answer
was. "
That broke up their meeting, and Jim left Harold's office
doubled over in laughter.
The message Jim carried back to Norfolk was loud and
clear to him — COMSUBLANT had better start worrying about
submarine MK-48 hardware configuration as a number one prior-
ity. The potential scheduling requirements for the still
pending MK-48 loading and handling SIIIPALTS and the burgeoning
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MK-48 fire control ORDALT/FEC requirements looked ominous at
best, requiring additional marching orders from the PM before
Jim could effectively do anything for him. The lack of such
orders didn't keep Jim from worrying about these problems
however. All of this was in addition to the routine problems
he romanced on a daily basis. Jim returned to his pursuit of
these matters with renewed vigor.
By mid July, the N-62 shop was really beginning to feel
the added weight of MK-48 Program involvement. The "MK-48
Program Staff Review" had raised a number of points requir-
ing followup investigation and various degrees of action.
In addition, Jim's interest and involvement in the MK-48 area
had now made his name available to various people in the
MK-48 business: NUSC, Newport, COMOPTEVFOR, the PMO, NOSSO-
LANT and COMSUSDEVGRU TWO, to name a few. As a result, he
was getting more and more telephone calls from people needing
fleet input for their area of endeavor. Chief Sharp was ex-
periencing the same thing in the fire control area. It
seemed that once people found out that there was someone to
talk to, they discovered that they wanted to talk. Mentally
reviewing all that had happened, hadn't happened, and was
about to happen since he distributed the "MK-48 Program
Staff Review", Jim concluded that the review was a milestone
event. It was the juncture where he broke out of his cocoon
and began to gain sort of a tacit "Mister MK-48" image on
the staff. Jim recalled,
"Yes, it was about mid July. I was in the
office early one Saturday morning -- it was my
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turn to guard the store and answer the telephone.
After I finished reading the morning message traf-
fic and determined that there was nothing 'hot',
I put my feet up on my desk and began to think
over where we had been since April, and where we
were headed. The time really had flown by, and,
on the surface, it didn't seem like much had hap-
pened. But, when I considered things in the aggre-
gate, some very significant things came to mind.
For one thing, I managed to crank out three major
COMSUBLANT position letters: two to the PMO, and
one to the CNO. The first, written in May, addressed
anticipated requirements to support fleet exercise
firing of the MK-48 torpedo. Specifically, the
letter pointed out the need for suitable torpedo
retrieving craft and noted that the projected pro-
curement of MK-27 Mobile Torpedo Targets (MTT's)
appeared inadequate in number. The letter also
requested the current status and future plans for
these procurements. The second letter, written in
June, provided the PMO with COMSUBLANT ' s preferred
order of MK-48 shore facility workshop activations.
It requested that only production torpedoes manu-
factured by the eventual winner of the competetive
selection process he distributed to the fleet, to
eliminate the problem of configuration management,
and it further requested that facility activation
dates be commensurate with the need to support the
first production torpedo deliveries. And, if, for
some reason, the latter request could not be met,
the letter went on to request that the initially
delivered torpedoes be supported from the MK-48
Test and Evaluation Support Facility at Complex 30
in Cape Kennedy (Port Canaveral), until the perma-
nent facilities in New London, Norfolk, and Charles-
ton could be activated in an orderly and well
organized manner. The third letter went to the
CNO on 2 July. It pointed out the fact that the
Norfolk facility could not be activated as a war-
shot workshop facility because of insurmountable
population safety constraints that had manifested
when the torpedo's warhead yield had increased as
a result of the new dual purpose configuration.
The letter recommended that the facility be used to
support exercise torpedoes only, and that a new war-
shot workshop facility, capable of supporting the
Norfolk area, be established at the Naval Weapons
Station in Yorktown , Virginia. The irony was that
virtually all of the staffing required to get these
letters out had come from the N-62 shop. We had
gotten the other necessary staff inputs by first
visiting the potentially interested staff officers
and still later by holding an ad hoc staff committee
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meeting in June. We still hadn't re-established
our 'MK-48 Torpedo Working Group' yet. In fact,
we didn't get the Chief of Staff's memo which re-
established it signed out until 23 July. It goes
without sayjng that we burned up a lot of energy
in the N-62 shop getting these letters out.
"And, we had also been getting ourselves more
and more involved in the scheduling of ORDALTS and
FEC ' s for installation in our submarines. Here-to-
fore, ORDALTS and FEC's had been getting installed
on a 'catch as catch can' basis. Chief Sharp and
I had done a lot of talking to our Submarines Squad-
ron Weapons Officers? as well as NUSC , Newport and
NOSSOLANT, the NAVORDSYSCOM field activities that
had actually been installing our ORDALTS. Prior to
this dialogue, ORDALTS had simply been installed
whenever the field engineers could find a submarine
along side somewhere, and could get aboard it. We
were now trying to do some organized scheduling.
Chief Sharp had figured out that our submarines
were literally thousands of man hours behind in
ORDALT accomplishments. At this point in time, we
were very actively utilizing the field services of
NOSSOLANT. They had experts available to help peo-
ple like us. CDR Greene had encouraged the N-62
shop to utilize their services when he first came
aboard in 1969. We had finally taken the que, and,
working through parent Submarine Squadron Commanders,
we were using NOSSOLANT teams to board and inspect
our submarines. They performed a service that they
called a Weapons System Review (WSR) . They would
literally open up equipment to verify which ORDALTS
were actually installed and ensure that all the
records, theirs, ours, the submarine's, NAVORDSYSCOM' s
,
and NAVSUPSYSCOM' s, matched the physical installation.
Once the ORDALTS were verified, they would review
the submarine's supply system records and spare
parts stocks to ensure that they supported the physi-
cal installation. If they didn't, they took the
steps necessary to formally correct all problems
through the Naval Supply System. The finished prod-
uct of a WSR was that everyone who needed to know,
not just the submarine, knew where the submarine
stood in the world of ORDALT accomplishment, and the
submarine in question was able to fully support its
physical installation. Needless to say, COMSUBLANT
and all of our submarines, should have been doing
this all along. We weren't, and it goes without
7 For this and all further reference to Submarine Squad-
rons, Flotillas, or Divisions, refer to Exhibit (13) to de-
termine organizat ional relationships.
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saying that we needed something like the WSR service
to help us straighten out our screwed up ordnance
configuration records. Although the WSR effort was
in its neophyte stages at this time, the informa-
tion gathered thus far showed that Chief Sharp, who
was now working very closely with NOSSOLANT, had
certainly been correct with his prediction — our
ORDALT program in the Atlantic Submarine Force was
a real bag of worms. What's more, we had to get a
handle on the administrative controls before MK-48
became operational or the problems would multiply.
Moreover, the FEC ' s , which were being installed by
Singer Librascope field engineers, were separate
efforts on top of all this.
"Unbeknownst to us for some time, Chief Sharp
and I were on converging courses in the fire control
business. It appeared that a lot of the configura-
tion administration problems that he was struggling
to identify were already at the source of the MK-48
firecontrol spare parts support problems we had
begun to encounter.
"Then, I had also been under the gun ever since
leaving Harold's office on 22 May to find another
submarine to replace the USS JACK for the Technical/
Operational Evaluation effort at the AUTEC Range.
The greatest pressure had come from the COMOPTEVFOR
staff in Norfolk. As you know, they were tasked by
CNO to supervise the technical evaluation of the two
torpedoes. Their role was that of a third party --
an unbiased 'devil's advocate.' I had paid them
quite a few visits, starting way back in January.
Their MK-48 Program Officer, CDR Fritz, and I had
developed a good relationship over the months. I
still couldn't get used to their role in the MK-48
business. They were tasked by CNO to supervise and
support the technical evaluation of the WESTINGHOUSE
torpedo and all of the MK-48 ancilliary support equip-
ment, which included fire control plus loading and
handling equipment. All of this was under the tech-
nical direction of NUSC , Newport. The CLEVITE tor-
pedo technical evaluation fell under the technical
direction of NOL, White Oak. The full Operational
evaluation of both torpedoes and all support equip-
mentwas to be conducted by COMOPTEVFOR. We, COMSUB-
LANT, provided the submarine platforms, but COMOPTEVFOR
controlled the submarines during their assigned MK-48
evaluation exercises. This was a big departure from
the traditional way of doing things. Rarely in
the past has the submarine force ever relinquished
operational control of its submarines. The real
'clincher* was the fact that COMOPTEVFOR ' s MK-48
Operational Plan prohibited submarine personnel,
Commanding Officer included, from discussing the
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results of their participation. Although the pur-
pose of this prohibition was quite valid in that
it attempted to protect the interests of the com-
peting contractors and maintain the integrity of
of the selection process, it proved quite frustra-
ting to me and a lot of other people. We were denied
that source of information. I was forced to get
the best 'edited' dope available, and that came
from CDR Fritz, who received a daily update on all
range firings. In any case, CDR Fritz wanted a
second 'dedicated' submarine 'on line', and he had
actually been 'leaning' on me since March. He was
convinced that conversion of the selected submarine
could take as much as two months to complete. Ac-
cordingly, the intensity of his requests for a de-
signated 'dedicated' submarine increased progres-
sively since April. I, in turn, initially with my
' MK-48 Program Staff Review', attempted to 'lean'
on the N-31 shop, our Operations and Scheduling
people. They finally came up with a candidate and
transmitted their recommendation to CNO for approval
by the Program Sponsor. On 26 June, CNO responded
by message approving the USS GRAYLING'S nomination.
CDR Fritz was pleased, the PMO was pleased, and N-31
and N-62 had the pressure taken off. However, for
N-62 it was only a momentary relief.
"Since 26 June, a continuous volley of messages
had been flying back and forth concerning the con-
figuration changes necessary to get GRAYLING ready.
She was currently in the Charleston Naval Shipyard
(CHASN, NSY) finishing up a routine overhaul, and
the PMO wanted to get people onboard 'ASAP' to get
the MK-48 work started. Back on 5 June, well before
GRAYLING was officially appointed, we had informally
passed the word to all interested parties that
GRAYLING was the most likely choice. The following
day, the PMO was on the phone to CHASN, NSY, trying
to get their ducks lined up to take on the addition-
al work required in the MK-48 conversion area.
"So, one Hell of a lot had transpired since
April. And, at that precise moment, my mind was
focused clearly on the fact that the GRAYLING con-
version was like right now, on deck, and it had to
get prime attention. It was our most significant
involvement to date. The TRIGGER MK-48 loading and
handling conversion had recently been completed, and
TRIGGER just left for the west coast as a result of
her transfer to COMSUBPAC. Although I'd never really
heard anything derrogatory about the conversion ef-
fort on TRIGGER, something said in a telephone con-
versation I had with the Submarine Squadron Four
Weapons Officer, LCDR Bob Mar] in, a week ago, lin-
gered on my rnind. In passing, Bob had said, 'CHASN,
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NSY didn't know which end was up on TRIGGER.' He
then added, 'I hope they have their homework done
for GRAYLING. '"
Following his Saturday morning "soul searching exercise",
Jim made it a point to monitor and interpret all messages
and correspondence regarding GRAYLING much more carefully.
And, he talked to Harold Progress on several occasions during
the month of July. Harold had kept his ear to the ground,
and all of the information that he was able to round up in-
dicated that the GRAYLING conversion plan was well in hand.
All agencies, commands, and contractors that were to be in-
volved in the onboard work had been notified, and the PMO was
apparently well satisfied with the groundwork that was being
laid. In fact, the early June effort by the PMO to get
-i-u-i
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paid off. NAVSHIPSYSCOM and CIIASN, NSY had agreed to do cer-
tain preliminary MK-48 work, before GRAYLING completed her
shipyard overhaul in August. The PMO had forwarded funds
for the work to CHASN, NSY expeditiously on 25 June. NAV-
SHIPSYSCOM had officially authorized CHASN, NSY to start the
work on 1 July. This was significant, since the MK-48 work
represented a considerable amount of additional work to be
accomplished in concert with an already full and tightly
scheduled shipyard overhaul. The major portion of the MK-48
conversion effort was actually supposed to take place during
an additionally scheduled, separate Technical Availability
(TAV) which was to follow GRAYLING'S overhaul. Hence, this
advance MK-48 effort was most advantageous and gave all con-
cerned an appreciable head start.
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July was a month of anticipation and planning — the big
concern to Jim was the determination of what the controlling
job was on GRAYLING and then the scheduling of other work
accordingly. By 18 July, it had been established from in-
coming message traffic and telephone conversations with the
PMO, NUSC, Newport, CHASN, NSY, and the Submarine Squadron
Four Weapons Officer that the fire control work would be con-
trolling. A NUSC, Newport message had asked COMSUBLANT for
six weeks to accomplish the work, with at least three of
those six weeks alongside a pier in Charleston. Jim had
quickly contacted the N-31 people to secure a block of time
for accomplishment of the fire control work, and, after
touching base with the N-402 shop, SSN Material, he drafted
a message to NUSC, Newport, NAVSHIPSYSCOM , the PMO, and
COMSUBRON FOUR with information copies to all other interested
addressees. The message made available five weeks, beginning
7 September, to accomplish all remaining work, it also made
available a sixth week to check out the fire control system
and the special instrumentation that was to be installed
with the ORDALTS. The message tasked COMSUBRON FOUR with the
coordination of the required work and sundry support needs
on scene. It also authorized COMSUBRON FOUR to exercise di-
rect liaison, as necessary, with the organizations perform-
ing the work. On the suggestion of N-402, CDR Standfast,
the message recommended to NAVSHIPSYSCOM that the loading
and handling SHIPALT "be fabricated now" to ensure that it
could readily be installed during the same period that the
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fire control ORDALTS were to be installed. A NAVSHIPSYSCOM
message concurred with the pref abrication recommendation,
and it enjoined CHASN, NSY to be able to complete all re-
quired installation work on GRAYLING during the first three
weeks of the 7 September six week TAV.
Jim burned up the telephone wires during the first week
in August, making certain that he had the total picture re-
garding what was to be done on GRAYLING. He had passed on
everything that he was able to find out to Bob Marlin, in
Charleston, and to GRAYLING'S Division Commander, COMSUBDIV
42, CDR Auger.
In the midst of all this, on a morning when CDR Greene
was out of the office, CDR Greene's phone began to ring. Jim
answered it, and it was CAFT Ready on the other end. Jim
explained that CDR Greene wasn't in and asked if there was
anything that he could do.
"Yes," replied CAPT Ready, "It's you I want to talk to
anyway. Get your ass over here right now."
"Yes, Sir!" replied Jim.
Jim hung up the phone, got in his car, and drove to
o
headquarters. Within a few moments, he was standing in
front of CAPT Ready's desk.
As CAPT Ready looked up, he said, "I want you to get your
tail on the next plane out of here and get down to the AUTEC
Q
COMSUBLANT headquarters was 4.5 miles away from the
complex where Jim's office was located.
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Range and square away PARGO's communications problems." As
the dialogue progressed, it appeared that CAPT Ready received
a frantic telephone call from PARGO's Squadron Commander re-
porting severe difficulties that PARGO was experiencing
while trying to effectively communicate with the AUTEC Range
control center personnel. Because the NUSC , Newport directed
TECH/EVAL was presently underway, the experienced COMOPTEVFOR
personnel that were usually manning the control center com-
munications circuits were not there and had not been there
for a few days. And, a couple of civilians inexperienced
with submarine communications were filling in for them, but
they neither understood nor appreciated the problems of a
submarine. As a result, the submarine was often asked to do
things which were extremely difficult or near impossible.
The frustrations of the submarine personnel mounted, and the
situation, in their opinion, occasionally reached chaotic
proportions. PARGO's Squadron Commander was paying the ship
a routine visit, observed all of this, and asked CAPT Ready
to do something to correct the situation.
Although Jim fully understood the problem and truely
sympathized with PARGO, he tried to remind CAPT Ready that
it was really none of COMSUBLANT's business. "Captain,"
Jim began, "this really is none of our business. That ship
is on loan down there to COMOPTEVFOR. They're supposed to
have a guy down there controlling this operation."
"I don't sec it that way," replied CAPT Ready. "They
can't communicate. You get the Hel] down there. We need a
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Naval Officer down there. And, stay down there until you
get the damned situation squared away."
"Yes, Sir!" replied Jim, as he left CAPT Ready's office.
Jim returned to his office and called CDR Fritz at COM-
OPTEVFOR. Jim related what had happened and what was evolv-
ing. "I recommend you, COMOPTEVFOR, stand up and say you're
going to take charge down there," said Jim, "or, as you can
see, I'm going to be forced to jump into the middle of your
pond. And," continued Jim, "you're going to get upset, I'm
sure, 'cause you don't want us in the middle of your pond."
"That's right!" responded CDR Fritz, and he began to
quote a verse right out of COMOPTEVFOR ' s Operations Plan.
With that, Jim got a copy of the Operations Plan and took
it over to headquarters to show CAPT Ready. Essentially what
it said was: What goes on down here is nobody's business but
CNO's, COMOPTEVFOR ' s , and the PM ' s . And, no one in the fleet
or on the submarine is permitted to see anything, say any-
thing, or do anything, because it is a very sensitive, com-
petetive situation. Furthermore, we don't want anybody down
here, and nobody's allowed down here, without the express
permission of COMOPTEVFOR.
Jim showed this to CAPT Ready. CAPT Ready read the
thing. He read it over again, and, when he finished, he
looked up and asked, "What the Hell are they doing about it?"




"OK!" replied CAPT Ready, making the problem disappear
and closing another MK-48 episode which consumed a good por-
tion of Jim's day.
On 6 August, it appeared that the stage was set, as Jim
went over the GRAYLING plans with CDR Greene. Jim was con-
fident that everything was "on track" . CDR Greene was also
satisfied but suggested that Jim go ahead and summarize the
status of the GRAYLING conversion effort, in writing, for
CAPT Ready, and that he use this document as the medium for
promulgating the information to the rest of the concerned
staff codes. Jim's memorandum summarized the situation as
follows
:
"1) USS GRAYLING (nominated to replace USS JACK
for MK-48 TECH/OPEVAL services) is scheduled
for active MK-48 Program participation in Jan-
uary 1971.
2) Alterations to GRAYLING, in addition to the
MK-48-0 fire control conversion completed dur-
ing the current shipyard overhaul, will in-
clude :
A) Installation of foundations and interface
cabling for Digital Data Acquisition Sys-
tem (DDAS) instrumentation. This is now
being accomplished by CHASN, NSY during
GRAYLING'S present overhaul, using long-
lead time hardware removed from JACK dur-
ing the period 19-21 June in New London.
B) Installation of a foundation for a modi-
fied SUBROC loader to be used to handle
and load IAK-48 torpedoes from topside into
the torpedo room. This item is also now
being accomplished by CHASN, NSY.
C) Installation and calibration of the DDAS
instrumentation. This item will be accom-
plished by NUSC, Newport during a currently
scheduled six week TAV in Charleston to
begin on 7 September 1970.
D) Installation of a prototype 'SPEC Change
ORDALT" which will convert one of GRAYLING'S
two Attack Directors to provide MK-48 MODS
1 & 2 (dual purpose weapons) capability.
This item will also be accomplished by NUSC,
Newport during the 7 September TAV.
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E) Modification of the onboard loading and
handling equipment (softening conversion)
to ensure compatability with all mods of
the MK-48 torpedo. This item will be ac-
complished by CHASN, NSY during the first
three weeks of the 7 September TAV
.
2) A modified WSAT has been arranged for GRAYLING
during the period 23-28 October, which will be
followed by a test firing of two MK-48 torpedoes
at the AUTEC Range on 30 October.
3) Schedules are firm — GRAYLING will be ready
by 1 November. The remaining deficiency is
crew training. ORD-4021, CAPT Surefoot
,
plans
to visit GRAYLING in the near future to provide
command guidance. NUSC, Newport will provide
for crew familiarization during the TAV period."
Although August was an extremely busy month in the N-62
shop, and little time was available for "gilding the lily",
Jim checked up on GRAYLING once more on 15 August to make
sure everything was moving forward properly. In Jim's own
words, "Things were moving along like clockwork."
At 0730 on 1 September, while Jim walked by CDR Greene's
office door, enroute to his own desk, with a dozen problems
on his mind, CDR Greene's voice rang out loud and clear.
"Get your ass in here," he blurted. "Look at this God damned
message," he continued, pushing it across his desk toward
Jim.
Jim looked at the message. It was from GRAYLING to COM-
SUBLANT with information copies to everyone in the world who
had an interest in GRAYLING'S MK-48 conversion efforts. It
read
:
"MK-48 TORPEDO SUPPORT INSTALLATION
1. NEW AND/OR UNCLEAR WORK ITEMS ARE CONTINUALLY




2. PREVIOUS CONFERENCE DID NOT FULLY DEFINE TOTAL
WORK PACKAGE OR RESPONSIBILITIES.
3. TO ENSURE COMPLETION OF ALL REQUIRED WORK DURING
PRESENT AVAILABILITY, RECOMMEND IMMEDIATE CON-
FERENCE TO CLEARLY DEFINE GOALS, REQUIREMENTS,
AND RESPONSIBILITIES OF ALL INTERESTED PARTIES."
Jim fell into a chair. "Good Lord!" he exclaimed. "What
in the Hell went wrong? I can't believe it. What in the
Hell is going on down there?"
"You tell me," responded CDR Greene.
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MK-48 TORPEDO FLEET INTRODUCTION (E)
It was not yet 0800. CDR Greene and Jim White were again
in the former's office, attempting to hypothesize how the
GRAYLING MK-48 conversion effort could have turned sour. It
really wasn't clear just what could have prompted the ship's
Commanding Officer to throw his hands up in the air and send
such a message "blast" to "God and everybody". He was es-
sentially censuring everyone from the Project Manager and
COMSUBLANT right on down the line.
The big hand wasn't on the hour yet when CDR Greene's
phone rang. He picked it up, almost reflexively, right in
the middle of one of his sentences. He was telling Jim
that he was going to call Rocky Powers, the GRAYLING'S skip-
per and get the "straight dope". There must have been a
little E.S.P. drifting through the air; it was CDR Powers on
the other end of the line. CDR Powers and CDR Greene went
back a long way. In addition to their excellent acquaint-
anceship, neither had any hang ups about getting right down
For clarification of the acronyms used throughout the
case, please refer to Appendix I.
This case was written by CDR David A. Newcomb and LCDR Robert
F. Hurley, Jr., under the direction of Professors William
Giauque and Michael Dean of the Naval Postgraduate School,
Monterey, California. All names have been disguised.
Cases are prepared as a basis for class discussion and are
not designed to present illustrations of either correct or
incorrect handling of administrative problems.
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to the facts of a situation. CDR Greene cupped his hand
over the receiver, and, while still listening to CDR Powers,
whispered, "Jim, pick up the extension at your desk; I want
you to listen to this."
The conversation lasted for about five minutes. CDR
Powers said that he sent his message the evening before, and
that he hoped he could get to CDR Greene to brief him "be-
fore there were any waves." The essence of his comments was
that the pre-installation conference for both the fire con-
trol work and the Shipyard work, which he attended, "left a
Hell of a lot to be desired." The first sign of difficulties
was the conspicuous absence of someone in overall charge of
the entire work effort. Despite the fact that the represent-
atives from NUSC, Newport and Charleston Naval Shipyard
(CHASN,NSY) were able to sufficiently outline the essentials
of their respective responsibilities, more and more work
items were popping out of the woodwork as the 7 September
TAV start date neared. Also worrisome was the fact that
these additional work items weren't being presented in the
format of some kind of a documented change to a master plan.
On the contrary, from CDR Powers' point of view, discovery
of many of the work items that were new to him was coming
about in bits and pieces through conversations with various
people. He had gotten a little additional information from
LCDR Bob Marl in, Submarine Squadron Four (COMSUBRON FOUR) 2
2 For this and all further reference to Submarine Squad-




Weapons Officer, but CDR Powers was of the opinion that Bob
Marlin was equally as exasperated as he was. He had also
gotten some of his information from NUSC, Newport personnel
over a cup of coffee in the wardroom, and from his own of-
ficers who had collected their "dope" from the various tech-
nicians that had been on and off the ship in connection with
the MK-48 installation planning. He was both perplexed and
annoyed by what he viewed as a potential "Tower of Bable
operation." What added insult to injury was the fact that
he, as commanding officer of the submarine, had somehow been
committed to an unidentified amount of complex work without
even the courtesy of being "cut in" on many items. And, the
straw that finally broke the camel's back was the fact that,
everything else not-with-standing, it appeared that no ef-
fort was being made to coordinate the work. Both Jim and
CDR Greene could readily appreciate what they were being
told. No commanding officer would stand by for such appar-
ent disregard for his responsibilities and ultimate account-
ability. As the conversation progressed, it was agreed that
a conference would be held in the GRAYLING'S wardroom, in
Charleston, the morning of 2 September, and that CDR Greene
and Jim would be in attendance. CDR Powers then committed
himself to touch base with COMSUBRON FOUR to ensure that all
of the agencies that he could determine were involved would
be asked to be represented. CDR Greene stated that he would
"close the loop" at COMSUBLANT ' s end by telephoning all or-
ganizations known to be involved, to ensure that there were
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"no loose ends." The conversation soon wound down on a
cordial note. After hanging up the phone, CDR Greene told
Jim to get them a couple of seats on the afternoon flight to
Charleston, and he drove over to headquarters to calm the
choppy waters which had been unmistakenly whipped up by the
GRAYLING'S message.
The next morning, at 1100, CDR Greene and Jim were seated
at GRAYLING'S wardroom table. The meeting was chaired by
GRAYLING'S Division Commander (COMSUBDIV 42), CDR Z.K. Auger.
Other attendees were Commanding Officer GRAYLING — CDR
Powers, COMSUBRON FOUR Weapons Officer -- LCDR Marlin, NUSC
,
Newport representative — Mr. T.S. Carde, Weapons Officer
GRAYLING — LT Call, and Charleston Naval Shipyard (CHASN,NSY)
representative — Mr. Lawson Riles, plus six unidentified
people listening in. The discussion was being led by CDR
Auger. He stated that the purpose of the meeting was to
clearly define the goals and responsibilities of all inter-
ested parties, with the specific intent of precluding the
unnecessary expenditure of more time and money at some later
date. He emphasized the apparent need for the meeting by
citing some existing problems, which clearly resulted from
lack of unified communications and direction. Specific ex-
amples were: virtually no documentation had been provided to
GRAYLING or COMSUBRON FOUR describing such things as materi-
als required, work schedules or milestones, the total scope
of the work, and the assignment of responsibilities; there
was no indication of how the NUSC, Newport and CHASN, NSY
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work was to be coordinated; and no effort had been made to
3
conduct an adequate pre-installation ship check. The lat-
ter omission was attested to by the fact that plans used for
earlier work on USS PARGO were just then being changed to
accommodate GRAYLING as a result of discovering that the con-
figuration of the two ships was different.
CDR Auger went on to say that he'd been on the telephone
with the MK-48-0/2 Project Manager (PM) , CAPT Surefoot , and
had been told that Mr. Carde was to be the general super-
visor and coordinator for all work that had to be done. Mr.
Carde didn't seem to be aware that he had that distinction,
but he concurred with the need and accepted the responsibil-
ity. At this point, CDR Auger got into the business of try-
ing to identify the work that had to be done. It was agreed
that NUSC, Newport and CHASN, NSY work schedules had to be
pinned down and coordinated. Following a prolonged discus-
sion, which broached quite a few potential and real problems,
the participants agreed to the following: Mr. Carde would
develop a final integrated work schedule. COMSUBDIV 42,
Commanding Officer GRAYLING, and COMSUBRON FOUR Weapons Of-
ficer would work together with CHASN, NSY planners and would
put together a schedule that would be compatible with ship's
force work requirements and concurrently serve as an input
3 Ship check is a term used to describe the process of
physically comparing a ship's installation with existing
plans to ensure that the plans match the installation. It
should bo appreciated that ships of the same class are rarely
built exact 1 y alike.
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for Mr. Carde's master schedule. COMSUBLANT would contact
COMOPTEVFOR and discuss projected plans for GRAYLING. This
would serve as the basis to initiate a message to all com-
mands, major and minor, that were concerned with GRAYLING'S
MK-48 conversion. This message would redesignate COMSUBRON
FOUR as "the primary point of contact regarding all matters
concerning GRAYLING'S MK-48 conversion and participation in
the Technical/Operational Evaluation Program." The message
would specifically state that all related communications
should be directed to LCDR Marlin, COMSUBRON FOUR Weapons
Officer, listing his telephone number, or, as an alternate
point of contact, to CDR Auger, COMSUBDIV 42, also listing
his telephone number. And, several other details were re-
solved.
CDR Auger stated that he would call CAPT Surefoot and
appraise him of the results of the conference. CDR Greene
requested that COMSUBRON FOUR provide weekly Situation Re-
ports (SITREPS) to N-62 by telephone and a written work list
as soon as it was compiled. The conference had identified
about a dozen significant work items. However, the list was
not exhaustive, so all in attendance agreed to exert inde-
pendent concerted efforts to ensure that all work items were
surfaced before the final list and the integrated work pack-
age were drawn up.
On the flight back to Norfolk that night, Jim and CDR
Greene discussed the situation again. The greatest single
message both had received from the current GRAYLING "flap"
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was that there appeared to be a flagrant breakdown in commun-
ications and direction from activities sponsoring MK-48 con-
version efforts to those commands actually receiving MK-48
support equipment, conversions, etc. The ironic thing about
the whole mess had been that Jim had talked to all of the
key planning offices just a few days before, and all of the
responses were dripping with confidence and assurances that
everything was on track. As a result, it just never occurred
to Jim to ask everyone if they had worked up an integrated
work package and cleared it with COMSUBRON FOUR and the
GRAYLING'S Commanding Officer. Jim mentioned this oversight
to CDR Greene.
"For Christ's sake, Jim," responded CDR Greene, "who
would ever have thought that, in a project as costly and
complex as this, that we would have to spoon-feed people like
the PM, NUSC, Newport, and CHASN, NSY directions regarding
the need to plan and coordinate their work efforts in the
field and to work through the cognizant commands while keep-
ing them informed regarding what they are going to do. And,"
he continued, "there's probably a lot more of this going on
that we don't even know about."
As unbelievable as it might seem, they decided that it
might do them well if Jim would start looking into the kinds
of similar things that might have happened within other
SUBLANT commands who have had cause to interface with the
MK-48 Program. They had never before received any formal




Two major action items faced Jim when he returned to his
office. First of all, he and CDR Greene had to put together
the message that they'd committed themselves to at the con-
ference. The other item was to look into the potential prob-
lems they'd discussed on the flight home. Both of these
items required considerable additional dialogue with other
commands, so Jim spent the next couple of days talking to
various MK-48 involved commands. He talked with the Weapons
Officers on the staffs of COMSUBDEVGRU TWO and COMSUBRON TEN,
both in New London, and he rehashed the situation with the
COMSUBRON FOUR staff in Charleston. There had been a number
of routine services provided to support MK-48 system evalua-
tions over the course of the past few months. Nothing ter-
ribly involved, but Jim probed to find out what the managerial
relationships had been. The specific involvements had to do
with arrangements for a SUBROC loader demonstration which
was held on a New London based submarine and three loading
and handling tests to evaluate some prototype MK-48 handling
equipment. This involved three other submarines. Another
involvement was the removal of long lead time handling items
from USS JACK for use in GRAYLING. A final involvement sur-
rounded the at-sea services a New London based submarine re-
ceived in support of a special MK-48 required sound trial at
the AUTEC Range.
The general concensus of the staff officers contacted
was that the advance plans, from the submarine and squadron
point of view, had been inadequate in several instances. In
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three cases, the responsible staff officers had been by-
passed; the agency representing the Project Manager's Office
(PiMO) had gone directly to the submarine. Another criticized
the fact that requirements were not well documented, and that
on the job responsibility was not clearly established. In
general, lines of communication between fleet' units and the
participating MK-48 field agency appeared to be weak.
When Jim talked to Bob Marlin to get his views on past
dealings with MK-48 agencies, he got an update on what was
going on in Charleston. In addition to everything else that
was going on, Bob claimed that he was going nuts trying to
help run down miscellaneous material and equipment that had
been shipped or mailed to the Charleston area by a couple of
contractors and MK—48 field agencies to support the MK—48
work effort. It appeared that several of the technicians
who were to work on GRAYLING began to arrive in Charleston,
and they couldn't find the material and equipment that they'd
sent ahead. Bob Marlin was trying to assist them, and in
the process he'd learned that the stuff had been sent to a
variety of addresses. He'd determined, thus far, that some
of it had been sent directly to GRAYLING, some to COMSUBRON
FOUR, some to the Charleston based submarine tender, the USS
ORION, and some to CHASN, NSY.
"Why Hell, Jim," elaborated Bob, "some of these dudes
have been here for almost a week, and they're still on a
'treasure hunt' trying to find their gear." Bob concluded
with the following, "Your (COMSUBLANT ' S ) message of 18 July
E-9

tasked us (COMSUBRON FOUR) to coordinate the required work;
it went to everyone that needed to know — why in the Hell
couldn ' t these people touch base with us before coming in
here from all directions, not knowing their ass from third
base. Christ, it's like a three ring circus down here."
After having talked to the various staff officers and
gathered a great deal of pertinent information, Jim finally
sat down with CDR Greene on 4 September, and they tried to
put together the message they'd promised the conference at-
tendees. Their purpose was to take charge and establish a
mandatory communications format to be followed by all parties
in the future when dealing with the GRAYLING. The message
was addressed to the PMO, NAVSHIPSYSCOM, COMOPTEVFOR, CHASN,
NSY, and NUSC, Newport, with information copies to CINCLANTFLT
CHNAVMAT, HASWSP, COMSUBDEVGRU TWO, COMSUBRON FOUR, and
GRAYLING. The subject was "USS GRAYLING MK-48 INSTALLATION".
It alluded to all pertinent previous correspondence leading
to the installation effort and enjoined that:
"TO ENSURE OPTIMUM COORDINATION OF WORK EFFORTS
DURING THIS CRITICAL PERIOD, COMSUBRON FOUR IS
DESIGNATED THE PRIMARY POINT OF CONTACT REGARDING
ALL MATTERS CONCERNING GRAYLING'S MK-48 CONVERSION
AND PARTICIPATION IN THE TECH/OP EVAL PROGRAM.
ALL RELATED COMMUNICATIONS SHOULD BE DIRECTED TO
LCDR BOB MARLIN, COMSUBRON FOUR WEAPONS OFFICER,
TELEPHONE 345-6G66. THE ALTERNATE POINT OF CONTACT
IS CDR A.K. AUGER, COMSUBDIV 42, TELEPHONE 345-6667."
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Copies of the message were also distributed to all ap-
propriate COMSUBLANT staff codes.
On 6 September, COMSUBLANT received a message from COM-
SUBRON FOUR outlining the required work items on GRAYLING,
per the 2 September conference agreement. The list had ex-
panded from the dozen or so items identified at the confer-
ence, to a total of 19. There were six major work efforts
required in the fire control area, five in the installation
of special instrumentation (DDAS) for the evaluation period,
five to complete the "softening" of the loading and handling
system in the torpedo room, and three in the combined train-
ing and installation calibration/alignment and check out
areas.
It appeared as if the committments agreed to at the 2
September conference were being fulfilled as planned. CDR
Greene had been keeping the powers to be at headquarters
appraised of the situation, and timely responses by all con-
cerned created the impression that all was, or was getting,
well.
Concerning the N-62 shop relationship with headquarters,
Jim recalled:
"CDR Greene had made several trips to headquar-
ters during those first two or three days after
GRAYLING'S message hit the air, making sure every-
one knew that we were working on the problem, what
we were doing, and that we would soon get things
back on the track. He promised the Chief of Staff
and CAPT Earnest (CAPT Ready's relief) that a re-
port and recommendations from our office would be
forthcoming, as soon as we had a handle on what
had happened so we could determine what type of
remedial action was necessary. During the Summer,
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CAPT Earnest had relieved CAPT Ready as N-6, and,
hindsight ing it, we were damned lucky to have two
such officers in a row. Both of them let CDR Greene
run the N-62 shop with a free hand. We were able
to enjoy minimized control over our correspondence
and decisions. No holdups or horse crap over se-
mantics -- correct spelling, grammar, and the facts
were the only things that counted. For all intents
and purposes, CDR Greene had direct access to the
Chief of Staff, after bringing N-6 up to speed.
And, his relationship with the Chief of Staff was
equally as good. This meant that he could get in
to see the Admiral when he felt it necessary.
Looking back on it now, I can really appreciate how
lucky we were — it really helped us to respond
quickly and with minimum 'bureaucratic bottleneck-
ing. '
"
On 10 September, CDR Greene signed out his promised re-
port on the GRAYLING matter, with recommendations to the
Chief of Staff, via CAPT Earnest. It summarized the confer-
ence events, the assigned tasks, the present status of GRAY-
LING'S conversion efforts, which by that time seemed to be
moving in the right direction to the satisfaction of all con-
cerned, and his recommendations. As a prelude to his recom-
mendations, he noted that although the GRAYLING effort
appeared to be coming under control, an aggregation of infor-
mation related to other fleet experiences indicated that
there appeared to be a general undercurrent of weak communi-
cations and resultant coordination problems. Accordingly,
he recommended that the noted deficiencies be passed on, for-
mally or informally, to the PM . He made the following spe-
cific recommendations aimed at gaining control of all future




"A) All requests for COMSUBLANT services must be directed
to COMSUBLANT (ATTN Code N-62), info to PMO, COMSUB-
DEVGRU TWO, at a minimum, and include the following:
1) Activity sponsoring the project.
2) Participating activities.
3) Requested services listing work items and/or
events to be accomplished.
4) Requested dates and/or time frames.
5) Name and telephone number of primary point of
contact in sponsoring activity who can address
all matters relative to the requested service.
B) COMSUBLANT N-62 will make necessary arrangements and
reply by message to the sponsoring activity, info to
IVlVj dilCl V^WJti^ Ui-Jj-^iJ V O i\U 1 nvj ^ ufic rXwU-L-L-Lc*,, u^uuulOll j
and Ship when applicable) at a minimum, and address
the following:
1) Affirm or negative regarding request.
2) Designate participating, ship (command) and point
of contact in the Squadron
,
(with telephone num-
ber) for all matters related to the requested
service
.
3) Set date, time and place for a briefing, list de-
sired attendees, and designate COMSUBLANT REP.
C) A briefing will be held prior to all MK-48 associated
Force projects. It will be hosted by COMSUBLANT or
designated rep (Squadron or DEVGRU TWO), attended by




1) Present a fully documented OP ORDER and/or work
package to the cognizant Squadron and Ship cov-
ering the entire scope of participation/work re-
quired and define the responsibilities of all
interested parties.
2) Present a documented work/event schedule, proper-
ly coordinated between participating activities
in advance when required.
3) Clearly define point of contact, his telephone
number, and designate the 'on the job supervisor. 1
4) Take all questions and proposals from attendees
for consideration, resolution, and implementation
as required.
o) ouiuuuuiifuu vVxix iGmiirit poinds oi contact witn-
in the Force.
D) Subsequent to the briefing the sponsoring authority
will assimilate all new inputs, as required, and
submit corrected documentation to those concerned be-
fore commencement of work/exercise.
E) Upon commencement of work the Squadron involved will
make weekly situation reports to COMSUBLANT N-62 via
telephone. A final report will be submitted via
message upon completion to COMSUBLANT info to PMO
a.nd other interested activities."
By mid September, Jim's conversations with Bob Marlin
had indicated that the Squadron's confidence that they had
the situation under control had increased considerably.
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There were still some new requirements popping up however,
six more to be exact, but they were being vectored through
the Squadron Weapons Officer, with COMSUBLANT being kept in-
formed. Among other things, the TAV had to be extended un-
til 1 October, in order for CHASN, NSY to complete the
fabrication, installation, and testing of certain torpedo
handling equipment. On 25 September, it had come to light
that people from the AUTEC Range had to install special un-
derwater tracking equipment. That required the use of divers
and also required interfacing with the ship's electronics
systems. And, COMSUBRON FOUR only had two days to "scrounge
up" the necessary divers. On 29 September NAVORDSYSCOM came
up with still more test equipment to be installed: special
tape recorders and an analog/digital convertur, both of which
had to be interfaced with ship's systems by the A.D. Little
Corp. On that same day, a similar installation involving
special test equipment had to be installed by General Dynam-
ics personnel from Electric Boat in Groton. All of these
manifestations had come to be known as "Oh by the ways"
.
Jim had gotten involved in the A.D. Little and Electric
Boat efforts. It took a series of telephone calls to the
PMO, NUSC, Newport, and COMSUBRON FOUR. It had finally been
established that NUSC, Newport would act for the PMO to co-
ordinate the A.D. Little/Electric Boat efforts. Mr. Jim
Callow was given as NUSC, Newport's point of contact. Jim
got a message out on this effort too, summarizing who the
points of contact were, for all concerned to read. The
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message fulfilled its intended effect; it got Mr. Callow and
Bob Marlin in touch on a formal basis, sanctioned by COMSUB-
LANT, and it let the world know that this type of liaison
and coordination was required.
As it turned out, COMSUBLANT direction of this sort be-
came very necessary from time to time as fleet involvement
expanded. The N-62 shop, Jim in particular, now watched
MK-48 message and letter traffic like a hawk, always prepared
to jump right into the middle of the problem at the first in-
dication of potential communications break downs involving
COMSUBLANT commands. It was kind of a sorting process that
continually required judicious action by COMSUBLANT, to make
certain that the parties involved were talking to the right
people. Sometimes the problem could be ironed out be a tele-
phone call to each of the involved parties, but quite often
an official message was required.
"Oh by the ways" continued to surface on a random basis,
but at a much more reduced scale into October. GRAYLING
eventually completed all hardware changes, crew familiariza-
tion requirements, and enjoyed a successful WSAT, as pre-
viously scheduled. The ship was declared ready to support
MK-48 TECH/OP EVAL requirements on 7 November 1970.
The GRAYLING smoke had pretty well settled by the middle
of October, permitting conduct of the at-sca calibration ef-
forts and the WSAT in a fashion devoid of the pressures that
had accompanied the opening weeks of GRAYLING'S conversion.
What had started out as a mighty tremendous undertaking had
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worked out satisfactorily, but it was no simple task. In
fact, conversations Jim had with Harold Progress and several
others in the MK-48 program seemed to suggest that the GRAY-
LING effort was a great success. This really tightened Jim's
jaws, for Jim and most of the people on scene felt that, if
it really was a success, it was because the fleet had gotten
involved. And, many of the Naval Officers that were famil-
iar with the fiasco thought that the fleet had shouldered
the PM's responsibility.
The real "end-all" came while GRAYLING was enroute to
conduct her WSAT. Jim couldn't believe his ears. He looked
up from his desk. CDR Greene was standing in front of Jim's
desk. "What did you say?" asked Jim.
"I sa,id the PMO wants ship's company to install the
'softening' SHIPALT in the next submarine," responded CDR
Greene with a smile on his face (he wasn't laughing, just
smiling)
.
But, Jim knew that he was serious. "Where did you get
that from, Commander?" Jim queried.
"I just got a call from CAPT Surefoot. He wants us to
try it. Based on what he saw on GRAYLING, he is of the opin-
ion that the ship's Torpedomen, provided that the SHIPALT
package is fabricated in advance, can make the installation
in three weeks. He would provide one or two shipyard tech-
nical advisors to supervise. This would be, just for now,
SHIPALT 1175 — the one going on the fi37 class fast attacks
like GRAYLING. What do you think?"
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Jim sagged back in his chair. "What do I think? I'll
tell you what I think," blurted Jim. "There's a limit to
what you can expect of a sailor — submarine torpedomen are
not shipyard outside machinists, and this SHIPALT is clearly
shipyard work. Please excuse my emotions, Boss, but, with
all due respect for CAPT Surefoot , I think he's crazy." How-
ever, Jim vividly remembered Harold Progress telling him way
back in May that the PMO was alarmed over the magnitude of
the unbudgeted cost of the "softening" SHIPALT, and that they
were looking for ways to trim costs down to something that
they could handle. "Boss," continued Jim, "do you mind tell-
ing me why he wants to do this?"
"Not at all, Jim. Cost — he has to save money."
"Suspicion confirmed," thought Jim to himself. "What
did you tell him?" asked Jim.
"I told him that we would try it, but that I wasn't very
enthusiastic about the outcome. I also told him that we want
to coordinate this one. He wants us to do it pronto. We
have to line up another 637 class submarine. Sleep on it,"
concluded CDR Greene. "We'll sit down tomorrow and decide
how we are going to handle this one."
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MK-48 TORPEDO FLEET INTRODUCTION (F)
CAPT Surefoot's proposal that a 637 class submarine crew
install loading and handling SHIPALTS seemed unreasonable
to Jim in face of the myriad of other problems facing fleet
introduction. And, he was ill prepared to digest such a pro-
posal with the foul taste of the GRAYLING fiasco still in
his mouth. It wasn't as if they, the fleet, had nothing else
to do; they really didn't need any more challenges. Further-
more, Jim knew all too well that this would tumble right on
2into the N-62 shop. Jim really resented the fact that CDR
Standfast and the N-402 shop (SSN Material) hadn't gotten
sacked with this SHIPALT business. The N-402 people had done
little more than lift a finger or two during the GRAYLING ef-
fort, and, if the lessons learned were going to be applied,
it seemed a foregone conclusion that the N-62 shop was going
See Appendix III for explanation of SHIPALT Program.
For clarification of the acronyms used throughout the case,
please refer to Appendix I
.
2
For this COMSUBLANT Staff Office and all others en-
countered, please refer to Exhibit 8 to determine organiza-
tional relationships.
This case was written by CDR David A. Newcomb and LCDR Robert
F. Hurley, Jr., under the direction of Professors William
Giauque and Michael Dean of the Naval Postgraduate School,
Monterey, California. All names have been disguised.
Cases are prepared as a basis for class discussion and are
not designed to present illustrations of either correct or
incorrect handling of administrative problems.
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to have to, once again, run with the ball. Jim knew full
well that there was no easy way out now.
What "bugged" Jim the most was that they, the N-62 shop,
worked very hard to identify MK-48 fleet introduction prob-
lems which they religiously passed on to both the appropriate
staff codes and outside commands serving the MK-48 Program,
but, aside from a lot of "lip service", nothing constructive
seemed to be happening except through their own effort. At
this point, Jim didn't consciously expect much help from the
rest of the staff any more -- that was like pulling teeth.
Aside from specific efforts such as converting TRIGGER
and GRAYLING, there were other outside problems that required
the assistance of others. A good example of one of these
3
outside problems was the GRDALT Program. There was an area
that the N-62 shop "bitched" about often, but one in which
little was done, at least to Jim's satisfaction. Recollect-
ing this problem, Jim related the following to this case-
writer :
"Those had been busy days, and a lot happened
during that Fall in addition to GRAYLING. We were
physically into the MK-48 business up to our necks,
and, God knows, it seemed like everything deserved
100% of our time. But, the unresolved business of
how to ready all of our submarines and when to do
it was one of the really big things gnawing away at
us. We needed no more challenges. Time was march-
ing on. Furthermore, it was at this point in time
that we began to recognize that the MK-48-0 fire
control conversion, which had been done to all but
one of our fast attack submarines, was only the
first step up a long ladder. And, many of our
3 See Appendix II for explanation of ORDALT Program.
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submarines were known, for certain, to be way be-
hind on the accomplishment of other ORDALTS . It
would take a matter of days per submarine to accom-
plish this ORDALT backlog. Then the new 'SPEC
Change ORDALT' 4 was corning at us also. 'SPEC Change'
had been a prototype conglomoration of experimental
ORDALTS when it went into PARGO and GRAYLING. Now
it was about to be approved as a formal ORDALT which
would take about four work weeks per submarine to
install. Where was that time going to come from,
and who the Hell was going to do the work? And,
those damned Field Engineering Changes (EEC's) were
still being stuffed into our submarines by Singer
Librascope field engineers. We still didn't know
what EEC's were in any great detail, but each MK-48-0
configured fire control system required over 80 of
them. But, before I go any further, I think it's
worth while to discuss some of the findings and
events leading up to the first of November, so that
you can develop an appreciation for the environment
in which the business of submarine conversion to
full MK-48 configuration was evolving.
"As I discussed with you before, Chief Sharp
had really been digging into the fire control ORDALT
administration area. By the time we were finishing
up GRAYLING, he had shed a lot of light on the exist-
ing problem areas, and the underlying causes were
just beginning to take shape. He had been greatly
assisted in his research efforts by the contacts he
had methodically established informally across the
submarine ordnance support community, outside of
SUBLANT. As it turned out, NOSSOLANT had become a
primary source of information and support in the
fire control area. The background on our relation-
ship with them is rather interesting. Some fortui-
tous, but very profitable, groundwork had been laid
by CDR Greene in July 1969, way back before either
Chief Sharp or I had reported aboard.
"Shortly after reporting aboard, CDR Greene had
encouraged the N-62 shop to make use of a variety
of field services offered by NOSSOLANT. As a field
office of NAVORD, its charter was service to the
fleet. They were equipped primarily to order ORDALT
kits, schedule installations, perform installations,
and render a wide variety of technical assistance
in the ordnance area to all ships of the fleet.
Their services included not only procurement and
installation of ORDALTS as requested by operational
The "SPEC Change ORDALT" was an ORDALT which changed
the basic MK-48-0 configured fjrc control systems to
MK-48-1/2 dual purpose capability.
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commanders, but they also included such things as
helping to trouble shoot equipment, calibrating
equipment, conducting installed shipboard ordnance
equipment configuration verifications, conducting
technical records reviews, and conducting ordnance
supply support inspections. They even corrected
documentation errors such as configuration errors
in the Ship's Armament Inventory List (SAIL) and
mailed in such corrections to the Master Configura-
tion data bank in KAVORDSYSCOM. These services
could be requested individually or in a package
called a Weapons System Review (WSR) , conducted by
a team of NOSSOLANT ordnance experts.
"For some unclear reason, the N-62 shop had
avoided doing any business with NOSSOLANT prior to
CDR Greene's arrival. It is suspected that, some-
where along the line, NOSSOLANT people had worked
on a submarine, something had gone wrong, and, as
a result, COMSUBLANT had cut them off and began to
do their ORDALT business with NUSC, Newport. NUSC
,
Newport, however, wasn't tailored to do things like
WSR's, so SUBLANT had lost, or perhaps forgotten,
the benefits of NOSSOLANT' s talents. Anyhow, after
CDR Greene reported aboard, NOSSOLANT was invited
back into the arena. The first submarine of ours
that they helped was the USS SKIPJACK. SKIPJACK
was just coming out of overhaul in the Summer of
1969~when N-62 shop had met with NOSSOLANT repre-
sentatives to set up her WSR. The WSR was subse-
quently carried off without any gliches, and SKIPJACK
was reportedly delighted with the assistance that
NOSSOLANT was able to render. Based on these re-
sults, several other submarines of ours were sched-
uled for WSR's over an extended period of time.
NOSSOLANT really helped each command to straighten
out their documentation, especially in the supply
and configuration areas. But, someho\y looking back,
I know that we were viewing the results of each
visit as an individual ship's problem. Then, about
the end of March 1970, after Chief Sharp had been
on the staff for a couple of months, he came to me
with reports from NOSSOLANT indicating that MK-4S-0
ORDALTS were routinely among those configuration
profiles having spare part support and supply docu-
mentation support problems. As a result, Chief
Sharp and I met with NOSSOLANT personnel during
early April -- It was at that meeting that I first
met NOSSOLANT 's procurement expert, Mr. Heindorf
Glockenspiel. He and his procurement people ulti-
mately rendered an immeasurable service to us. How-
ever, the full scope of the support problems were
still not clear at this time, but Mr. Glockenspiel's
findings indicated that, for some reason or reasons,
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5the supply COSAL/APL documentation issued to ships
incident to overhauls or significant MK-48 ORDALT
configuration changes more often than not did not
correctly support the installed equipments. MK-48-0
fire control alterations were routinely included in
this category. I noted the need to look further
into this problem in my 24 April 1970 'MK-48 Program
Staff Review. ' By working with NOSSOLANT and by
riding the submarines ourselves, when the opportunity
permitted, we got a 'first hand' picture of the prob-
lem symptoms. And, through continuing inquiries and
research into the administration of the ORDALT pro-
gram, with the assistance of NAVORDSYSCOM, NUSC,
Newport, and others, we slowly put together a picture
of what was happening to our submarines. By mid
October 1970, we pretty well knew what wasn't right
about the program. However, we didn't yet know all
of the exact causes, exactly who was at fault, ex-
actly who could correct the problems, or, for that
matter, exactly who to complain to. We did know
that many of our ship's SAIL records were grossly
inaccurate. Since these records were the data base
for NAVORDSYSCOM' s master computer configuration
records in Washington, D.C., it had to follow that
these records were also plagued with inaccuracies.
This, in turn, had led to the issuance of inaccurate
Maintenance Data Cards (MDC's), inaccurate supply
support documents, inadequate spare part support,
inaccurate or incorrect technical publications, in-
accurate engineering drawings, and, in some cases,
shipyard work lists calling out incorrect overhaul
ORDALT work requirements. The problem was compounded
in many ways. The arbitrary installation of ORDALTS
on a catch as catch can basis was frequently accom-
plished without the benefit of an orderly master
schedule to coordinate and control the installation
efforts. As a result, the documentation updating
efforts that were supposed to be done concurrently
with the installation efforts were often done in an
unsatisfactory fashion. In some cases this require-
ment was overlooked completely. Another problem
was that unproofed ORDALTS, those installed prior to
their complete and proper integration into the formal
ORDALT system, were finding their way into the ship-
yard work packages. Often they had been installed
in one or many ships before deficiencies were de-
tected. This required costly changes and more poten-
tial for faulty documentation and poor supply support
List
5 Consolidated Shipboard Allowance List/Allowance Parts
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On top of all this came the MK-48-0 ORDALTS , followed
by more than 80 FEC ' s , and then the 'SPEC Change
ORDALT. ' The MK-48 ORDALT spare parts were sent to
the installing activities by NAVORDSYSCOM, and the
required COSAL/APL documents were to be concurrently
sent directly. to the affected ship by the Ship's
Part Control Center (SPCC), one of NAVSUPSYSCOM'
s
Inventory Control Points (ICP's). Through NOSSOLANT's
continuing inspections, however, it was being dis-
covered that most ships that had had MK-48 ORDALTS
installed were deficient in required spare parts and
did not have the proper COSAL/APL documentation.
What had happened, it appears, was that the ships
had never received the correct COSAL/APL documenta-
tion from SPCC. Hence, too often, the spare parts
arrived and no one knew what they were all for.
The fates of these spare parts were varied, but
many were off-loaded from the ships. In come cases
shipboard personnel knew what the spare parts were
for and they were dutifully stored away. Unfortun-
ately, these people were eventually transferred,
and the excess spare parts were soon off-loaded,
when a subsequent inventory showed their presence
but no accompanying documentation allowing all of
the items to be carried. In the case of the ships
that managed to get the correct COSAL/APL documenta-
tion or that corrected their old documentation under
the advice of ORDALT installation personnel, another
fate often befell the spare parts. They remained in
the ship's inventories, but, because the MK-48 fire
control equipment wasn't being exercised, there were
no part failures requiring use of the spare parts.
This lack of usage data, in time, caused the spare
parts to be off-loaded as excess material. There
were pitfalls at every turn.
"MK-48 FEC ' s added to the problem because, too
often, the onboard documentation changes were not
being concurrently made. What's more, these alter-
ations were not ORDALTS, so they could not be re-
flected in ths ship's SAIL or NAVORDSYSCOM ' s master
computer configuration records, and we had no way
to crank them into the system.
"As you can see, we felt that we had one Hell
of a problem in the fire control area. Keeping in
mind the fact that we had four completely different
fire control systems (MK-101 , MK-106 , MK-112 , and MK-113)
installed in our submarines, with several modifica-
tions of each, you can begin to appreciate our dilemna.
On top of all this, then, we had the new additional
prospect of the evolving MK-48 loading and handling
S1IIPALTS required to 'soften' our ships. Here too,
we had a requirement for twelve different alteration
plans -- one tailored for each class of submarine.
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"Believe me, I'm not exaggerating the problem.
We'd heard a dozen or more 'sea stories' about how
fire control spare parts were being left in ship-
yards, off-loaded as excess, given away, etc. But,
if I ever thought the situation wasn't really that
bad, I really had the picture painted for me, in
living color, by a telephone call I received one
morning in November 1970. It was the Submarine
Squadron Fifty Weapons Officer6 , LCDR Frank Hammer
'Jim, ' he said, 'guess what I just found?'
'I don't know, Frank. What did you just find?'
I said.
'$20,000 worth of MK-48 fire control spare parts
in the "Dempster dumpster," at the head of the pier,'
Frank continued.
Then I asked, 'How in the Hell did that happen?'
'They were off-laoded by the (expletive deleted)
BLIVITFISH sometime last night as excess. No one
onboard could find any paperwork telling what they
were for, so they assumed they were "good for nothing,"'
answered Frank.
"That pretty much says it all, regarding the fire
control spare parts problem. This, then, was the en-
vironment in which we were working at that point in
time.
"
Chief Sharp's rememberance of the Fall of 1070 pretty
much confirmed what Jim White had said. Chief Sharp had an
opportunity to review Jim's comments, after which he was
asked how he saw the situation. He recalled the following
to this casewriter:
"That's part of it . I couldn't help but note
that Mr. White didn't mention that I was still
crashing around trying to keep a lid on all the
other force fire control problems. That's another
story in itself. One thing that Mr. White could
have emphasized was that, with NOSSOLANT's help,
we were starting, one ship at a time, to get the
configuration business squared away. But, I guess
we didn't start to gain any confidence that we
were making headway until much later."
For this and all further reference to submarine Squad-




NOSSOLANT personnel vividly recalled the period discussed
by Jim and Chief Sharp. In fact, Mr. Heindorf Glockenspiel
had been involved in SUBLANT's ordnance supply support prob-
lems since the first submarine WSR on SKIPJACK. His area of
expertise was spare parts support for fleet weapons systems,
and, at that point in time, he was working on a project which
involved translating the information found in a ship's SAIL
into supply support language. The output of this translation
effort was a profile of all allowance documents required to
support a specific technical configuration. This service was
a part of NOSSOLANT' s WSR package. Mr. Glockenspiel recon-
structed NOSSOLANT 's involvement and recalled his personal
impressions of the problem causes for this casewriter:
"We used a NOSSOLANT constructed quasi-COSAL
profile based on what we found the ship's physical
installation to be. Our 'hand-made' documents
were compared with those COSAL documents issued
to the ship by SPCC and we found that the ship's
existing documentation did not support the actual
configuration in a number of areas. ORDALTS and
FEC ' s had affected the ship's configuration, but
this was not always displayed in the documentation.
As a matter of fact, some of the equipment wasn't
even supported. This wasn't really a great sur-
prise, because this problem existed, to varying
degrees, on all ships where configuration changes
had taken place. The first time we really focused
on MK-48 configuration spares occurred on the USS
DANIEL BOONE, right after she came out of overhaul
at Newport News Shipbuilding and Drydock Co.
(NNSBDDCO). While conducting the WSR, we went
down the MK-48 fire control support profile list-
ing, line item by line item, and discovered that,
of the $40,000 worth of initial spare parts pro-
cured and paid for by NAVORDSYSCOM and sent to the
ship while in the shipyard, only about $20,000
worth were actually onboard the ship. The other
$20,000 worth were in a shipyard warehouse. Why?
Because the documentation sent to the ship by SPCC
didn't agree with the documentation that NAVORDSYSCOM
F-8

and the contractor were working with. There was a
decided gap between what the supply side of the
house knew and what the technical side knew. As
a result of this, we initiated correspondence on
the subject and inspected more submarines during
early 1970. We discovered a pattern of the same
problems from New London to Charleston — It became
quite apparent that something had to be done.
Therefore, we, with the concurrence of the PMO,
NAVORDSYSCOM, and COMSUBLANT , took the initiative
and began to force load the missing MK-48 fire con-
trol spare parts on the ships inspected. After
all, the PMO selected and paid for these parts,
and this was the only way we could ensure that
they wouldn't be pushed in the submarine's front
door only to be shoved out the back door. It took
us several months of looking at the same old prob-
lems before we reached this point. But, by that
time we knew that it was going to take positive
physical involvement to correct an individual ship's
problems. As the NAVORDSYSCOM 8000 series instruc-
tion on the subject is written, the custodians of
the ordnance equipments, in this case the submarines,
are responsible for ensuring that all equipment
changes are properly reported. In a lot of cases,
the shipyard or contractor's people had been making
these changes and the ship simply didn't know what
was going on. Accordingly, all too often, this
inadequate dialogue between the ship and the tech-
nicians resulted in none of the changes getting re-
ported. We all learned a lot during those days.
It took three laborious years to get the mess
straightened out, but, as you probably already
know, COMSUBLANT now schedules all ORDALT support
administration through us, and there isn't a thing
that goes on or off of a submarine that isn't con-
trolled. Back in those days, we were really grasp-
ing, but nowadays each ship is double checked to
see that everything from hardware to software meshes
and is totally supported. This is done after each
change by all required functional support sources
in the ordnance community -- It's really slick.
How we got all the players together is another
story -- White or. Sharp can tell you that one."
Mr. Glockenspiel was asked what he thought had gone
wrong at the PM level that might have caused the MK-48 fire
control support problems to occur. Before he was given a
chance to answer, he was told that Jim White and Chief Sharp
both felt that getting to the real source of the breakdown
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in management was really tough. The PMO staff really seemed
to have a handle on the fire control business, but, somehow,
between the manufacturer, Singer Librascope, and the subma-
rines, something had gone wrong to cause the problems to
occur. Mr. Glockenspiel responded as follows:
"The problem wasn't unique; it existed across
the board with other PM's as well. They do a fine
job of procurement, managing, and the other kinds
of things PM's do, but when it comes to the last
detail — implementation at the fleet level — there
is no one on site to see what is going on. I got
involved because my business is spare parts — not
necessarily MK-48 spare parts. There were obviously
problems in the documentation — hence in the supply
system, but someone who is knowledgeable has to
validate that documentation or those errors and
their source will go unidentified and uncorrected.
The PM had told NAVSUPSYSCOM what kind of support
was needed, but NAVSUPSYSCOM has a master computer
program for issuing spare parts. If MK-48 fire con-
trol peculiar requirements are not called out for
special treatment in the form of computer technical
overrides, the submarine COSAL's are issued in ac-
cordance with the format that exists for all other
ordnance equipment. In effect, the COSAL's that
SUBLANT units were receiving called for about 50%
fewer spares, no spares in some cases, than NAVORD-
SYSCOM had intended. It was up to the PM's techni-
cal people to review the manufacturer's spare parts
provisioning list and check out the COSAL for sup-
port continuity. NUSC, Newport, the technical di-
rector for fire control development, was the In
Service Engineering Agent (ISEA), and, as such, was
required to attend the Librascope provisioning con-
ference and interface with SPCC to ensure compati-
bility. It's hard to say where the mismatch occurred,
but, ultimately, the supply documents didn't support
the PM's intentions. In fact, in many cases, the
poor old PM had to pay double to meet his intentions.
That's in effect what happened when he had to re-
order those spare parts that were lost to inadvertent
discarding. It's really difficult to say who, ex-
actly, dropped the ball. The ships, although guilty
of numerous other errors, certainly had no way of
knowing what spare parts they were supposed to re-
ceive. As I see it, what it all comes down to is,
if you don't have someone to monitor things at the
fleet level, then all of the effective planning in
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the world just goes pffffff.... on the ship. We,
NOSSOLANT, serve the fleet every day; we are avail-
able as an arm of NAVORDSYSCOM — Wouldn't it make
sense if ILS7 procurement plans included us in the
loop to close that gap? Unfortunately, this isn't
often done."
Mr. Glockenspiel's comments were substantiated by Mr. Sam
Sparks, a NOSSOLANT engineer who had supervised the installa-
tion of many ORDALTS by NOSSOLANT teams. He added his own
impression that the big break through in starting to straighten
out the SUBLANT ORDALT and ordnance equipment configuration
quagmire had come with the dialogue that had begun between
himself and Chief Oblisk (Chief Sharp's predecessor), back
in the Summer of 1969 — That was the first formal attempt
at scheduling and controlling ORDALTS at the Force Commander's
level.
In addition to the direction of the WESTINGHOUSE MK-48-0/2
torpedo technical evaluation and representation of the PMO
in the field, responsible for MK-48 ancilliary support sys-
tems such as: loading and handling, retrievers, and workshops
ashore and afloat, NUSC, Newport was deeply involved in the
MK-48 fire control area. NUSC was also responsible for di-
rection of the technical evaluation of the fire control sys-
tem, hence, in the forefront of the fire control change
program. NUSC, Newport's efforts in the MK-48 fire control
area were considered excellent by the PMO and many others.
Most notable was the fact that the required fire control
7 Integrated Logistics Support
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changes had kept pace with all of the many torpedo changes
required throughout its growth. This effort wasn't slowed
in the least bit by the debut of the CELVITE MK-48-1 torpe-
do. They were not only directing the fire control technical
evaluation; they were also bringing a lot of expertise to
bear in solving fire control engineering problems jointly
with Singer Librascope. This effort was the source of many
of SUBLANT's headaches: Specifically in the FEC arena. De-
spite the praise directed toward NUSC, Newport from many
quarters, which included Jim, he also saw them as those peo-
ple responsible for an endless parade of uncontrolled changes
and their attendant problems. So distraught over NUSC, New-
port's and Singer Librascope 's FEC induced problems was the
N-62 shop that, by November 1970, CDR Greene, Jim and Chief
Sharp had let it be known, at every available opportunity,
that FEC's were making everyone very unhappy, they were in-
compatible with the ORDALT support system, and they, COMSUB-
LANT, wanted them to stop.
When reminded of COMSUBLANT ' s point of view in the late
Fall of 1970, Mr. Ron Tyme, director of NUSC, Newport's fire
control engineering effort at that time, responded as follows
"Well it all started when there was only a MK-48-0
torpedo. At that time everyone thought that it was
the ultimate torpedo. In 1964 we entered into a con-
tract with Librascope for the fire control system.
At that time NUSC, Newport had a coordinating program
office here in Newport. I was one of three guys
working out of that office. As you know NUSC was
the technical director for the fire control system,
and under that charter our office interfaced with
the PMO and ORL, Penn State. In those days we were
beset with many initial technical problems. We
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really had no one who was familiar with the prob-
lems of the fleet — you know, familiar with ship-
board problems. Why, if the torpedo and the fire
control system were designed to those initial specs,
with the required equipment in the attack center and
the torpedo room and all the cable connecting them,
the system never would have worked. Recognition of
this prompted our first big change. Initially, the
specs were changed, mostly on the torpedo, and they
continued to change at a hectic pace for over a year.
These changes resulted in contractual changes, not
FEC's; they came later. The situation was compounded
by the fact that we had several quasi-managers —
ORL/PSU, NUSC, Newport, the PMO, and many more who
always seemed to have to have a say. They were all
quite competent, but it was difficult for them to
make mutually agreeable decisions. With the torpe-
do specs continually changing, with the severe time
constraints, and with the continuing requirement
that the fire control equipment keep pace with the
torpedo, the pressure was always on. There was not
a good contractual arrangement either. We had to
operate under fixed price contracts with both Libra-
scope and Westinghouse, and the changes were really
driving the price up. It was hard, in those early
days, to convince the PM that he couldn't change the
torpedo without expecting to change the fire control
also — It always seemed to come as a surprize to
the PMO. One little change in the torpedo could be
a big change in the fire control system. When the
CLEVITE torpedo, the MK-48-1, came in, it became a
different ball game — It was a different weapon,
and the fire control system had to accommodate it as
well as the MK-48-2. Initially, the decision was
made, MK-48-1 not withstanding, to go ahead and
totally install the basic MK-48-0 fire control sys-
tems in all ships — the necessary ORDALTS to make
these equipments compatible with the selected weapon
could come later. Budgets, ship overhaul cycles,
and many other things, more or less, locked that de-
cision in. However, in order to keep up with the
torpedo test and evaluation findings, these fire con-
trol systems had to be brought up to the latest tor-
pedo configuration. Accordingly, FEC's were developed
to keep pace with the rapid changes going into the
torpedo. There was no way to get those changes in-
troduced and installed in a rapid enough fashion
through the ORDALT system as it existed. It would
have taken at least a year to process the paper for
each change. We took a lot of criticism from the
fleet in those days. Guys like Bill Greene and Jim
White were very vocal in their criticism, but we did
not have time to do it any other way -- We had tre-
mendous pressures to keep the fire control system
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updated, coming from the highest levels of the Navy.
We really felt that the Fleet Commanders and their
objections to FEC's were more of a hindrance than a
help — They just didn't understand that we had to
get those changes into the fire control systems,
and FEC's were the only way to do it.
"In retrospect, I think a lot of the conflict
would have been avoided if the fleet had been brought
into the MK-48 Program earlier, at the planning lev-
el, and had been briefed on the details of the pro-
gram and the ongoing problems, but they were kept in
the dark. The high level decision makers were forcing
decisions down on the PM, without conscious concern
or, perhaps, knowledge as to how they would impact on
the fleet. And, we were caught in the middle. The
fleet did, however, profit in one way. Many sub-
marines were several thousands of man hours behind
on accomplishment of ORDALTS. Accomplishment of
these outstanding ORDALTS was a basic prerequisite
to updating the fire control systems to MK-48 config-
uration. As a result, the MK-48 Program forced and
subsidized much of the effort to get these altera-
tions completed so we could establish an ORDALT
baseline upon which we could plan and install MK-48.
To be candid, up until that time, the Fleet Command-
ers had lost control of the ordnance configurations
of their submarines."
When questioned regarding the spare parts problems and
the disagreement between the NAVORDSYSCOM list of MK-48 fire
control spare parts and the SPCC COSAL's, Mr. Tyme responded
as follows:
"We were aware of the problems. Vini 0' Shea's
group right here in NUSC, Newport would review pro-
visioning lists, and he would implement the neces-
sary guidance and initiate the necessary technical
overrides, but the problem was in SPCC. The nec-
essary information was fed to them, but their output
never matched the input. I don't like to tell tales
out of school, but, no matter how I look at it, I'd
have to say that the problem laid somewhere inside
SPCC. One of the problems SPCC had was a historic
time lag problem — I've seen as much as a year and
a half lapse between the provisioning conference
and the issuance of the APL's and COSALS by SPCC in
other projects. They are getting better, but that
has been a long-standing problem source. Meanwhile,
the poor old ships were crying for updated APL's.
Why Hell, I don't have to tell you. We could sit
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here for hours and swap 'sea stories' about the
fate of the spare parts we paid for and pushed to
the submarines, but that would get us nowhere. It
didn't take us many of these episodes to decide
that we were going to have to do something about
it, ourselves. What we did to alleviate the prob-
lem was mark up the old APL's and give them to the
submarines as Interim Allowance Parts Lists (IAPL's)
as we accomplished the actual hardware alterations.
They'd use the IAPL's to justify keeping, the spare
parts onboard 'till the 'system' finally caught up
with the problem. I know that sounds like a pretty
unorthodox approach to the problem, but those were
the kinds of things that we had to do to get things
done. Why, you know how the fleet was 'bitching'
about our FEC's, I'm sure. Well, some people might
have had a cardiac arrest if they would have found
out about our XO's. These were what we called Ex-
perimental ORDALTS. These were alterations we
would make to the fire control systems actually
firing torpedoes during the TECH/OPEVAL' s and the
STP.8 We would remove them when we would install
the formal FEC or the ORDALT. We saw no need to
publicize the fact that we were doing this, because
it only affected a few submarines, and the entire
process was kept under our thumb."
When asked about the fire control situation during the
period surrounding the GRAYLING conversion, Mr. Tyme respond-
ed as follows:
"Well if you know anything about the GRAYLING
fiasco, I'm sure it looks pretty foolish to you.
But, before I give you my side of the story, let
me lead up to it a bit and try to set the perspec-
tive. As you know, the basic MK-48-0 fire control
installation had been going into the submarines
during their shipyard overhauls. However, all of
the follow up alterations had to go into the sub-
marines in the field, at least for the most part.
Our change requirements were accelerating and begin-
ning to peak around November 1970. We ran into
terrible problems if COMSUBLANT would switch sub-
marines on us at the last minute, when scheduling
the installation of our fire control alterations —
each submarine was slightly different in configura-





getting our documentation straightened out before
we went aboard. Because of these configuration
nuances, our MK-48 fire control alterations were
hand tailored to specific ships. Furthermore,
these hardware changes had to be supported by a
considerable software requirement. Technical man-
uals, COSAL's, PMS9 changes, and MRC10 card changes
were involved as well as spare parts. This is why
last minute ship changes used to get us so upset.
And, if we didn't get all of our documentation
straightened out, we really used to catch Hell.
COMSUBLANT eventually got the scheduling under con-
trol, but, at that time, in November 1970, sched-
uling was really arbitrary from where we stood.
I guess the biggest contributor to our looking
somewhat foolish during the GRAYLING conversion
was the requirement laid upon us by the PMO just
prior to her conversion. About a month to six
weeks prior to GRAYLING'S conversion, we get this
frantic telephone call from the PMO. It seems as
though they'd just had a big review at the DOD/CNO
level — They wanted a 'shoot out'. They wanted
a comparative evaluation of the MOD-0 and the MOD-
1/2, from the same submarine. Well Christ, that
just wasn't compatible. I mean the MK-48-0, anti-
submarine, torpedo couldn't be fired with the 'SPEC
Change GRDALT', but the MK-48-1/2, dual purpose,
torpedoes couldn't be fired without it. We didn't
know what the Hell we were going to do. We strug-
gled with the problem during the limited time al-
lotted, and we were saved by the fact that many of
the fast attack submarines had two attack directors
installed in their fire control system, GRAYLING
included. We took advantage of this fact and de-
veloped what we called the 'Half & Half ORDALT.
But, again, it really wasn't an ORDALT — We'd never
been able to do it in time if it was. What we did
was configure one of the attack directors to fire
the anti-submarine torpedo and the other to fire
both dual purpose torpedoes. Believe me, getting
ready to do this on GRAYLING was no trivial matter,
and trying to do it together with all of the other
planned conversion work proved to be a pretty un-
coordinated evolution at best. About the only thing
good I can say regarding the GRALYING 'flap' is that
we did get the job done. Today I can report with




a great deal of satisfaction that we've come a long
way in the ORDALT management business since those
days. Things have improved immeasurably, particu-
larly in terms of management coordination."
The atmosphere in the N-62 shop, at least from Jim's
standpoint, was almost foreboding, the morning he stepped
into CDR Greene's office to discuss how they would go about
having the "ship's force" of some, yet unidentified, subma-
rine install the MK-48 "Softening SHIPALT"
.
"Well, Boss," Jim began, "I guess we have to decide who
is going to have the honor of being the first submarine to
overhaul their own torpedo room."
"We don't have to look far, Jim," answered CDR Greene.
"I have already touched base with the Operations people (N-31),
and they already have a ship lined up to get ready to relieve
PARGO. PARGO will be going into the shipyard in a few months,
as I'm sure you know."
"Who's the lucky guy?" asked Jim.
"The USS BERGALL11 ," answered CDR Greene.
"When?" asked Jim.
"That's the sticky wicket, Jim," replied CDR Greene.
"It's going to happen over the Christmas Holidays. We're
going to have to do a little diplomatic planning as well as
overhaul planning."
After drawing a couple of cups of coffee, Jim and CDR
Greene settled down in CDR Greene's office to review the
11 BERGALL was an SSN assigned to COMSUBDEVGRU TWO.
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bidding. The discussion was free wheeling and attempted to
address the full scope of considerations. The "brainstorm-
ing effort" focused on lessons learned from the GRAYLING ex-
perience, steps necessary to assure control of the BERGALL
effort, what role COMSUBLANT (specifically the N-62 shop)
should play, who the key participants in the' BERGALL conver-
sion effort would be, what could go wrong, what the tentative
schedule should look like, what could be done right now to
enhance the probability of a successful effort, how the nec-
essary communications and coordination could be assured, and
a myriad of other related matters. Jim took copious notes
throughout the session. After about two hours, a "game plan"
began to emerge. In essence, their finally agreed upon ap-
proach closely paralleled the basic recommendations contained
12in CDR Greene's 10 September memo to the Chief of Staff.
When the session concluded, CDR Greene went over to head-
13quarters to bring CAPT Earnest up to speed on the tentative
plans for handling the BERGALL conversion. Jim returned to
his office and began to review his notes. The first major
step that they'd agreed to was to call a BERGALL MK-48 con-
version meeting on COMSUBLANT "turf". It had also been de-
cided that, pending CAPT Earnest's blessing, the meeting
12 This memo summarized the problems surrounding the
GRAYLING conversion effort and made pertinent recommendations
for avoidance of similar problems during future MK-48 con-
version efforts. For more detail, please refer to page E-13
of the (E) case.
13 COMSUBLANT headquarters was 4.5 miles away from the
complex where the N-62 offices were located.
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would be chaired by COMSUBLANT (represented by CDR Greene)
and would be physically convened in the COMSUBDEVGRU TWO con-
ference room at the Submarine Base in New London, Connecticut
(SUBASE, NLON). These decisions were reached for several
reasons. Paramount, however, was the fact that they wanted
it unmistakably clear that COMSUBLANT was in charge of this
one. Other considerations included the fact that the con-
version would be performed in New London, COMSUBDEVGRU TWO
was BERGALL's parent squadron, and all of the key submarine
force players would be located in New London. Twelve Novem-
ber was the date tentatively established for the meeting.
That day was chosen because it was in the near term yet al-
lowed enough time to get all the participants lined up, but,
also, because the BERGALL would be out to sea. The latter
fact raised questions in some quarters, but it had been de-
cided that the ship should not be burdened with the initial
"flap" of "getting organized". Jim and CDR Greene had con-
cluded that the Christmas work requirement was frustrating
enough. Accordingly, they agreed that the BERGALL's Command-
ing Officer would be brought into the problem only after a
well defined work package, schedule, and control system were
firmly established.
Before the message setting things into motion was drafted,
Jim spent three days on the telephone clearing the 12 Novem-
ber date with the key players. COMSUBDEVGRU TWO welcomed
the proposed plan, but Jim thought he detected a hint of
tacit reluctance on the part of some offices representing
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the PM to endorse the requirement for such a meeting. Never-
theless, 12 November was agreed upon. In parallel with
establishing the date, Jim spent considerable time setting
up an agenda for the forthcoming meeting. Salient points
were discussed on the telephone with the potential meeting
attendees who would be affected. Easing Jim's burden con-
siderably was the fact that the PMO had been very helpful in
identifying the people who would be involved in the BERGALL
conversion effort. The telephone dialogue had stressed the
need for coordination, reminding everyone that BERGALL would
receive the total MK-48 conversion package — The fire con-
trol ORDALTS as well as the loading and handling SHIPALT.
The official COMSUBLANT message calling the 12 November
meeting was signed off the staff on 5 November. Once again
COMSUBLANT was sending a message to multiple addressees re-
garding MK-48 conversion of a submarine. However, this time
the message called out three new requirements: COMSUBLANT
would chair the meeting, the PM was requested to provide the
name of one man who would be an "on the job supervisor" for
all work, and an integrated and documented total work pack-
age, with detailed schedules and milestones, was requested.
On 12 November, all interested participants were assem-
bled in the COMSUBDEVGRU TWO conference room as planned. In
addition to Jim and CDR Greene, there were 16 official at-
tendees representing eight different commands and agencies.
The organizations represented were NUSC , Newport (Mr. Ron
Tyme and Mr. Andy Watt for fire control and Mr. I.M. Pulling
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for loading and handling), Singer Librascope (Mr. G. 0' Really
and Mr. Z. Formatt), COMSUBDEVGRU TWO (LCDR V. Keen, the
COMSUBDEVGRU TWO MK-48 Officer and LCDR J. Verrily, the COM-
SUBDEVGRU TWO Weapons Officer), CHASN, NSY (Mr. Jammy Landry
and LCDR B. Decker), NAVSEC (Mr. A.R. Baker), NOSSOLANT (Mr.
W. Blockman), PMO-402 (Mr. Rod Stiles for fire control and
Mr. Bill Roper for loading and handling), and there was also
a contingent of three representatives from the Electric Boat
Division of General Dynamics to address post SHIPALT load
,14line alignment.
During the moments immediately preceeding the meeting,
Jim and CDR Greene, coffee cups in hand, mingled with the
attendees. Jim, once again, thought he'd detected an air of
coolness among some of those present, regarding the need for
the meeting. He mentioned this to CDR Greene, just before
the meeting started. CDR Greene smiled, and, with a bit of
a twinkle in his eyes, he said, "I think some of these guys
are in for a rather rude awakening. They may find their
feet being held to the fire before the morning's over."
CDR Greene called the meeting to order at 1000 sharp.
He quickly established the fact that the USS BERGALL would
begin a special availability on 20 November, to conclude on
14 The alignment of the torpedo resting in the storage
tray when in position to be loaded into each of the torpedo
tubes. The longitudinal center of the torpedo must be in
line with the tube center if the torpedo is to be loaded
without scratching or marring its surface. Gross misalign-
ment can result in the inability to load the torpedo. Please
refer to Exhibit (14) and Appendix VI.
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17 January 1971, for the purpose of receiving the required
MK-48 Torpedo Weapons System ORDALTS and SHIPALTS. He drove
home the point that GRAYLING'S recent conversion effort had
been frought with difficulties, precipitated by the lack of
communications and coordination. He cited the fact that a
prime reason for calling the present meeting was "to estab-
lish early and effective communications channels at all lev-
els, and to define clear cut responsibilities."
CDR Greene then proceeded, introducing pertinent items
succinctly, soliciting discussion, and effectively closing
discussion with a firm statement of the agreed course of ac-
tion and assignment of responsibility. About CDR Greene's
platform behavior, one of the attendees recalled:
"He had a smile on his face, was able to judi-
ciously inject levity where appropriate, but, from
the start, he effectively conveyed the message that
MK-48 fleet interface efforts, to date, had been
lacking, that the agenda was poignantly relevant,
and that COMMANDER SUBMARINE FORCE, UNITED STATES
ATLANTIC FLEET was firmly in control at the helm."
The first subject was the identification of the individ-
ual responsible for overall onboard supervision and coordi-
nation. Mr. Stiles, of the PMO, formally appointed Mr.
Formatt of Singer Librascope. CDR Greene then stated that
the first responsibility required of Mr. Formatt was the gen-
eration and presentation of an integrated work package and
schedule to all parties concerned. The second requirement
was that he meet with LCDR Keen, of COMSUBDEVGRU TWO, and
the Commanding Officer of the BERGALL, at the earliest oppor-
tunity, to review the completed package/schedule and implement
F-22

same. Evidently, Mr. Formatt had been informally forewarned
by the PMO, because, to the surprise of CDR Greene, Jim, and
the others present, he presented an already, well prepared,
integrated work package.
CDR Greene thanked Mr. Formatt and stated that the pack-
age would serve as an excellent base line, but further stated
that he would keep to the agenda to ensure that independent
review of the scope of the work would take place. CDR
Greene's outline for discussion called for review of the 26
work items performed on GRAYLING during September and October,
identification of those items applicable to BERGALL, and
identification of new items and problems. He solicited the
scope of work required, as independently arrived at by each
command, vendor, and agency involved, and called for a re-
view of potential work scheduling problems. He then read
the list of GRAYLING work items and enjoined the attendees
to consider their requirements to the last detail. In order
to drive home the latter point, he asked the attendees if
they had given full consideration to such items as the fol-
lowing:
- Crane services required from SUBASE, NLON
- Rigger services
- Disposition and storing of materials required to sup-
port the onboard work effort
- Mailing address of such materials and points of contact
to be held responsible
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- Pre-installation ship checks to determine BERGALL's
configuration differences
- Clean-up/painting touch up/welding services
- Adequacy of spare parts support for new equipments
- BERGALL's load line alignment status before work began
15
- WSAT schedules and requirements expected
- Training and guidance of BERGALL's crew members doing
SHIPALT work and operating new equipment
As CDR Greene read the list, Jim surveyed the faces of
those attending. He noted some uneasy shifting around and
note taking, as CDR Greene ticked off items that apparently
had not received full prior attention.
CDR Greene kept a tight rein on the dialogue that followed;
the ensuing oratory of the participants was dynamic and
loaded with revelations, problems, conflicts, surprises and
awakening concern. CDR Greene adroitly guided each discus-
sion, summarized conclusions, and tasked followup action
throughout. Jim kept the minutes. The meeting lasted until
late afternoon. While many small details that required ac-
tion emerged, there were some very significant points broached
that were extremely pertinent to success. Each impacted
like a bombshell, causing group dismay. For example: It was
determined that installation of the SHIPALT by "Forces
Afloat" did not mean just the ship's crew. Submarine tender
15 Weapons System Accuracy Trials
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or shore based machine shop assistance was required. Hence,
SUBASE, NLON Engineering and Repair Facility (SUBASE E&R)
services were determined to be necessary. SUBASE E&R had not
been aware of this requirement — As a matter of fact, no
one in the submarine force had been aware of the requirement.
COMSUBDEVGRU TWO accepted the responsibility to affect liai-
son. The PMO representatives agreed that some degree of
funding would be required. CHASN, NSY reported that the
SHIPALT kits would not be available until 23 December. NUSC,
Newport reported that two loading and handling demonstrations
were required to ensure that all problems were corrected.
Electric Boat said three days would be required for load line
alignment. CONSUBDEVGRU TWO let it be known that sea trials
had to be conducted on 14 January. Everyone was upset over
having to work through the holidays. Mr. Landry from CHASN,
NSY broached a previously unidentified requirement to drill
36 holes in certain load line hardware fixtures in a machine
shop (i.e. SUBASE E&R) and to check the accuracy of each
hole, in the ship, before drilling the next hole — This
process was deemed so time consuming that most of the at-
tendees felt that it couldn't be done between 23 December
and 14 January. Mr. Formatt appeared stunned that his pre-
liminary schedule inputs could have been so inadequate. The
group was in a near frenzy. CDR Greene handled this by ask-
ing Mr. Landry if the SHIPALT kits could be shipped in parts
(i.e. if portions of the kits could be shipped as completed).
After a series of telephone calls to Charleston, it was
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determined that partial kits could be in New London by 10
December, and the hole drilling effort could begin at that
time. After other details such as "ship's force" guidance
to be provided and special tools to be provided were resolved,
it was determined that work on the SHIPALT could probably be
completed by 14 January.
Each item was "hammered out" in this manner, with vary-
ing degrees of complication, before a final approach was
arrived at. Mr. Formatt kept shaking his head and taking
notes.
When the meeting finally adjourned, it was unanimously
agreed that the project would have certainly floundered with-
out benefit of the meeting. The effort had been exhaustive.
Jim's notes later generated 15 typewritten pages of minutes.
Mr. Formatt had a bundle of notes filling his briefcase,
from which to make changes to his work package and schedule.
He was still shaking his head when he left. No one left the
meeting without tasks and follow up requirements. But, a
feasible schedule had been worked out, and an integrated work
package would result. There was a monumental amount of phy-
sical work yet to be done on BERGALL, but there would be a
viable plan to guide its accomplishment. It appeared as if
the scope of the work and all of the work requirements had
been satisfactorily identified. Only time would tell, but





Jim and CDR Greene adjourned to the "0" Club bar and
ordered a couple of beers. There they discussed the day's
events, the rocky road traveled to get there, and the un-
certainty ahead. At one point during the discussion, CDR
Greene rocked his head back, drained his beer glass, banged
the empty glass on the bar, turned to Jim, looked him square-
ly in his eyes and said, "We have over a hundred submarines
in the Force, Jim, at least a dozen different classes — Is
it going to take this kind of an effort to get MK-48 installed
on each and every one of them?"




The introduction suggested that even the most complicated
of problems can be handled through well planned utilization
of available expertise, brought to bear through coordinated
effort, which is, in turn, accomplished through effective
communications. The point was forcefully made at the outset
that effective communications requires precise decisions re-
garding who to communicate with, how to communicate, when to
communicate, and where to communicate.
The case studies presented herein dealt only with the
problems involved in readying the first submarines in SUBLANT
to carry and fire the MK-48 torpedo, as a prelude to Fleet
Introduction. The cases dealt only with specific hardware
problems, the time span was limited to happenings which oc-
curred between October 1969 and December 1970, and the pro-
gram view was limited to the Fleet's perspective of relevant
happenings. Nevertheless, the related manifold events, prob-
lems, decision, interactions, etc. are representative of the
who, how, when, and where communication decisions facing
Fleet Introduction of any weapons system, in any area of the
process. Complexity increases with major systems, but the
essence of the interplay phenomena and the need to deal with
it are ever present, regardless of system complexity. The
lessons to be learned concerning that need focus on the ob-
vious requirement for coordinated communications: Namely,
the whos, the hows, the whens, and the wheres.
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The authors believe that, on the basis of the six case
studies presented, it is possible to draw specific conclu-
sions regarding project communications requirements and to
point to specific ground rules to be followed for the intro-
duction of any major weapons system. Before making any such
attempt, however, the authors wish to quickly allude to the
fact that, in addition to any fundamental ground rules iden-
tified for project communications, there are other lessons
to be learned. Very obviously, each facet of the Fleet In-
troduction process merits study.
These other lessons, communications notwithstanding, in-
volve such factors as management rationale, the ramifications
of decisions, and the effect of the actions taken or not tak-
en to deal with problems in each area. In the case of the
Fleet Introduction of the MK-48 torpedo, many of these other
lessons remain to be learned. For example, consider the
following areas:
The MK-48 MOD-1 Torpedo itself . The issues relevant to
the torpedo involve: inventory goals, controls, and con-
straints; interface problems encountered with shipboard
14launcher equipments; shelf life and "turnaround" require-
ments; shipboard safety manifestations; logistic support re-
quirements and difficulties; security; reliability; and
maintainability
.
14 Torpedo "turnaround" refers to how often a torpedo
must be returned to a torpedo workshop, ashore or on a ten-




MK-48 MQD-1 Torpedo Retrievers . Torpedoes fired as ex-
ercise units, MK-27 MTT's as well, must be recovered after
launch. Special retrieval equipment and vehicles were/are
required for on range and open ocean firings to deal with
varying weather conditions and exercise requirements. Boats,
helicopters, and ships are potential retrieval platforms.
The evolution of the MK-48 torpedo and the MK-27 MTT retriev-
al systems has been unique, and the lessons to be gleaned
are manifest.
The MK-27 MTT's . This area is almost as fertile for case
study development as the torpedo itself.
MK-48 Tender Workshops and Magazine Stowage . This sub-
ject is extremely relevant to the successful deployment and
support of the MK-48 torpedo. It is likewise a complex
area, well suited for case study development. Many lessons
could be learned from study of this effort.
Shipboard Loading and Handling . The evolution of the re-
quired SHIPALTS and the problems encountered beyond the
BERGALL experience described in Case (F) are subjects replete
with lessons still being learned. This program has been
frought with difficulties and management challenges.
Submarine Fire Control . Tracing the resolution of the
many problems facing alteration of submarine fire control
systems would provide a classic case study opportunity. The
problems in this area exposed in this series of cases were
followed by others. And, the successful solutions to these
problems have since led to a well managed alteration program.
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Training/Exercise Firing . The steps which led to the
development of the "MK-48 Training and Certification Program"
would provide another classic case study opportunity. The
coordination of the many players and the departure from the
traditional torpedo introduction efforts were significant.
MK-48 Shore Facility Workshops and Magazines . This area
was explored in great depth by the authors. Regretably,
time constraints precluded case study development. Neverthe-
less, the authors will address this area to illustrate the
potential that it, and all of the other above mentioned
areas lends to possible case study development.
The authors spent many hours researching the COMSUBLANT
archives and interviewing present and past members of the
COMSUBLANT, PMO, NUSC, Newport, and NAVORDSYSCGM staffs.
Several pertinent and causative details were recorded.
There was, in turn, disclosure of the following five key
events and/or determinants that were to be further developed
into a case study. They are as follows:
1. The inability to activate the already constructed
Norfolk MK-48 workshop because the selected torpedo war-
head yield exceeded the safe explosive quantity/distance
ratio for the area's population density. The workshop
was planned and built to accommodate the MK-48-0 with
the smaller warhead.
2. The essentially last minute inability to activate the
Charleston workshop on schedule, as planned, because of
a contract that, somehow, was never negotiated, as
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required, to effect the internal structural changes nec-
essary in order to accept the MK-48-1 torpedo workshop
test and handling equipment.
3. The fact that the high priority assigned to MK-48
TWS development with CNO, NAVORD, NAVSHIPS , and other in-
volved commands and agencies had no apparent effect on
the priority assigned to construction of the MK-48 work-
shop buildings, which fell under the cognizance of NAVFAC.
Investigation revealed that the building contract admin-
istrators and the Resident Officers in Charge of Con-
15
struction (ROICC) apparently assigned building
construction priorities based solely on cost. Hence,
any other building undergoing construction on station
that cost more than a MK-48 workshop that was undergoing
construction on the same station would axiomatically
have higher priority for construction. The inability of
the PM to effect MK-48 workshop construction on a prior-
ity commensurate with other components of the weapons
system appeared to be quite paradoxical.
4. The tardy activation of the New London facility, with
a long list of waivers, appeared to be the result of in-
adequate attention to detail in the initial activation
planning and supervision effort.
15 Civil Engineering Corps. (CEC) officer assigned to a




5. The availability of real estate and the aforementioned
quantity/distance requirements reportedly forced the con-
struction of one of the New London facilities in the mid-
dle of an old stone quarry and the other in the middle
of a previously swampy area. The former endured a rather
traumatic engagement with periodic rockslides until the
quarry walls were reinforced with concrete, and the lat-
ter is plagued by leaks and wetness. In fact, some of
the people interviewed are convinced that the latter
facility is literally sinking.
Based upon the above discussion and examples, the authors
strongly endorse follow-on effort to further research and de-
velop case studies involving the MK-48 TWS . And, while the
above subjects are viewed as being related to Fleet Intro-
duction, it is suggested that the MK-48 Program's scope pro-
vides considerable room for case study effort in several
areas other than Fleet Introduction.
Returning, then, to the thesis that it is possible to
draw specific conclusions regarding project communications
requirements and to point out specific ground rules to be
followed for the introduction of any major weapons system,
the authors feel safe in assuming that any student of the
presented case studies would agree that the requirement for
Fleet involvement is a foregone conclusion. This is not to
say that many would agree as to the degree of involvement
,
or how and when such involvement should occur. Accordingly,




CONCLUSION : A Project Manager's Staff is not generally
organized to coordinate the detailed steps necessary for in-
troducing new hardware at the Fleet level. Further, the
PM's Staff does not have the means to maintain on the job
supervision of interface efforts in the Fleet.
RECOMMENDATION : The Project Manager and his Staff must
recognize the "Customer" position of the Fleet and organize
to effectively deal with it: Namely, the PM should ensure
that his Staff includes a Fleet Liaison Officer. That offi-
cer should be well versed and familiar with the Fleet com-
munity concerned. He should be formally chartered to
interface with an assigned Fleet representative(s) (i.e., a
Project Officer on the Type/Force Commander's Staff), from
the date the project is designated and a PM is assigned. As
the PMO is reorganized to cope with the project's progression
through the various phases, the Fleet Liaison Officer's role
must be continued. And, as the project approaches Fleet In-
troduction, the Fleet Liaison Officer should be provided the
required staffing to permit sustained, in field efforts to
supervise the details of each facet of the Fleet Introduction
effort
.
CONCLUSION : The Type/Force Commander's Staff is not
functionally nor by traditional attitude or circumstance
suited to interface formally with a Project Office. Officers
assigned to Operational Staffs, in general, are too wrapped
up in the daily exigencies of operations and existing hard-
ware problems to devote extensive time and effort to the de-
velopment of new hardware.
60

must recognize its "Customer" position and the "Producer"
position of the PMO and organize to effectively deal with it:
Namely, the Type/Force Commander should ensure that his
Staff includes a Project Officer for each major project that
is destined to interface with the units he commands. Each
Project Officer should be on an equal footing with the heads
of Staff functional offices. This suggests that he should
be a Navy Captain with a charter permitting him to act across
functional lines with the authority of the Commander, as
necessary to acquire the degree of functional support re-
quired to effectively represent and support the Fleet's in-
terests in all project matters. The Project Officer should
be assigned concurrently with the PMO's Fleet Liaison Offi-
cer, and a formal communications link should be established
at that time and sustained throughout the development proc-
ess and Fleet Introduction. Where the command has a counter-
part on the opposite coast, as is usually the case, or there
is more than one Type/Force Commander involved, a concensus
should be reached on all appropriate matters so that a single
face can be presented to the PMO. Furthermore, the onus
rests with the Type/Force Commander to ensure that it is
clear to all other commands dealing with his Staff on project
related matters that they must deal with one, and only one,
point of contact -- his Project Officer. Hand-in-hand with
I
this responsibility is the requirement to ensure that the
Project Officer is truely authorized to speak for the
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Commander in all project related matters. What's more, the
Type/Force Commander must ensure that the other commands
recognize this fact. It goes without saying, then, that
selection of an individual to fill a Project Officer posi-
tion is not a matter to be treated lightly. The authors
recognize that there are those who consider the cost of such
an effort exorbitant or, at least, not in line with what they
consider is required. To those who feel this way the authors
can only suggest that it is a small price to pay when viewed
in perspective with the long lived effects of inactions or
wrong decisions made during the development and Fleet Intro-
duction processes.
CONCLUSION : Neither the PM nor the Type/Force Commander
possess the degree of authority necessary to effect all de-
cisions that may be in the best interest of the project.
This is due to the fact that other major commands, for a
variety of reasons, may not agree with their decisions. In
some instances, neither the PM nor the Type/Force Commander
may be in the position to fund an action that would be in
the best interest of the project.
RECOMMENDATION : All major projects should have a central
forum, a court of appeals if you will, for carrying the needs
of the project to the CNO so that final and effective deci-
sions can be made in areas beyond the authority of the PM or
Type/Force Commander. For this purpose, it is recommended
that the CNO's Project Sponsor chair a coordination group,
similar to the present PCG, and that the key membership be
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limited to the PM, the Type/Force Commanders, and, perhaps,
one or two agencies acting in major support roles for the
PM. All decisions regarding funding or policy beyond the
authority of the PM and the Type/Force Commanders can,
through this forum, be referred to the CNO for action. Once
a decision has been made, the CNO can task and/or fund other
commands, as appropriate, such as NAVSEA, to take action to
support the decision.
CONCLUSION : There are presently no ground rules, direc-
tions, or check off lists available to guide PM's or their
Staffs and field agencies regarding Fleet/project interface
efforts. This has led to irritations, misunderstandings,
lack of proper guidance, bypassing of key personnel, mutual
on the job interference, and unsatisfactory installation/
testing efforts.
RECOMMENDATION : All projects that will require inter-
face with the Fleet should be required to publish formal
ground rules setting forth and providing guidance regarding
step-by-step procedures for effecting Fleet liaison and sub-
sequent hardware or software interface. Specific individual
responsibility should be assigned in each instance, and re-
quirements for necessary ship checks, meetings, integrated
work packages, and specific Fleet liaison should be standard-
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1 The EX-10 (MK-48) Torpedo Project Officer was the BUWEPS Torpedo
Division Head. The EX-10 was another functional responsibility
with the division. Two men were assigned responsibility for the
project.
December 1966






















PMO 99 reported to ORDNANCE SYSCOM for technical aspects of the
project, including design, development, production and support
responsibilities.
PMO 99 reported to MASWSP for coordination and integration of
MK-48 into the overall Navy ASW effort. Reports included approval
of schedules, funding, system integration and program monitoring.
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Exhibit 4 Naval Material Command Organization Chart
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SPRING 1968 "Dual Effort"
PMO Organization Chart













ORD - 055/PMO 99
MK 48 - 0/2
ORD - 054
MK 48 - 1
1 MK 48 - 1 Program Management stated in the existing ORDNANCE SYSCOM
Torpedo Division ORD - 054, in August 1967.
2 ORD - 055/PMO 99 became PMO 499 in February 1969.





MK 48 - 1
Management
Office
ORD - 055/PMO 99
MK 48 - 0/2
N0L/W0





























MK 48 - 1
Torpedo
CM.
MK 48 - 0/2
Back up
Exploder
Note: symbol - - - - means "coordination",
Exhibit 5 Spring 1968 "Dual Effort" PMO Organization Chart
X-5































































Exhibit 6 Summer 1971 "Post Competition" PMO Organization Chart.
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MK-48 PROGRAM COORDINATION GROUP (PCG)
MEMBER ORGANIZATIONS
The MK-48 PCG was established in August 1966; members were:
Chairman ; Office of CNO* (OP-951E) , Head Sub-Surface Branch, Technical
Appraisal and Requirements Division of ASW Programs.
Members : Office of CNO:
* OP-312D. Head Weapons Systems and Readiness Section, Submarine
Warfare Division.
OP-090C2, Assistant to Director Navy Program Planning.
OP-713C, Assistant Head Strategic and Submarine Warefare
Branch, Undersea Warfare and Ocean Surveillance.
OP-322D2, Assistant for Surface Weapons, ASW and Ocean Sur-
veillance Division.
* MK-48 Torpedo Project Officer (MK-48-0/2)
.
* NUSC, Newport (NUWRES) MK-48 Program Shipboard Equipment
Technical Director.
* ORL Pennsylvania State University, MK-48 Technical Director.
* BUPERS Submarine Personnel Program Manager.
The MK-48 PCG Membership in August ]968 was:
Chairman : Head Submarine Warfare Branch, Undersea and Strategic Warfare
Division, (OP-713)
Members : Same as * members from above plus following new members.
MK-48-1 Torpedo Project Officer.
MASWSP (ASW-113), Head Submarine Systems Plans Branch.
COMSUBDEVGRU TWO (Chairman Fleet Firing Sub Group)
.
NAVMAT (MAT-0322), Head, ASW Systems Development Branch.
COMSUBLANT Force Weapons Officer.
COMSUBPAC Force Weapons Officer.
OP-322C1, Assistant for Surface Weapons, ASW and Ocean Sur-
veillance Division.
COMOPTEVFOR Staff Representative.
COMCRUDESLANT ASW Weapons Officer.
Naval Safety Center (Chairman Safety Sub Group)
.
COMASWFORPAC Weapons Officer.
COMCRUDESPAC ASW Weapons Officer.
NAVFAC (Code- 20211) Assistant Master Plans Branch.
NAVSHIPSYSCOM Senior Project Engineer of SSN New Construction.
Note: PCG meetings were normally attended by a variety of other organ-
izations (non-members) involved in MK-48 Weapons System Develop-
ment. Their attendance was solicited when matters affecting
their areas of responsibility were to be addressed.
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Exhibit 10 Orgnaizational Relationship Between COMSUBLANT Staff














































































Note: Denotes Functional Control
Denotes Program Management Matrix Relationship
. _.— Denotes Staff Relationship





COMSUBLANT Staff and PMO





































— Formal Chain of Command
- Primary Informal Interfaces
See Exhibits 2, 3, 4, 6 and 10 for additional detail regarding
organizational relationships.
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ABC - Atomic, Biological, and Chemical
ACOS - Assistant Chief of Staff
ADP - Automatic Data Processing
APL - Applied Physics Laboratory, Johns Hopkins University
APL - Allowance Parts List
AS - Submarine Tender
ASAP - As soon as possible
ASR - Submarine Rescue Vessel
ASTOR - Anti-Submarine Torpedo
ASW - Anti-Submarine Warfare
AUW - Advanced Underwater Weapons
BUMED - Bureau of Medicine and Surgery
BUPERS - Bureau of Naval Personnel
BUSANDA - Bureau of Supply and Accounts
BUSHIPS - Bureau of Ships
BUWEPS - Bureau of Weapons
BUYARDS &, DOCKS - Bureau of Yards and Docks
CAPT - Captain
CDR - Commander
CHASN - Charleston, South Carolina
CHASN.NSY - Charleston Naval Shipyard, Charleston, South
Carolina
CHNAVMAT - Chief of the Naval Material Command
CINCESTLANT - Commander in Chief Eastern Atlantic
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CINCLANT - Commander in Chief Atlantic
CINCLANTFLT - Commander in Chief, U.S. Atlantic Fleet
CINCPAC - Commander in Chief Pacific
CINCPACFLT - Commander in Chief, U.S. Pacific Fleet
CLEVITE - CLEVITE Corporation (later became Ocean Systems
Division of GOULD INC.)
CNM - Chief of the Naval Material Command
CNO - Chief of Naval Operations
COMASWFORLANT - Commander, Anti-Submarine Forces Atlantic
COMASWFORPAC - Commander, Ant i-Submarine Forces Pacific
COMCRUDESLANT - Commander, Cruiser Destroyer Force Atlantic
COMCRUDESPAC - Commander, Cruiser Destroyer Force Pacific
COMFIVE - Commandant of the Fifth Naval District
COMOPTEVFOR - Commander Operational Test and Evaluation
Forces
COMSUBACLANT - Commander Allied Submarine Command Atlantic
COMSUBDEVGRU TWO - Commander Submarine Development Group Two
COMSUBDIV - Commander Submarine Division
COMSUBFLOT - Commander Submarine Flotilla
COMSUBLANT - Commander Submarine Force Atlantic
COMSUBPAC - Commander Submarine Force Pacific
COMSUBRON - Commander Submarine Squadron
COMSUBWESTLANT - Commander Submarine Forces Western Atlantic
COMTAC - Communications and Tactical
COSAL - Consolidated Shipboard Allowance List
COSMIC - NATO TOP SECRET
CCrr - Consolidated Operability Tests
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CP - Cost Plus Contract
CPFF - Cost Plus Fixed Fee Contract
CPI - Cost Plus Incentive Contract
CPO - Chief Petty Officer
DCOS - Deputy Chief of Staff
DDAS - Digital Data Acquisition System
DEVGRU TWO - Submarine Development Group Two
DOD - Department of Defense
DPT - Development Prototype Torpedo
DRL - Defense Research Laboratory, University of Texas
DSARC - DOD Defense System Acquisition Review Council
ECM - Electronics Countermeasures
EVAL - Evaluation
FAM - Basic Familiarization Training
FBM - Fleet Ballistic Missile
FBMTC - Fleet Ballistic Missile Training Center
F/C - Fire Control
FEC - Field Engineering Change
FORACS - Fleet Operational Readiness Accuracy Calibration
Station
FPI - Fixed Price Incentive Contract
FPIF - Fixed Price Incentive Fee Contract
FSTC - Fleet Submarine Training Command
GD - General Dynamics Corp.
GE - General Electric Corp.
GM - General Motors Corp.




IAPL - Interim Allowance Parts List
ICP - Inventory Control Point
ISEA - In Service Engineering Agent/Activity
LANTFLT NAVFACOM - Atlantic Fleet Naval Facilities Command
LCDR - Lieutenant Commander
LIBRASCOPE - Singer Librascope Co.
LT - Lieutenant
3M - Maintenance and Material Management
MASWSP - Manager, Anti-Submarine Warfare Systems
MCPOC - Command Master Chief Petty Officer
MRC - Maintenance Requirements Cards
MTCS - Senior Chief Missile Technician
MTT - MK-27 Mobile Torpedo Target
NATO - North Atlantic Treaty Organization
NAVAIRSYSCOM - Naval Air Systems Command
NAVFAC - Naval Facilities Command
NAVFACOM - Naval Facilities Command
NAVMAT - Naval Material Command
NAVMATCOM - Naval Material Command
NAVORD - Naval Ordnance Systems Command
NAVORDSYSCOM - Naval Ordnance Systems Command
NAVORDSYSUPOLANT - Naval Ordnance System Support Office
Atlantic
NAVSEC - Naval Ship Engineering Center
NAVSHIPS - Naval Ships Systems Command
NAVSHIPSYSCOM - Naval Ships Systems Command
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NAVSUP - Naval Supply Systems Command
NAVSUPSYSCOM - Naval Supply Systems Command
NEC - Navy Enlisted Classification Code
NLON - New London, Connecticut
NNSBDDCO - Newport News Shipbuilding and Dry Dock Co.
NORVA - Norfolk, Virginia
NOS/IH - Naval Ordnance Station, Indian Head, Maryland
NOSSO - Naval Ordnance System Support Office
NOSSOLANT - Naval Ordnance System Support Office Atlantic
NSRDC - Naval Ship Research and Development Center
NOSC - Naval Underwater Systems Center, Newport, Rhode Island
(formerly NUWRES)
NUSC, Newport - Naval Underwater Systems Center, Newport,
Rhode Island (formerly NUWRES)
NUWC - Naval Undersea Warfare Center, Pasadena, California
NUWRES - Naval Underwater Research and Evaluation Center,
Newport, Rhode Island (now NUSC, Newport)
OPLAN - Operations Plan
OPNAV - Office of the Chief of Naval Operations
OPORD - Operations Order
OP ORDER - Operations Order
OPTEVFOR - Operational Test and Evaluation Forces
ORDALT - Ordnance Alteration
ORI - Operations Research Inc.
ORL/PSU - Ordnance Research Laboratory, Pennsylvania State
University
OSD - Office of the Secretary of Defense
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PAO - Public Affairs Office
PCG - MK-48 Program Coordination Group
PCO - Prospective Commanding Officer
PIP - Personnel Information Program
PM - Project Manager
PML - Peat, Marwick, and Livingston
PMO - Project Manager's Office
POS - Project Office Staff
PPT - Production Prototype Torpedo
PXO - Prospective Executive Officer
RAV - Restricted Availability
RDF - Radio Direction Finding
REP - Representative
RPS - Registered Publications System
SACLANT - Supreme Allied Command Atlantic
SAIL - Ship's Armament Inventory List
SECNAV - Secretary of the Navy
SHIPALT - Ship Alteration
SITREPS - Situation Reports
SOAC - Submarine Officer Advanced Course
SOAP - Supply Operations Assistance Program
SOBC - Submarine Officer Basic Course
SOIC - Submarine Officer Intermediate Course
SPCC - Ship's Parts Control Center, Mechaniscburg, Pennsylvania
SS - Diesel Submarine
SSBN - Nuclear Fleet Ballistic Missile Submarine
SSN - Nuclear Fast Attack Submarine
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STP - Selection Test Procedure
SUBASE E&R - Engineering and Repair Department of the U.S.
Naval Submarine Base, New London, Connecticut
SUBASE, NLON - U.S. Naval Submarine Base, New London, Con-
necticut
SUBDEVGRU TWO - Submarine Development Group Two
SUBLANT - Atlantic Submarine Force
SUBPAC - Pacific Submarine Force
SUBROC - Submarine Launched Rocket
SUBSAFE - Submarine Safety
SUBSCOL - U.S. Naval Submarine School, New London, Connect-
icut
TACNOTE - Tactical Note
TAD - Temporary Additional Duty
TAV - Technical Availability
TECHEVAL - Technical Evaluation
TECH/OPEVAL - Technical/Operational Evaluation
TWS - Torpedo Weapons System
VITRO - VITRO Laboratories
WECO - Westinghouse Electric Corp.
WSAT - Weapons System Accuracy Trials
WSR - Weapons System Review





The Ordnance Alteration (ORDALT) Program is sponsored by
the Naval Ordnance Systems Command (NAVORDSYSCOM) , for the
purpose of maintaining physical, as well as, configuration
control of installed ordnance equipments. Before an existing
ordnance system that is installed in a Naval vessel or shore
station can be altered, that alteration must be approved and
proofed; it must also be implemented as an ORDALT kit within
the ORDALT system.
To become an ORDALT kit, an alteration must be accompanied
by concurrent changes to all related technical publications,
all engineering drawings and ship's plans, all preventative
maintenance system documents [e.g. Maintenance Data Cards
(MDC's) used to maintain the equipment], and all supply docu-
mentation [Consolidated Shipboard Allowance Lists (COSAL)
and Allowance Parts Lists (APL's)]. In addition, the spare
parts must be in the supply system and the kit must include
initial spare parts, if required, for the parent ship or
station supply inventories. And, last but not least, an
ORDALT kit must include all of the necessary step-by-step
instructions for accomplishment of the alteration.
An ORDALT can be proposed by any competent vendor, com-
mand, or individual. However, to gain approval, it must
represent a significant and beneficial improvement to an





The physical hardware proofing and full kit proofing for
submarine weapons system ORDALT's has been the responsibility
of NUSC, Newport. Normal procedure calls for NUSC, Newport
to proof the alteration in their laboratory and the full kit
onboard a submarine assigned by the Type Commander (e.g.
COMSUBLANT). Final approval for the plans and kit must also
have received prior approval by the appropriate functional
codes within NAVORDSYSCOM.
Once the kit has been fully proofed, it is made avail-
able for installation in existing equipments. The kit has,
of course, already been assigned a number and is made ready
for distribution upon final approval and the fabrication of
a sufficient initial quantity. ORDALT kits and the attend-
ant preparation costs are funded by NAVORDSYSCOM.
When made available for general installation, an ORDALT
kit is normally grouped with other technically compatible
kits into a multiple ORDALT package called a "Baseline".
Normally, installations are scheduled to achieve a defined
baseline configuration. This procedure greatly reduces the
difficulty of trying to effect support changes in multiple
small increments for each ORDALT kit. The idea is to bring
a ship's hardware and software configuration together in a
better controlled, more economically suitable, and more man-
ageable steps. Baseline changes usually require several
hundred manhours to accomplish. ORDALT installations are
scheduled for accomplishment either in a shipyard or in the
field, dependent primarily upon the complexity and time
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available. Shipyard ORDALT's are scheduled by NAVORDSYSCOM
and are automatically integrated into the Type Commander's
shipyard overhaul work lists, following a review by the Type
Commander's staff for correctness, applicability, and possi-
ble conflicts with other scheduled work. Field installations
are scheduled by NOSSOLANT/NOSSOPAC, who orders the kits
after coordinating material, ship, and technician availabil-
ity through NUSC, Newport and the Type Commander. NUSC
,
Newport normally provides contractor or in-house technicians
to install ORDALT's. However, NOSSOLANT/NOSSOPAC and/or
Fleet personnel are able to, and often do, perform minor or
less complicated ORDALT's.
After an ORDALT is installed, the installing activity
assists the parent command in making the necessary changes
to the supporting systems (e.g. software and the supply sys-
tem). NOSSOLANT/NOSSOPAC provides a final post ORDALT re-
view to ensure total compatability . At the time the ORDALT
is installed, a major requirement exists to change the Ship's
Armament Inventory List (SAIL) to reflect the new configura-
tion. The SAIL change is forwarded to several activities
within the ordnance support community, but the essential
purpose of the change is to effect the necessary change in
the NAVORDSYSCOM configuration data bank. If that change is
properly made, all supporting systems will respond to the
new configuration requirement. However, if that change is
not made, monumental administrative problems can be precipi-
tated. Cumulative failures to make changes result in loss
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of configuration control and related support. Each command
possessing ordnance equipment bears the ultimate responsibil-





The Ship Alteration (SHIPALT) Program is sponsored by
the Naval Ships System Command (NAVSHIPSYSCOM) , for the pur-
pose of maintaining physical as well as configuration control
of ship design. SHIPALT' s (as opposed to ORDALT's for ex-
ample) apply to those items specifically under the design
control of NAVSHIPSYSCOM. Such items could normally include
all hull and integrally installed ship's supporting systems
(i.e. winches, piping systems, switchboards, wiring, fuel
systems, auxiliary equipment installation configurations,
etc. )
.
Before en existing item or system under NAVSHIPSYSCOM
cognizance can be altered, the basic SHIPALT plan must be
approved by NAVSHIPSYSCOM.
A SHIPALT can be proposed by any competent vendor, com-
mand or individual. However, to gain approval it must repre-
sent a significant and beneficial improvement to the existing
design, or be necessary for the safety of the equipment, sys-
tem, ship, or personnel.
While it is ideally intended that SHIPALT' s accomplish
the same degree of control as ORDALT's, in practice, admin-
istration of the SHIPALT program has been less rigorous.
Approved SHIPALT' s are, in many cases, issued with more
generalized instructions for accomplishment than are ORDALT's.
Hence, the installing activity (i.e. shipyard, tender, or
III-l

ship's force) is often permitted some degree of flexibility
in the physical implementation. While the end purpose is the
same, in effect, the same SHIPALT, installed by different ac-
tivities, has not, in most instances, reflected the same
physical detail. This has caused criticism by those in favor
of more detailed control. It has, paradoxically, also led to
dissimilarity in configuration of systems between ships of
the same class. However, in all fairness to the system, the
generalized instructions are brought about by the fact that,
for all practical purposes, no two ships of the same class
are built identically. This is not to say that there are
gross differences, but construction practices do, in fact,
vary between shipyards. It's an unfortunate fact of life
that has to be lived with. As a result, if a SHIPALT were de-
signed to accommodate a specific ship down to the most minute
of details (e.g. calling out terminal numbers or radius of
turn for a new piping installation so that it will exactly
fit), there is a very high probability that the SHIPALT will
accommodate that ship but no others. Hence, the need exists
to issue a little "artist's license" with each SHIPALT.
All approved SHIPALT' s are identified by an assigned
SHIPALT number. SHIPALT 's are additionally categorized in
accordance with who is authorized to install them and who
will fund them. SHIPALT' s scheduled by NAVSHIPSYSCOM for
shipyard accomplishment are normally funded by NAVSHIPSYSCOM.
SHIPALT' s falling into this category are, like ORDALT ' s in-
cluded in the ship's overhaul work package and are reviewed
III-2

by the Type Commander (e.g. COMSUBLANT) for compatibility
with other shipyard work. Other SHIPALT's funded by NAVSHIP-
SYSCOM are authorized for accomplishment by forces afloat.
In addition, still others are approved by NAVSHIPSYSCOM for
accomplishment, but are funded by the Type Commander.
As in the case of ORDALT's, it is critical that completed
SHIPALT's be properly reflected in the ship's master plans
and that all supporting documentation (software) be changed
to reflect the alteration. It is incumbent upon each command
receiving SHIPALT's to ensure that total compatibility is
accomplished persuant to installation. Failure to change
supporting documentation results, as is the case with ORDALT's
which are improperly recorded, in the loss of configuration
control and will contribute to inaccurate ship's master plans.
The latter deficiency is, in part, the reason why all plan-
ning for shipboard alterations or the installation of new
equipment should be preceded by a thorough onboard "ship
check." Master plans are notoriously inaccurate, regarding





Charters/Responsibilities of COMSUBLANT Staff Functional Codes 1
00 COMSUBLANT (THE COMMANDER)
Functional Statement
NATIONAL Command, operational and administrative control of
ships, units and shore (field) activities assigned to
SUBLANT; operational control over other units assigned by
higher authority. Submarine Operational Advisor to
CINCLANT for Polaris/Poseidon Operations, serving as code
J006, CINCLANT Staff. Assists BUPERS and Naval District
Commandants in support of Naval Research Program.
COMSUBACLANT Additional duty to SACLANT as Operational Ad-
visor for Polaris/Poseidon Operations, and a NATO Major
Subordinate Commander as COMSUBACLANT. Advises SACLANT
on submarine matters and coordinates submarine planning
within the Atlantic Command.
COMSUBWESTLANT Subordinate command of CINCWESTLANT. Serves
as NATO Commander as COMSUBWESTLANT. Principal responsi-
bility is Operational Commander NATO Submarines, Western
Atlantic Area.
SPECIAL COMMAND ASSISTANTS TO THE COMMANDER
001 FLAG LIEUTENANT & AIDE
Functional Statement - Personal aide to Commander. Direct
representative of Commander relating to uniforms, honors,
ceremonies, official visits, salutes, presentation of
awards, and transportation. Division Officer for Flag
mess stewards and Commanders and Chief of Staff writers.
Flag Mess Caterer. Additional duty as Flag Lieutenant
& Aide for COMSUBACLANT and COMSUBWESTLANT.
01 CHIEF OF STAFF
Functional Statement - Direct representative of the Commander;
effectuates the policies and orders of the Commander and
advises the Commander of all significant matters pertain-
ing to command. Directs and Coordinates work of the
Staff. Coordinates activities of the command. Super-
visory authority over Summary and Special Courts-martial.
Senior Aide to Force Commander. Additional duty as Chief
of Staff, COMSUBACLANT and CONSUBWESTLANT.




Functional Statement. - Advises the Force Commander and pro-
vides assistance to SUBLANT subordinate commands in all
matters pertaining to enlisted personnel. Represents
Force Commander at various ceremonies. Serves as member
of Awards Board for enlisted personnel of SUBLANT.
002 FLAG SECRETARY AND AIDE
Functional Statement - Assistant for coordination of staff
work, and administrative activities of the staff. Assists
staff officers in preparations of plans and directives.
Secretary of Awards Board and Beneficial Suggestion
Board. Commanding Officer, Flag Allowance. Personal
aide to the Commander. Additional duty as Flag Secretary,
COMSUBACLANT and COMSUBWESTLANT.
0021 ASSISTANT FLAG SECRETARY
Functional Statement - Executive Officer of Flag Allowance.
Classified Material, Top Secret and COSMIC Control,
Staff Personnel, Education, and Postal Officer. Coordi-
nates the administrative activities of the Flag Office.
Additional duty as Assistant Flag Secretary, COMSUBACLANT
and COMSUBWESTLANT.
003 PUBLIC AFFAIRS OFFICER
Functional Statement - Directs PAO program and advises Com-
mander on PAO matters. Arranges interviews and press
conferences. Provides news coverage of Force activities
and events. Acts on requests from press and public.
Obtains cruises for selected civilians. Obtains security
clearances for material released. Maintains Command
History. Administrator of overseas community relations
fund. Responsible for Quarterly Information Bulletin.
Coordinates graphic aids section.
004 FORCE MEDICAL OFFICER
Functional Statement - Assists Chief of Staff and advises
Commander on medical policy and procedures. Makes rec-
ommendations concerning health problems. Advises Person-
nel Officer on Hospital Corps allocation. Coordinates
Medical Office activities of the Force. Advises Command-
er on medical aspects of ABC warfare; coordinates and
disseminates medical information within the Force.
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005 FORCE DENTAL OFFICER
Functional Statement - Advises Commander on dental problems
and services. Coordinates Force dental services. Moni-
tors dental reports to assure best utilization of facil-
ities and personnel. Inspects and advises dental facil-
ities. Coordinates and disseminates dental information
within the Force. Coordinates and makes recommendations
for dental training. Coordinates preventative dentistry
to include stannous fluoride treatments.. Establishes
uniformity in dental treatment and programs.
006 FORCE LEGAL OFFICER
Functional Statement - Advises Commander and staff officers
on legal matters. Supervises military justice in the
Force. Reviews courts-martial convened by subordinate
commands. Prepares actions and recommendations for
Force Commander in military justice matters. Reviews
and prepares endorsements for investigations. Serves as
staff Legal Assistance Officer. Coordinates Legal As-
sistance Program for Force. Administers Force Safe
Driving Program. Coordinates legal services for subor-
dinate units with Navy Law Center.
007 PROGRAM MANAGER, FBM PERSONNEL INFORMATION PROGRAM (PIP)
Functional Statement - Implements PIP, designed to foster
personal growth and maturity, through distribution of
materials, evaluation of new material, supervision of
budget allocation, and attending appropriate conferences
and seminars dealing with PIP matters.
N-l SHOP (ADMINISTRATION/PERSONNEL)
Nl ASSISTANT CHIEF OF STAFF FOR ADMIN/PERSONNEL fe NAVAL
RESERVE
Functional Statement (not available)
N10 FORCE PERSONNEL OFFICER
Functional Statement (not available)
Nil CAREER COUNSELOR
Functional Statement (not available)
N12 FORCE CHAPLAIN
Functional Statemen t (not available)
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N-2 SHOP (READINESS AND TRAINING)
N2 ASSISTANT CHIEF OF STAFF FOR READINESS AND TRAINING
Functional Statement - Coordinate tactical and ASW development
programs. Administer TACNOTE system, and tactical digest.
Review exercise OPORDS and reports. Responsible for the
Force battle efficiency competition and awards. Senior
member, Board of Administrators, Command Recreation Fund.
Member of Joint SUBLANT/SUBPAC ASW Steering Committee.
N21 FORCE TRAINING OFFICER
Functional Statement - Coordination, planning and supervision
of shore based instructions, sonar information centers
and submarine based training programs including qualifi-
cation in submarines, qualification for command and ad-
vancement in rate. Precommissioning and overhaul training.
Control of TAD funds.
N211 ASSISTANT FORCE TRAINING OFFICER
Functional Statement - School quota control. Polaris/Poseidon
training control for off crew and SSBN crews in overhaul,
shipyard, factory, and special training control; pre-comm/
reftra/shkon training. Submarine officer/enlisted quali-
fication and command qualifications.
N22 TACTICAL READINESS OFFICER
Functional Statement - Coordinate tactical and ASW develop-
ment programs. Administer TACNOTE system and tactical
digest. Review exercise OPORDS and reports. Responsible
for the Force battle efficiency competition and awards.
Senior member, Board of Administrators, Command Recrea-
tion Fund. Member of Joint COMSUBLANT/COMSUBPAC ASW
steering committee.
N23 PROSPECTIVE COMMANDING OFFICER INSTRUCTOR
Functional Statement - Plan and conduct courses of instruc-
tion for submarine Prospective Commanding Officers. Re-
fresher Training for SUBRON/DIVCOMS and coordinate
training of Prospective Commanding Officers/Executive
Officers assigned surface ships of the Force.
N231 ASSISTANT PROSPECTIVE COMMANDING OFFICER INSTRUCTOR
Functional Statement - Develop curriculum for instruction of
Prospective Commanding Officers. Monitor courses of in-
struction for submarine Prospective Commanding Officers.
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N-3 SHOP (PLANS AND OPERATIONS)
N3 DEPUTY CHIEF OF STAFF FOR PLANS AND OPERATIONS (C-3 NATO)
Functional Statement - Coordinate and supervise Force Plans,
exercises, operations, intelligence, communication tac-
tics, and training functions. Prepares all wartime and
mobilization plans. Acts as Chief of Staff in the ab-
sence of the Chief of Staff. Additional duty as Deputy
Chief of Staff for Plans and Operations on the staff of
COMSUBACLANT/COMSUBWESTLANT.
N03 OPERATIONS ANALYST (PEG REPRESENTATIVE)
Functional Statement - Scientific and analytical advisor to
N3. Examines and evaluates plans, concepts, and tactics
concerning submarine warfare and makes recommendations
for improvement of submarine systems.
N-3 SHOP (NORTHWOOD, ENGLAND)
N3N COMSUBLANT REPRESENTATIVE NORTHWOOD (C-3N NATO)
Functional Statement - Operates CINCESTLANT NATO submarine
plot. Directs message center. Maintains liaison with
various national and NATO authorities. Coordinates ef-
forts to minimize submerged interference.
N3N1 ASSISTANT COMSUBLANT REPRESENTATIVE NORTH (C-3N1 NATO)
Functional Statement - Communications officer and RPS custo-
dian. Classified material control, TOP SECRET control,
and crypto security officer for Northwood.
N-31 SHOP (OPERATIONS)
N31 ASSISTANT CHIEF OF STAFF FOR OPERATIONS (C-31 NATO)
Functional Statement - Coordinate and supervise the operation
and movement of ships. Promulgate employment and exer-
cise schedules and operation orders. Assign notional
numbers. Evaluate unidentified submarine contacts, col-
lisions, and groundings. Force navigator, oceanographer
and readiness officer. Supervises Command Watch Officers.
Maintain the emergency action file, search and rescue
plans and weather information. Arrange port visits and
clearances. Monitor SOPA functions. Additional duty as





N311 ASSISTANT OPERATIONS OFFICER (C-311 NATO)
Functional Statement - Supervises Command Watch Officers.
Review and route mail and message traffic. Acts as
Operations Officer in absence of N31.
COMMAND WATCH OFFICER (N311A/B/C/D/E
)
Functional Statement - Complete coverage of all phases of
submarine operations. Thorough familiarization with sub-
marine deployment, movements, operational status, plot-
ting instructions and intelligence matters. Represents
the Commander and is empowered to take action in his
name.
N312 ASSISTANT OPERATIONS OFFICER FOR SCHEDULING
Functional Statement - Assists in the functions and planning




N32 PLANS OFFICER (C-32 NATO)
Functional Statement - Development and preparation of basic
national war plans, long-range Force requirements, spe-
cial plans and contingency plans. Additional duty as
Planning Officer for COMSUBACLANT/COMSUBWESTLANT.
C-32N ASSISTANT NATO PLANS OFFICER (ADDU FROM SACLANT)
Functional Statement - Provides assistance in the coordina-
tion and review of NATO, Allied Command Atlantic, War
Plans and NATO planning conferences.
N321 WAR PLANS OFFICER (C-321 NATO)
Functional Statement - Preparation and review of national
and NATO general war plans. Security and TOP SECRET con-
trol officer for plans section. Administration super-





N322 CONTINGENCY PLANS OFFICER (C-322 NATO)
Functional Statement - Responsible for preparation of contin-
gency and unconventional warfare plans, facilities project
planning, construction planning for force activities
ashore, and Force structure and administrative assignment
plan. Additional duty as contingency plans officer on
the staff of COMSUBACLANT/COMSUBWESTLANT.
N-33 SHOP (COMMUNICATIONS)
N33 COMMUNICATIONS OFFICER (C-33 NATO)
Functional Statement - Force and staff communications. Regu-
lation and review of submarine broadcast, communication
reports and projects, and communication OPLANS & OPORDS
.
Custody of communications equipment, RPS & COMTAC publi-
cations. NATO codeword action officer. Additional duty
as Communications Officer of the staff of COMSUBACLANT/
COMSUBWESTLANT.
N331 ASSISTANT COMMUNICATIONS/MESSAGE CENTER OFFICER (N331
NATO)
Functional Statement - Force Communication Officer in absence
of N33. COMTAC publication control officer. Supervise
Communication Watch Officers. Enlisted Division Officer
for the Message Center. Review incoming/outgoing mes-
sages. Supervise communications projects and submarine
broadcasts. Courier officer.
N332 RPS CUSTODIAN
Functional Statement - Act as Registered Publications System
custodian, officer courier, force crypto-security officer,
and Communications Watch Officer, when necessary.
COMMUNICATION WATCH OFFICER (N332A/B/C/D
)
Functional Statement - Insure efficient operation, adminis-
tration and security of message center. Insure proper
operation of outgoing message traffic and incoming mes-
sage routing. Assistant Division Officer. Member





Functional Statement - Special Security Officer. Screen and
disseminate intelligence information. Coordinate special
submarine matters. Force censorship officer. Advise on
photographic matters. Initiate action on intelligence
security violations. Responsible for security annex of
basic OPLAN & OPORD.
N341 ASSISTANT INTELLIGENCE OFFICER
Functional Statement - Assistant Special Security Officer.
Maintain intelligence publications. Act as Force Intel-
ligence Officer in the absence of N34
.
N-4 SHOP (LOGISTICS £ MANAGEMENT)
N4 DEPUTY CHIEF OF STAFF FOR LOGISTICS AND MANAGEMENT
Functional Statement - Coordination and evaluation of Force
meterial and logistics conditions. Supervision of mat-
ters concerning Force material, supply, and fiscal ord-
nance maintenance and new developments pertaining thereto,
N-40 SHOP (MATERIAL)
N40 ASSISTANT CHIEF OF STAFF FOR MATERIAL
Functional Statement - Responsible for matters relating to
ship maintenance and material readiness of all units of
the Submarine Force. Coordination and review of the
maintenance section. Formulation of maintenance and
material policies for ships. Scheduling assignments of
restricted availabilities and overhauls. Participation
in ship alteration/modernization/ improvement programs.
Provide engineering and technical advice regarding ship
design and maintenance, including new construction, con-
ceptual proposals, Force levels, and ship activation/






N40A ASSISTANT MAINTENANCE OFFICER FOR BUDGETING AND SCHEDULING
Functional Statement - Assist N40 in overhaul funds adminis-
tration, budget preparation and justification, and over-
haul scheduling. Prepare battery renewal and interim
docking schedules. Utilize ADP methods and analyze trends
in ship maintenance costs.
N401 FORCE MAINTENANCE OFFICER
Functional Statement - Principal technical assistant to N40.
Administers Force modernization program. Coordination
with industrial and governmental activities on matters
concerning the design, construction, modernization, and
repair of ships. Monitor quality assurance/control and
SUBSAFE certification programs. Responsible for hull
surveys and inspections. Administers overhaul funds and
budget preparation. Maintains overhaul schedules.
N4012 ASSISTANT MAINTENANCE OFFICER FOR QUALITY ASSURANCE/
SUBSAFE
Functional Statement - Monitor SUBSAFE certification. Pre-
pare quality assurance/control directives.
N4013 ASSISTANT MAINTENANCE OFFICER FOR MAINTENANCE AND
MATERIAL MANAGEMENT PROGRAMS
Functional Statement - Develops and implements programs for
improved maintenance management and logistic support.
Establishes criteria and develops techniques for evalua-
ting performance of intermediate level maintenance activ-
ities. Makes recommendations concerning development and
improvement of preventative maintenance policies and
practices. Develops and implements techniques for uti-
lization of 3M data.
N402 MATERIAL OFFICER FOR NUCLEAR ATTACK SUBMARINES
Functional Statement - Responsible for material upkeep, re-
pair, and alteration programs of SSN's. Advises on ma-
terial aspects of SSN modernization, conversion, and
overhaul. Takes action on shipyard work list. Main-






N402A ASSISTANT SSN MATERIAL OFFICER FOR SSN-637 CLASS
Functional Statement - Assists N402 with primary cognizance
of commissioned SSN-637 class submarines. Develops and
implements programs for improved maintenance management
and logistic support for 637 class. Coordinates devel-
opment and implementation of improved production manage-
ment system for Force intermediate level maintenance
activities for 637 class.
N402B ASSISTANT SSN MATERIAL OFFICER FOR PRE-594 AND ONE-OF-
A-KIND SSN's
Functional Statement - Assists N402 with primary cognizance
of pre-594 class SSN's, NR-1, and SSN 671. Develops and
implements programs for improved maintenance management
and logistic support for pre-594 class. Coordinates de-
velopment and implementation of improved production man-
agement systems for Force intermediate level maintenance
activities for pre-594 class.
N402C ASSISTANT SSN MATERIAL OFFICER FOR SSN 594 CLASS AND
NEW CONSTRUCTION
Functional Statement - Assists N402 with primary cognizance
of SSN-594 and new construction SSN's (through end of
shipbuilder's guarantee period). Develops and implements
for improved maintenance management and logistic support
for SSN-594 class. Coordinates development and implemen-
tation of improved production management systems for
Force intermediate level maintenance activities for SSN-
594 class. Maintains liaison with NAVSHIPS ship Acquisi-
tion Project Manager. Implements a diesel engine
inspection program for all submarines.
N403 MATERIAL OFFICER FOR NON-NUCLEAR SUBMARINES
Functional Statement - Responsible for material, upkeep, re-
pair alteration, and allowance for SS's. Maintains
records and status information on diesel material and
maintenance matters. Prepares action on shipyard work
lists. Maintains cost data and makes budget recommenda-







N404 MATERIAL OFFICER FOR ELECTRONICS, ACOUSTICS, OPTICS,
AND NAVIGATION
Functional Statement - Responsible for electronics, acoustics,
optics, navigation, noise measurement and reduction mat-
ters. Preparation of action on shipyard work lists in
above areas.
N404A ASSISTANT MATERIAL OFFICER FOR ELECTRONICS (NAV)
Functional Statement - Responsible for Electronic matters,
specifically radar and RDF equipments, navigation systems,
and sonar and noise measurement matters. Maintain elec-
tronics/navigation systems installation records. Moni-
tors new developments in Submarine Force electronics/
navigation systems.
N404B ASSISTANT MATERIAL OFFICER FOR ELECTRONICS
Functional Statement - Responsible for electronics matters;
specifically communications, ECM, associated antennas,
metrology; and optics matters including allowed photo-
graphic equipment and periscopes. Maintain installation
records. Monitor new developments in Submarine Force
electronics/optics systems.
N405 MATERIAL OFFICER FOR FLEET BALLISTIC MISSILE SUBMARINES
Functional Statement - Responsible for the material, upkeep,
repair, and alteration program for SSBN's. Liaison with
NAVMATCOM and shipyards concerning SSBN material, main-
tenance, construction, and overhaul program. Develop-
ments in FBM special systems, nuclear propulsion, and
auxiliary machinery. Maintains cost and budgeting data
in above areas.
N405A ASSISTANT MATERIAL OFFICER FOR SSBN's (OVERHAULS)
Functional Statement - Assist N405 in matters of SSBN over-
haul, material upkeep, repair, and alterations program.
Liaison with NAVMATCOM and shipyards in above areas.
N405B ASSISTANT MATERIAL OFFICER FOR SSBN's (MAINTENANCE)
Functional Statement - Assist N405 in matters of SSBN main-
tenance, material upkeep, repair, and alterations pro-





N-40 SHOP (cont, )
N406 MATERIAL OFFICER FOR SUBMARINE TENDERS, RESCUE VESSELS,
AND SERVICE CRAFT
Functional Statement - Responsible for material upkeep, re-
pair, and alteration programs for tenders, rescue vessels,
and service craft. Action on shipyard work lists and
liaison with NAVMATCOM and shipyards in above areas.
Maintain cost data and make budget recommendations. Main-
tain section responsibility for rescue, salvage and
UDT/SEAL.
N407 THE NAVY MAINTENANCE AND MATERIAL MANAGEMENT (3M)
OFFICER
Functional Statement - Responsible for all aspects of the 3M
system, including implementation, review, analysis, and
training.
N407A ASSISTANT TO THE 3M OFFICER
Functional Statement - Coordination with N7 to ensure proper
collection and submission of data by ships. Analyze
processed data and arrange in useable form. Adapt 3M
procedure to ADP.
N408 MATERIAL OFFICER FOR NUCLEAR PROPULSION
Functional Statement - Coordinate, recommend, and advise on
the technical aspects of primary nuclear propulsion sys-
tems. Radiological controls/safety. Liaison on nuclear
matters with NAVSHIPS, NAVMAT, and shipyards. Maintain
records of nuclear core useage. Advises action on ship-
yard work list pertaining to nuclear matters.
N-41 SHOP (SUPPLY)
N41 ASSISTANT CHIEF OF STAFF FOR SUPPLY
Functional Statement - Responsible for the administration of
the plans and policies of the Commander in the area of
supply, transportation, and financial management. Addi-
tional assigned functions include supply inspections,
and audits of Force units. Scheduling of SOAP program.
Responsible for material procurement, expenditure, and
shipment, receipt, custody, and stowage, stock records,
inventory control, subsistence, operation of general
messes, transportation, resale, and air and surface cargo





N411 SUPPLY AND TRANSPORTATION OFFICER
Functional Statement - Acts in areas of supply and transpor-
tation in the absence of N41. Administration of N41
division correspondence. Administration of officer and
enlisted personnel in the Supply Division. Preparation
and review of logistic plans and annexes. Review of all
matters pertaining to policy or procedure in supply and
transportation.
N411A MOB SUB SUPPLY SUPPORT
Functional Statement - Assists N411 in all matters pertaining
to tenders, including management, inventories, load lists,
and supply overhauls. Prepare briefings and presenta-
tions. Responsible for FBM site support, including air
and surface resupply and allowance. Monitor supply over-
hauls of AS, AG, AK, and service craft.
N411A1 POLARIS/POSEIDON TRANSPORTATION OFFICER
Functional Statement - Responsible for all matters pertain-
ing to FBM site support and FBM crew lifts. Assume the
duties of N411A in his absence. Responsible for ail mat-
ters pertaining to subsistence of shipyard messes.
N411B SUBMARINE PROGRAMS
Functional Statement - Development of supply management and
control procedures. Responsible for Force supply readi-
ness. Review of annual supply inspection reports. Prep-
aration of briefings and presentations. Monitor and
review supply training programs, curricula, and schedules.
N411B1 SSN SUPPLY AND PMO LIAISON OFFICER
Functional Statement - Responsible for all supply matters
pertaining to SSBN's. Participation in inspections.
Monitoring the supply overhauls and allowance lists of
SSBN's.
N411B2 SS/SSN/ASR SUPPLY OFFICER
Functional Statement - Responsible for all supply matters
pertaining to SS/SSN/ASR. Participate in inspections.




N-41 SHOP (cont. )
N412 FORCE COMPTROLLER
Functional Statement - Takes action in financial matters in
the absence of N41. Prepares and reviews Force operating
budgets of logistic plans and annexes for financial mat-
ters. Responsible for internal audits, financial policies,
assembling management statistics, accounting functions,
analyzing trends, and monitoring disbursing functions.
N412B ASSISTANT COMPTROLLER FOR FISCAL OPERATIONS (ASHORE)
Functional Statement - Provide guidance in the development of
ashore operating budgets. Analyze fiscal reports and
statistics. Staff Supply Officer. Develops, reviews,
and administers land/space leasing arrangements and com-
mercial industrial reviews.
N412B1 HEAD-BUDGET/ ACCOUNTING (ASHORE)
Functional Statement - Assists in development of ashore seg-
ment of operating budget. Maintains records of current
status and reviews execution of ashore segments of oper-
ating budget. Develops and recommends standard cost
parameters for execution of ashore operating budget.
Develops, administers, and reviews Headquarters Opera-
tions Budget. Coordinates, develops, and reviews TAD/
TRAINING funds budget.
N412C ASSISTANT COMPTROLLER FOR FINANCIAL MANAGEMENT
Functional Statement - Reviews, compiles, and analyzes finan-
cial statistics and fiscal procedures. Compiling and
reporting fuel inventories and expenditures. Responsi-
ble for audit/inspections reports and analytical review
of access program. Coordinator of thrift program.
N412C1 HEAD-SPECIAL PROGRAM SELECTION
Functional Statement - Assist N412C in the execution and mon-
itoring of assigned special projects. Coordination of
tender computor programs and supply-financial problems
which relate to ADP procedures.
IV-14

N-6 SHOP (POLARIS/POSEIDON WEAPONS SYSTEM)
N6 DEPUTY CHIEF OF STAFF FOR POLARIS /POSEIDON WEAPONS SYSTEM
Functional Statement - Determines, improves, and reports com-
bat readiness, operational reliability, safety, security,
and system accuracy of the FBM weapons system and tacti-
cal weapons system. Assesses SSBN performance by analy-
sis of operational information to determine capability
to perform assigned missions and tasks. Assists Command-
er as Polaris advisor to Unified Commander.
N06 TECHNICAL ASSISTANCE (APL)
Functional Statement - Utilizes analytical methods in assess-
ment of the effectiveness of SSBN's on patrol and in
pre-deployment phases. Maintains and reviews current
information concerning the readiness and accuracy stand-
ards of SSBN's.
N-61 SHOP (STRATEGIC WEAPONS SYSTEMS)
N61 FORCE STRATEGIC WEAPONS SYSTEMS OFFICER
Functional Statement - Directs N61 division in support of N6
.
Advises N6 on readiness, operational reliability, safety,
security, and system accuracy of the FBM weapons system.
Maintains development and employment plans for FBM weap-
ons system. Reviews procedural documentation affecting
tactical employment of the FBM weapons system.
N611 ASSISTANT FOR FBM NAVIGATION SUB-SYSTEM READINESS
Functional Statement - Responsible for all technical and op-
erational aspects of the FBM weapons system navigation
sub-system. Improve navigational readiness.
N612 ASSISTANT FOR FBM MISSILE READINESS
Functional Statement - Responsible for all technical, opera-
tional, readiness, and material aspects of the FBM weap-
ons sub-system, fire control, guidance, and launcher
sub-systems. Maintains information concerning the em-
ployment of deployed SSBN's.
IV-15

N-62 SHOP (TACTICAL WEAPONS SYSTEMS AND WEAPONS LOGISTICS)
N62 FORCE TACTICAL WEAPONS SYSTEMS AND WEAPONS LOGISTICS
OFFICER
Functional Statement - Responsible for maintaining the high-
est degree of logistic and material readiness with re-
spect to tactical weapons systems and associated ordnance.
Advise on all matters concerning weapons system policies,
procedures, training, and doctrine.
N621 ASSISTANT WEAPONS OFFICER FOR WEAPONS LOGISTICS
Functional Statement - Maintain accountability system and
effect distribution of ASTOR, Polaris, Poseidon, and
SUBROC warheads. Maintain inventory of torpedoes, mis-
siles, pyrotechnics, and associated equipment. Advise
on weapons design deficiencies.
N622 ASSISTANT WEAPONS OFFICER FOR MK-48 PROJECT AND UNDER-
WATER FIRE CONTROL SYSTEMS
Functional Statement - Advises in all aspects of MK-48 proj-
ect with respect to its introduction into SUBLANT . Ad-
vises on and monitors WSAT, COT, and FORACS Weapons
System Check. Advises on adequacy of maintenance, re-
pair, operating procedures, and logistic support. Ad-
vises on design deficiencies and recommends improvements.
N623 ASSISTANT WEAPONS OFFICER FOR TACTICAL WEAPONS AND
WEAPONS MATERIAL
Functional Statement - Assists Weapons Officer with primary
cognizance of tactical weapons, preparation procedures,
quality assurance, weapons loading/handling equipment and
procedures, weapons system material, surface armament,
pyrotechnics signals and evasion devices. Advises on
adequacy of design, maintenance, repair, operating pro-
cedures, and logistic support. Supervises administra-
tion of N62 office and assigned enlisted personnel.
IV-16

N-63 SHOP (NUCLEAR WEAPONS SAFETY)
N63 FORCE NUCLEAR WEAPONS SAFETY OFFICER
Functional Statement - Responsible for nuclear weapons safety,
security, inspections, and procedural documentation.
Implementation and maintenance of COMSUBLANTINST 58110.1,
CINCLANT OPORD 2000, ANNEX "W" , and SWOP libaray. Sched-
ule and coordinate nuclear weapons inspections. Chairman
of Force Nuclear Weapons Safety Council.
N631 ASSISTANT FORCE NUCLEAR WEAPONS SAFETY OFFICER
Functional Statement - Assists N63 in all duties when assigned.
Advises on all matters concerning the FBM weapons system.
N-64 SHOP (SSBN SECURITY)
N64 SSBN SECURITY PROGRAM OFFICER
Functional Statement - Responsible for the direction, plan-
ning, coordination, and supervision of the program, in-
cluding determining and scheduling required exercises,
designing new tactics, determining those areas requiring
simulation model effort, and coordinating with other
commands and the New Development Officer.
N64A ASSISTANT SSBN SECURITY PROGRAM OFFICER
Functional Statement - Assists the Director in carrying out
his functions and duties. Responsible for the design
and implementation of at-sea exercises including partici-
pation as umpire, assisting in analysis of exercises and
the preparation of summary reports.
N641 HEAD, TACTICAL TEAM
Functional Statement - Responsible for the development and
exercise of analytical and simulation models including
the analysis and evaluation of exercises and the super-
vision of the Tactical Analysis Group.
N642 HEAD, RECONSTRUCTION TEAM
Functional Statement - Responsible for the collection of at-
sea data and the reconstruction of these exercises to
meet the needs of the Analysis Group. Assists in the
scheduling, planning for, and evaluation of new equip-
ments pertinent to the program.
IV-17

N-7 SHOP (AUTOMATIC DATA PROCESSING)
N7 ASSISTANT CHIEF OF STAFF FOR AUTOMATIC DATA PROCESSING
SYSTEMS
Functional Statement - Provides ADP support to Commander and
staff. Coordinator for all ADP matters. Maintains liai-
son with higher authority concerning ADP management.
Monitors command ADP usage and development, tactical data
systems and intelligence systems.
N71 ASSISTANT FOR ADP OPERATIONS
Functional Statement - Coordinates scheduling ADP production.
Directs software and hardware testing; analyzes ADP
products; liaison officer with systems commands and sub-
ordinate commands.
N72 ASSISTANT FOR PROGRAM DEVELOPMENT
Functional Statement - Systems analyst of integrated mechan-
ized EAM/EDPM data systems. Programs new applications
and reviews EAM/EDPM operation programs. Supervises
programming sub-section. Develops flow charts. Converts
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TYPICAL DUTIES OF, AND RESPONSIBILITIES NORMALLY ASSIGNED
TO NAVY CHIEF PETTY OFFICERS
A Chief Petty Officer (CPO) is a senior Navy enlisted man
with, normally, more than ten years service. In most cases,
his formal education stopped at the high school level. How-
ever, it is not too uncommon to find CPO's pursuing college
degrees during their off-duty hours.
All Navy enlisted personnel are divided into ratings
which are a function of some specialty ranging from cooking
to maintenance of sophisticated electronic equipment. The
complexity of today's Navy, particularly with regard to equip-
ment, dictates that most Navy enlisted ratings by formed to
provide specialists to operate and/or maintain a specific
category of equipment. The range of equipment categories in-
cludes, but is not limited to: propulsion equipment, radar,
sonar, several kinds of fire control systems, computer sys-
tems, aircraft maintenance, aircraft handling and launching
systems, and a whole host of weapons systems.
Other Navy enlisted ratings are tied to the provision of
a number of services such as food handling and preparation,
supply functions, ship's service functions (e.g. laundry and
dry cleaning, hair cutting, operation of ship's store facil-
ities, etc.), communications (visual and electronic), ship's
operation (Quartermasters and Boatswain's Mates), payroll
disbursement and accounting, and a great deal more.
V-l

The CPO can be likened to a master tradesman in his area
of expertise. He has essentially reached the pinnacle of his
career, unless he decides to pursue one of a number of pro-
grams leading to a commission. Although there are enlisted
men who do seek a commission, the majority do not. And, to
make the careers of the majority more appealing by prevent-
ing stagnation, a program which provided two more CPO pro-
motion levels (Senior CPO and Master CPO) was initiated in
the late 1950' s.
As a result of the Navy enlisted rating structure being
linked to the performance of a specialized form of work, the
Navy enlisted man becomes a specialist or a technician. Some
Navy enlisted men are exposed to formalized leadership train-
ing, but the majority are indoctrinated in the world of peo-
ple management by the "school of hard knocks." Some fair
well, and others don't. The situation is somewhat aggravated
by the fact that recommendations for advancement are custom-
arily connected to the enlisted man's ability to perform his
technical specialty. In fact, in many cases, if an enlisted
man has sufficient time in grade and has satisfied the ad-
ministrative requirements for advancement (usually in the
form of correspondence courses), the man's recommendation is
too often approved in a very impersonal "rubber stamp"
Once advanced to CPO, there was a tendancy for some en-
listed men to turn off the drive they used to achieve promo-
tion. Some simply sat back and became wards of the government
until they became eligible to retire. This practice is fa-




fashion, giving little or no regard to the man's ability to
deal with people or his ability to handle the additional re-
sponsibilities which will come with the promotion. It should
be understood that this is through no fault of the Navy en-
listed man. Rather, it is a practice which has grown into
use by the Navy officer corps in the face of a myriad of,
seemingly, more pressing work.
Causes aside, the result is that several Navy enlisted
men advance to the CPO level with little ability to manage
anything, short of their technical specialty. Their exposure
to personnel management is usually limited to dealing with
their subordinates. On some larger ships or shore stations,
there may be many CPO's in the same division, thereby expos-
ing them to personnel management at the peer level. However,
CPO's, in general, are somewhat reluctant to deal with offi-
cers outside of their immediate division or department. This
is not to say that CPO's live in shells — that simply isn't
true. What is suggested is simply that a CPO rarely develops
a one-on-one relationship with an officer other than his im-
mediate superior.
This two part situation, the promotion to the CPO level
based on technical competence alone and the reluctance of
CPO's to comfortably deal with the officer community as a
whole, was alleviated somewhat by the additional CPO promo-
tional levels mentioned earlier. Promotion to the Senior and
Master CPO levels is dealt with much like the officer selec-
tion process from within the enlisted ranks. Each applicant
V-3

for promotion is screened by an interview board that is made
up of officers divorced from his command as well as his tech-
nical specialty. The intent is to examine the applicant's
ability to effectively present himself to and communicate
with "strange" impartial officers. Additionally, it reduces
the likelihood of "rubber stamp" recommendations for promo-
tion. Professional aspects of the promotion candidate are
dealt with in the usual way: by examination. However, the
applicant must have successfully completed the examination
before he may face the interview board. As a result, better
quality CPO's are being introduced into the Senior/Master
CPO structure. In fact, in some commands, junior officer
positions are being filled by Senior and Master CPO's. They
arc also being assigned to staffs as assistants to staff of-
ficers filling functional roles. Seldom, however, are they
ever tasked to fill a functional role by themselves. This is
principally due to the fact that personnel filling those roles
must often speak to both officers and senior civilians out-
side of their command, in the voice of the staff commander.
This is an awkward position, at best, for an enlisted man.
However, it probably goes without saying that there are many
Senior and Master CPO's that can be entrusted with such jobs.
Unfortunately, the performance capabilities of these people
will go unrecognized until each of them surfaces, one by one,
and the Navy turns around the stereotype of the typical Navy
Chief, coffee cup in hand, enjoining the details of a specif-




SUBMARINE ONBOARD TORPEDO LOADING AND HANDLING EQUIPMENT
This Appendix attempts to provide insight regarding the
configuration and scope of equipments involved in submarine
torpedo loading and handling evolutions. The coverage is
not exhaustive by any stretch of the imagination. Neverthe-
less, it should render an appreciation for the potential
difficulties involved in designing and installing a "soften-
ing SHIPALT." Such a SHIPALT must protect the torpedo skin
and assure expeditious loading while simultaneously providing
for correct torpedo alignment. While reviewing this Appendix,
recognize the fact that all fixtures and components coming
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The material presented in this thesis is based upon re-
corded interviews with the personnel involved; a multitude
of letters, memos, and papers extracted from the archives of
the organizations involved; and the personal knowledge and
opinions of the authors.
The tape recorded interviews are in the possession of the
thesis Co-advisors. The authors recognize that there is a
great deal of fertile ground yet to be plowed in the MK-48
program. And, the authors desire to make these recorded in-
terviews available to interested researchers with the provi-
sion that all interviewees remain anonymous.
Those letters, memos, and papers that the authors were
permitted to retain are in the process of being entered into
the formal library system at the Naval Postgraduate School.
Finally, the authors have gained a great deal of personal
knowledge regarding the MK-48 Program that is not necessarily
expressed in this thesis. The authors are willing to share
this knowledge and the aforementioned reference material with
those interested, under the covenant that any resultant work






It is anticipated that the case studies presented in
this thesis will achieve several miles of teaching benefit
in the years to come. Their use is not limited to any single
academic subject. Accordingly, the authors have conducted
"free-wheeling" discussions with the thesis Co-advisors re-
garding key points in each case. Topics included in these
discussions are attitudes and personalities of the players,
extenuating or aggravating circumstances, actual outcomes,
and identification of subtle clues.
Additionally, the authors have responded to questions
presented by the thesis Co-advisors regarding teaching tech-
niques and value. These conversations, questions and re-
sponses have been recorded on tape and are in the possession
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